1. Stern and I spent nearly two hours with President Sadat at his office today. We thought we would be paying brief courtesy call, but it developed that Sadat had carefully prepared in advance a detailed and very specific presentation on Suez Canal Initiative.

2. Sadat said he looked forward to Secretary’s visit. He wanted to discuss practical matters with the Secretary. He said he had the power to commit Egypt to an interim arrangement on the canal and to a comprehensive and lasting settlement. He was not optimistic that either would eventuate, given Israel’s intransigent attitude. At this point Sadat sent for relief map of canal and Sinai.

3. Sadat opened his presentation by emphasizing the need for some movement on the ground. This would create the necessary atmosphere to facilitate progress towards a comprehensive settlement.

4. Sadat then pointed on map to three passes which dominated the Suez Canal: Jidda, Mitla, and Sidi al-Ma’atir. He noted that Mitla was 27 kilometers from canal and other two passes about 60 kilometers away.

5. Sadat said his idea was that if we could convince Israel to complete the first phase, to agree in principle, then work on the canal would start and he would proclaim a six months’ ceasefire. He would restore diplomatic relations with the US. Then all parties could take a fresh breath and work calmly with jarring to reach a comprehensive settlement. If efforts with jarring did not succeed, Egyptian forces must be free to act.

6. Sadat said he must insist that UAR forces cross the canal but he was willing to accept a no-man’s-land between Israeli and UAR forces to be filled by UN or four power forces. He wanted Secretary Rogers to know what he (Sadat) could agree to and what he could not.

7. Sadat said he read in the papers that Israelis were thinking in terms of a withdrawal of ten to seventeen kilometers. This would mean nothing if Israel really intended to make peace. This was a

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TEST OF ISRAELI INTENTIONS. IF THE ISRAELIS WITHDREW ONLY TWENTY KILOMETERS THEY WOULD REMAIN IN A POSITION TO THREATEN EGYPTIAN CITIES AND INTERRUPT NAVIGATION IN THE CANAL WITHIN AN HOUR. WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SAFETY OF NAVIGATION IN THE CANAL? ASKED SADAT RHETORICALLY. I AM, HE SAID. HE WOULD NOT ACCEPT ISRAEL AS A PARTNER. THAT WAS "DISGUSTING LOGIC."

8. SADAT SAID HE HAD HEARD USG WAS SUGGESTING WITHDRAWAL OF FORTY KILOMETERS. THIS WOULD NOT WORK. WHOEVER HELD THE THREE PASSES COULD REACH THE CANAL IN TWO HOURS.

9. SADAT RECALLED HIS PUBLIC SUGGESTION THAT ISRAELIS WITHDREW TO A LINE BEHIND EL ARISH. THIS POSITION WAS NEGOTIABLE. HE ASKED THAT WE TELL PRESIDENT NIXON AND SECRETARY THAT. IN A REAL TEST FOR PEACE HE WAS WILLING TO DROP EL ARISH, BUT HE MUST HAVE THE THREE PASSES. THE ENTRY WAYS TO THE SUEZ CANAL MUST BE UNDER HIS CONTROL.

10. SADAT THEN DREW A LINE ON HIS MAP RUNNING FROM BIR AL ABD ON THE MEDITERRANEAN STRAIGHT DOWN TO THE SOUTHERN MOST TIP OF THE SINAI PENINSULA. HE NOTED THAT THIS LEFT SHARM AL-SHEIKH IN ISRAELI HANDS PENDING THE WORKING OUT OF INTERNATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS. SADAT SAID EGYPTIAN FORCES WOULD BE PRESENT UP TO THIS LINE. THEN THERE WOULD BE A THIRTY TO FIFTY KILOMETER NO-MAN'S-LAND BETWEEN EGYPTIAN AND ISRAEL FORCES. SADAT NOTED THIS WOULD LEAVE ISRAELI FORCES IN EL ARISH.

11. LESS THAN THIS, SAID SADAT, I CANNOT AGREE TO. HE HAD FULLY CONSULTED HIS MILITARY BEFORE MAKING THESE PROPOSALS. UAR FORCES MUST CROSS THE CANAL.

12. SADAT SAID HE WAS SURE ISRAELIS WOULD NOT AGREE TO THIS. BUT HE WAS NOT IN A POSITION TO BARGAIN OR COMPROMISE. HE HAD MENTIONED EL ARISH FOR THE SAKE OF COMPROMISE. BUT THIS POSITION WAS NOT FOR COMPROMISE. DID WE THINK, HE ASKED, THAT IF UAR AND ISRAEL FORCES WERE RE-DEPLOYED ALONG THESE LINES THERE WOULD NEVER BE ANOTHER RESUMPTION OF FIRE? HIS PROPOSAL WOULD END THE WAR AND CREATE NEW ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH HE EXPECTED ALL PARTIES TO WORK FOR PEACE. HE DOUBTED ISRAEL WOULD WORK FOR PEACE.

13. STERNER SAID HE WAS SEARCHING HIS INSTINCTS TO SEE HOW ISRAELIS WERE LIKELY TO FEEL ABOUT THIS. ALTHOUGH WE ALL EXPECTED A PEACE SETTLEMENT, IT WAS CLEAR THAT ISRAELIS WOULD NOT RETURN TO A SITUATION SIMILAR TO THAT IN 1967. SUEZ CANAL INITIATIVE PROVIDED OPPORTUNITY TO TEST POSSIBLE INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS, PROBLEM WHICH HAD TO BE DEALT WITH WAS LACK OF ISRAELI CONFIDENCE IN UAR. STERNER FELT THAT UAR INSISTENCE THAT ITS FORCES CROSS CANAL WOULD

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POSE A PROBLEM. SADAT REJOINED THAT THAT WAS A PROBLEM FOR HIM, HIS ARMED FORCES, AND HIS COUNTRY. HE WAS PREPARED TO BE ELASTIC. BUT HE COULD NOT ACCEPT WHAT HE KNEW THE ARMY AND THE COUNTRY WOULD NOT ACCEPT.

14. STERNER THEN INQUIRED AS TO WHAT KIND OF MILITARY FORCES MIGHT CROSS THE CANAL. WAS IT CONCEIVABLE THAT EGYPT’S REQUIREMENTS WOULD BE FULFILLED IF THESE WERE LOCAL SECURITY FORCES WHO WOULD CARRY WITH THEM THE EGYPTIAN FLAG AND ALL THE ATTRIBUTES OF SOVEREIGNTY? SADAT ASKED IF USG COULD GUARANTEE THAT ISRAELI REGULAR FORCES WOULD NOT ATTACK SUCH EGYPTIAN FORCES. STERNER SAID NO. SADAT SAID LOOK BT
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At both sides, ask the Israelis what they want guaranteed? Would they accept mutual guarantees? Comment: Both Sterner and I came away with impression that Sadat fairly loose as to type of Egyptian forces which would cross canal.

15. Sterner then said we could not expect Israelis to accept such a decisive loss in their military position. Israelis think they have taken some significant steps. They have, under certain conditions, agreed to consider partial withdrawal. This would greatly lengthen their defensive line. UAR had to understand these Israeli consider-
ations. Sadat said he was offering them a peace agreement for the first time in 22 years. He was ready to recognize the Israelis in their borders. This was a test for peace. Israelis wanted expansion. He said he had been informed that Golda Meir had recently told visitor that Israel had just as much right to change its borders as USSR had after World War II. This showed Israeli's true intentions. Never forget this is my land, said Sadat. Mark this! he added.

16. Sterner said he saw contradiction in Sadat's statements that this would be really end of war and at the same time insisting that UAR armed forces would be free to act in six months. Sadat said there was no such contradiction. If his initiative accepted, phantom of war would vanish, to a certain extent. This was probably not true for Israel. Israelis still hoped to achieve Egyptian sub-
mission. Sadat said acceptance of his initiative would put his people in the mood for no war. But if Israel persisted in trying to extort concessions in form of Egyptian land and dignity, Egypt would face the consequences.

17. Bergus pointed to difficulties created by six-month time limit on ceasefire. Technicians seemed agreed that it would take six months to clear canal and prepare it for navigation. UAR would then have job of building up confidence of international maritime community that canal was a safe place to transit their ships. Sadat intimated that in certain circumstances he might grant an additional three months ceasefire. But he said that it was precisely to build

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UN NECESSARY MARITIME CONFIDENCE THAT HE NEED CONSIDER.
SINAI PASSES AND A NO-MAN’S-LAND. HE COULD NEVER ACCEPT AN
"ETERNAL" CEASEFIRE.

18. STERNER THEN SAID WE WOULD BE INTERESTED TO SEE WHAT ISRAELIS
WERE PRESENTLY IN THE PROCESS OF COMING UP WITH. SADAT COMMENTED
THAT ISRAELI BEHAVIOR WAS DETRIMENTALLY AFFECTING US PRESTIGE IN
ARAB WORLD. ISRAELIS KEPT SAYING "WE ARE NOT IN A HURRY" TO
RESPOND TO USG. THIS TO A COUNTRY WHICH HAD GIVEN ISRAEL EVERYTHING
FROM A LOAF OF BREAD TO PHANTOMS. LOSS OF US PRESTIGE CREATED
PROBLEMS FOR SADAT. IN SEVEN-HOUR DSO MEETING YESTERDAY, HE HAD
TO TAKE TOUGH LINE WITH HIS ASU INTERLOCUTORS, FINALLY TELLING THEM
THAT QUESTION OF EGYPTIAN CONFIDENCE IN US WAS HIS BUSINESS NOT
THEIRS.

19. STERNER EXPRESSED VIEW THAT SECRETARY ROGERS AND USG WOULD
WELCOME SADAT’S GETTING DOWN TO BRASS TACKS IN SUCH SPECIFIC TERMS.
GIVEN LENGTHY PAST DISCUSSIONS SINCE 1967, IT WAS ALMOST INCREDIBLE
THING THAT WE HAVE MOVED INTO SUCH SPECIFICS IN PAST COUPLE OF
MONTHS. STERNER STRESSED THAT FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES IN GOVERNMENTAL
ATTITUDES WERE TAKING PLACE AND THAT MORE WOULD BE REQUIRED. THIS
WOULD TAKE TIME.

20. SADAT SAID THIS WAS WHY HE KEPT CONTACT WITH USG. HE STILL
HAD CONFIDENCE IN US. HE FELT VISIT OF SECRETARY ROGERS WAS GOOD AND
PROMISING STEP. HE WANTED TO DISCUSS THESE CONCRETE THINGS WITH THE
SECRETARY. IF HE AND SECRETARY CONFINED THEIR DISCUSSIONS TO GENER-
ALITIES, BOTH WOULD BE WASTING THEIR TIME. HE WANTED TO PUT ALL HIS
CARDS ON THE TABLE. IF USG WAS PREPARED FOR PRACTICAL DISCUSSIONS,
SADAT WAS WILLING TO CARRY THEM ON AT ANY LEVEL. SECRETARY ROGERS
MIGHT WISH BRING MILITARY ADVISER WITH HIM TO CAIRO TO DISCUSS
MILITARY ASPECTS WITH UAR MILITARY.

21. SADAT CONCLUDED HIS REMARKS ABOUT SUEZ CANAL INITIATIVE BY
SAYING THAT IF ISRAELIS WOULD NOT AGREE TO EVACUATE THREE VITAL
PASSES IN SINAI, USG SHOULD SPARE ITS EFFORTS AND NOT PURSUE THIS
MATTER ANY FURTHER. USG SHOULD THEN CONSIDER TRYING SOMETHING ELSE.
STERNER SAID WE DID NOT YET KNOW WHAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD COME UP
WITH. THE ISRAELIS, TOO, WOULD HAVE PROBLEMS WITH THEIR MILITARY.
SADAT MENTIONED THAT HIS OWN MILITARY HAD WANTED UAR FORCES TO
TAKE POSITIONS BEHIND LINE STARTING AT EL MAZAR ON MEDITERRANEAN.
HE HAD TALKED THEM INTO ACCEPTING BIR AL ABD.

BERGUS

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