SECRET

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

TELEGRAM

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4503
BT
SECRET SECTION 1 OF 3 Caire 3737

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM AMBASSADOR

NODIS/ChEROKEE

E.O. 11652 XGDS
TAGS: PFCR XF EG US
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH SAADAT

1. SUMMARY: DELIVERED PRESIDENT'S DEC 1 AND
YOUR NOV 21 LETTERS TO SAADAT TODAY. HE CALLED
HIS CONFIDENCE IN YOU HAD CAUSED HIM ACCEPT
6-POINT AGREEMENT. ANNOUNCE AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE
TO RESUME DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND ELEVATE INTERESTS
SECTIONS TO AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL. THIS HAD EVOKED
CRITICISM IN ARAB WORLD AND FROM SOVIETS. HE HAD
IGNORED SUCH CRITICISM, BUT NOW HAD TO ASK IF
HE HAD CHOSSED PROPER COURSE. SIX-POINT AGREEMENT
IMPLEMENTED ONLY TO ISRAEL'S BENEFIT. SOME FIRST
PHASE DIENGAGEMENT NECESSARY IF PEACE CONFERENCE
IS TO MOVE FORWARD. FAILING THIS, WHILE GOE WILL
ATTEND CONFERENCE, FAYMY WILL HAVE MAKE OPENING PUBLIC
STATEMENT NEGOTIATIONS NOT POSSIBLE UNTIL CEASEFIRE
FULLY HONORED AND WALK OUT. ONLY ISRAEL STANDS IN
WAY OF DESIRED BETTER US-GOE RELATIONS. WITHOUT
MASSIVE USG HELP, ISRAEL WOULD NOT BE IN A PRESENT
POSITION. GOE HAS SHATTERED ISRAEL'S MYTH OF UNCON-
QUERABILITY AND ITS LONG-HELD STRATEGIC DOCTRINES.
GOE READY DO IT AGAIN, IF NECESSARY, BUT HE PREFERENCES
PEACEFUL ROUTE. UNFORTUNATELY ISRAEL DOES NOT.
SITUATION VOLATILE AND USG HELP ON ACHIEVING FIRST
PHASE DIENGAGEMENT NEEDED TO ENABLE HIM TO STRENGTHEN
HIS POSITION IN CONTINUING PRESENT COURSE. CALLED
HE HAD ADVISED USG AND USSR THAT, IN ABSENCE PROGRESS
ON FIRST PHASE DIENGAGEMENT, HE WOULD CALL ON THEM
AS GUARANTORS SC RESOLUTION TO SEND FORCES. I AS
SURED HIM USG WANTS TO CONTINUE WORK WITH HIM IN

Sincerely

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FRAMEWORK YOUR EARLIER DISCUSSIONS WITH HIM.
APPEAL TO SC FOR JOINT US-USSR ACTION WOULD SET US
BACK. EMPHASIZED USG COUNTING ON SADAT'S STATESMAN-
SHIP TO PREVENT ANY DISRUPTION OF CONSTRUCTIVE NEGOT-
IATING PROCESS WE HAVE JOINTLY FORGED. END SUMMARY.

2. I HAD HOUR-LONG MEETING WITH SADAT TODAY. HAFEZ
ISMAIL WAS THE ONLY OTHER PERSON PRESENT (I HAD EXPECTED
FAHMY ALSO TO BE THERE, BUT IT TURNED OUT HE WAS WITH
VICE PRESIDENT HUSSEIN SHAPEI RECEIVING CREDENTIALS OF
NEW-ARRIVED AMBASSADORS.)

3. AFTER SOME GENEROUS WELCOMING COMMENTS, SADAT SAID
HE UNDERSTOOD I HAD LETTER FROM YOU TO DELIVER.
I EXPLAINED THAT THIS HAD INDEED PROMPTED BY
INITIAL REQUEST FOR A MEETING, BUT THAT EARLIER THIS
MORNING I HAD ALSO RECEIVED A LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT
TO HIM. I HAD NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO TELL FAHMY ABOUT THIS
LAST LETTER, SINCE I WAS STILL EXPECTING TO MEET WITH
HIM LATER TODAY TO DELIVER PARALLEL LETTER FROM YOU
TO THE MINISTER. HE SAID IT MADE NO DIFFERENCE
"OUR GOVERNMENT DOES NOT WORK IN DUPICLITY". I THEN
GAVE HIM THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER OF DECEMBER 1 AND
YOURS OF NOVEMBER 21. HE READ THEM CAREFULLY IN
THE ORDER THEY WERE WRITTEN AND SAID HE WOULD SEND A
REPLY TO THE PRESIDENT, THROUGH ME, PROBABLY SOME TIME
LATER TODAY OR TOMORROW. SPEAKING Earnestly BUT COR-
DIALLY, SADAT LAUNCHED INTO AN OBVIOUSLY PREPARED, BUT
SOMewhat RAMBLING 45-MINUTE LONG MONOLOGUE. TO GIVE THE
FLAVOR A DETAILED SUMMARY FOLLOWS:

4. HE HAD WANTED TO "TALK" TO BOTH THE USG AND THE
SOVIETS ABOUT THE PRESENT SITUATION SINCE BOTH POWERS
ARE THE "GUARANTORS" OF PERTINENT SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTIONS. IN THIS CONTEXT FAHMY HAD YESTERDAY BEEN
INSTRUCTED TO CONVEY TO ME AND TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR
HIS MESSAGE (PARA 10 CAIRO 3719) THAT MESSAGE HAD
BEEN PROMPTED BY CONCERN OVER RECENT DEVELOPMENTS.
THESE HAD A LONG BACKGROUND.

5. RECALLING YOUR RECENT VISIT, HE SAID HE
HAD KNOWN OTHER SECRETARIES OF STATE AND HAD DEALT WITH
THEM. HE HAD BEEN ESPECIALLY "TOUCHED" HOWEVER BY
THE DEEP UNDERSTANDING AND KNOWLEDGE WHICH YOU
HAD SHOWN OF EVEN THE SMALLEST DETAILS OF THE

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MIDDLE EAST PROBLEM. DURING THAT VISIT, AN UNDERSTANDING HAD BEEN REACHED BETWEEN OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS. THERE WAS NO BILATERAL CONFLICT BETWEEN THE USG AND EGYPT, AND HE DID NOT WANT ONE TO ARISE. USG IS LARGE POWER, EGYPT SMALL, EGYPT'S ONLY PURPOSE IS TO DEVELOP. IT DOES NOT WANT ENEMIES. ISRAEL, UNFORTUNATELY, STANDS BETWEEN US. A CONFLICT ARISES AS A RESULT OF WHAT USG CALLS A BALANCE OF POWER IN MIDDLE EAST AREA. THIS MEANS ISRAEL WILL BE MADE STRONGER THAN ALL ARAB STATES COMBINED. HE COULD NEVER ACCEPT THIS, AND PROFESSION TO HAVE SO INDICATED TO THE PRESIDENT AND OTHERS ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS. ALREADY ISRAEL TALKS ABOUT FORMING A RETALIATION FORCE. BEFORE OCTOBER 6 ISRAEL BOASTED OF ITS UNCONQUERABILITY. EVEN THE USG BELIEVE IT.
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TO EVERYONE'S SURPRISE, EGYPT HAD Fought 17 DAYS AND
COULD HAVE CONTINUED. ISRAEL HAD BEEN IN TROUBLE.
WITHOUT MASSIVE USG HELP, IT WOULD NOT BE IN ITS PRE-
SENT POSITIONS.

6. HE HAD TOLD YOU, SADAT RECALLED, THAT HE
IS CONVINCED THE ARAB-ISRAEL PROBLEM CANNOT BE SOLVED
MILITARILY. ISRAEL HAD BELIEVED OTHERWISE. HE HAD
WANTED TO PROVE TO ISRAEL THAT IT WAS WRONG. HE WAS
NOT NOW GOING TO COMMIT THE SAME ERROR THAT ISRAEL HAD
AND CONTEND A MILITARY SOLUTION IS FEASIBLE. UNFORTUNATE-
LY, ISRAELIS REMAIN ARROGANT, COUNTING UPON USG BACKING,
AND REFUSE TO BE ON SAME LEVEL AS EGYPT. THEY INSIST ON
MAINTAINING SUPERIORITY.

7. DURING HIS TALKS WITH YOU, SADAT
RELATED, HE HAD STRESSED IT WAS TIME TO CREATE A NEW
UNDERSTANDING WITH USG AND TO TRY TO FIND A SOLUTION TO
OUTSTANDING PROBLEMS. YOUR "CONSTRUCTIVE
VIEW" HAD PLEASED HIM, AND AS A RESULT HE HAD AGREED TO
THE SIX POINTS. HE HAD ALSO BEEN WILLING TO ANNOUNCE AGREEMENT
IN PRINCIPLE TO RESUME DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AND TO ELEVATING
OUR RESPECTIVE INTERESTS SECTIONS TO AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL.
ALL OF THIS HAD BEEN INTENDED TO CREATE A NEW ATMOS-
PHERE AND ERA IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS. HE HAD PUB-
LICLY STATED AFTER YOUR VISIT THAT THE USG
POSITION WAS POSITIVE AND CONSTRUCTIVE, THIS DESPITE
THE FACT THAT WITHOUT MASSIVE USG AID, ISRAEL WOULD NOT
NOW BE OCCUPYING EGYPTIAN AND OTHER ARAB TERRITORIES.
HE HAD BEEN CRITICIZED ALL OVER THE WORLD, AND ESPECIALLY
THE ARAB WORLD, FOR THIS. SYRIA AND ALGERIA HAD COM-
PLAINED HE HAD NOT CONSULTED THEM. USSR HAD CRITICIZED
HIM, "OPENLY AND SECRETLY," FOR "BYPASSING" THEM.

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BREZHNEV HAD SAID THIS TO A (UNNAMED) "RESPONSIBLE LEADER," WHO HAD PASSED IT ON TO SADAT. HE HAD REFUSED TO HEED THESE CRITICISMS, AND HIS ARAB COLLEAGUES AT THE SUMMIT HAD BACKED HIS POSITION. UNFORTUNATELY, USG WAS NOW AGAIN UNDERMINING HIS POSITION.

8. SIX-POINT AGREEMENT, SADAT CONTINUED, HAD BEEN WORKED OUT DURING YOUR VISIT AS A STEP TOWARD CREATING A NEW ATMOSPHERE IN THE INTEREST OF PEACE. DISTURBINGLY, ISRAEL HAD EXECUTED IT ONLY IN ITS OWN INTERESTS. ISRAELI CHECKPOINTS AT KM. 131 AND 109 WERE TO BE REPLACED BY UN POSTS. SUEZ, HE EMPHASIZED, HAD BEEN A "FREE CITY," WHICH ISRAEL HAD BEEN UNABLE TO TAKE. UNEF HAD ENTERED SUEZ AS A FREE CITY. EVEN ISRAEL HAD ACKNOWLEDGED THIS WHEN AGREEING TO UN CHECKPOINTS. AN ISRAELI OFFICER WAS TO BE ON THE SUEZ BANK OF THE CANAL TO INSPECT WHAT THIRD ARMY, NOT WHAT SUEZ RECEIVES. ISRAEL PERSISTS IN INSISTING ALL SUEZ-BOUND SUPPLIES MUST BE INSPECTED. THIS HAS CAUSED CONSIDERABLE CRITICISM IN EGYPT. EGYPT COULD, IF IT WISHES, REMOVE ISRAELI FORCES ON BOTH SIDES OF THE CANAL. ISRAEL DOES NOT REGARD PEACE AS BEING IN ITS INTERESTS. IN FACT IT DOES NOT WANT IT.

9. ADDITIONALLY, HE HAD AGREED TO EASE THE BLOCKADE OF THE BAB AL-MANDAB AS A FIRST STEP, BUT AFTER DISENGAGEMENT IMPOSED HE IS READY TO STOP ISRAELI PASSAGE COMPLETELY. ISRAELI HAD ALREADY VIOLATED UNDERSTANDING THAT PASSAGE OF SUCH VESSELS NOT BE PUBLICIZED. DURING TALKS WITH SECRETARY, PARA 2 OF 6-POINT AGREEMENT HAD BEEN DRAFTED IN TERMS OF "FRAMEWORK OF AN AGREEMENT ON THE DISENGAGEMENT...". IN THE LIGHT OF WHAT HAS HAPPENED, HE WAS FORCED NOW TO ASK HIMSELF, "WAS IT A TRAP?" HAD HE BEEN TOO READY TO ACCEPT THE SECRETARY'S WORD?

10. AT PRESENT IT APPEARS ISRAEL IS USING MILITARY TALKS SOLELY FOR ITS BENEFIT. IT IS CONSTANTLY CHANGING ITS POSITIONS ON DISENGAGEMENT FORMULAS WHICH ITS REPRESENTATIVE HAS PROPOSED. AS A RESULT, NOTHING HAS COME OUT OF TALKS TO IMPLEMENT PARA 2. AS FOR PARA 1 OF THE CEASEFIRE, HERE, TOO, VIOLATIONS ARE TAKING PLACE EVERY DAY. OTHER POINTS ARE BEING EQUALLY IGNORED. HE, THE PRESIDENT, HE REPEATED, IS BEING SEVERELY CRITICIZED FOR HAVING ACCEPTED THE USG IDEAS. ARABS AND
AFRICANS ARE DOING SO AND SOVIETS POINTEDLY NOTE THAT THEY HAD WARNED HIM THIS MIGHT HAPPEN. SOME FORM OF DISENGAGEMENT IS ESSENTIAL IF PEACE IS TO BE REACHED. USG IS NOW ASKING HIM TO ATTEND THE PEACE CONFERENCE. SUCH A PEACE CONFERENCE HAD INITIALLY BEEN HIS IDEA. BUT WHAT IS THE POINT OF ATTENDING A PEACE CONFERENCE, HE ASKED Rhetorically, IF THERE IS NO REAL CEASEFIRE. EGYPT WILL ATTEND, HE ADDED, BUT FAHMY WILL BE INSTRUCTED TO GIVE AN OPENING SPEECH INDICATING NO CEASEFIRE EXISTS. FAHMY WILL ADD THAT WHEN A CEASEFIRE IS REACHED AND GUARANTEED, EGYPT WILL BE READY TO PROCEED. THEN FAHMY WILL LEAVE, SHOWING EGYPTIAN DISSATISFACTION BEFORE THE WHOLE WORLD.

11. IN THE SPIRIT IN WHICH THE SIX POINTS WERE DRAFTED SADAT WONDERED WHAT YOU THOUGHT WERE THE PROSPECTS FOR NEAR TERM MOVEMENT. DESPITE RESUMPTION OF BILATERAL TALKS AT AMBASSADORIAL LEVEL AS A MEANS OF PROMOTING PEACE, NOTHING HAS HAPPENED. AS A RESULT, HE HAD YESTERDAY ASKED FAHMY TO ADVISE SOVIET AMBASSADOR AND ME THAT HE MIGHT HAVE TO ASK FOR FORCES (PARA 12, CAIRO 3719). HE HAD THUS FAR RECEIVED NO "CONSTRUCTIVE" RESULT TO HIS APPEAL. WHAT SHOULD HE DO? VIOLATE THE CEASEFIRE? ON THE WEST BANK, ISRAELIS ARE IN A TRAP AND HE WAS READY, IF NECESSARY, TO GIVE THEM A DRUBBING. THOUGH ISRAEL REFUSES TO ADMIT IT, IT HAS SUFFERED SOME 10,000 CASUALTIES FROM OCTOBER WAR. IF NECESSARY, HE IS READY AGAIN TO INFlict HEAVY LOSSES ON ISRAELI
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FORCES ON THE WEST BANK.

12. BUT FROM A BROADER POINT OF VIEW, WHAT THEN? ISRAEL HAS ALREADY LOST THE STRATEGIC BATTLE. ALL OF BEN GURION'S FIVE CHERISHED SECURITY POINTS HAVE BEEN UNDERMINED. ISRAEL'S CLAIM TO AREA SUPREMACY HAD BEEN DISPROVED. HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF CONTINUED USG BACKING, ISRAEL STILL HOPES TO CONVINCE THE WORLD AND THEMSELVES THAT THEY WILL WIN A NEW BATTLE. SUCH A CONFLICT WOULD NOT FURTHER US-EGYPTIAN BILATERAL, US-ARAB RELATIONS, OR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.

13. INSTEAD OF EASING, THE AREA SITUATION IS BECOMING MORE COMPLICATED EVERY DAY. HE HAD NO OBJECTION IF USG WISHED TO GIVE EVERY ISRAELI A TANK AND AN AIRPLANE, BUT USG SHOULD TELL ISRAEL TO USE SUCH WEAPONS TO DEFEND ITS OWN COUNTRY, NOT "MY OCCUPIED LANDS AND THOSE OF OTHER ARABS." ISRAEL REMAINS THE MAIN PROBLEM BETWEEN US. USG HAS ITS INTERESTS IN THE AREA WHICH ARABS RECOGNIZE. HE HAD DISCUSSED THIS WITH ARAB COLLEAGUES AND ALL ARE READY FOR BETTER RELATIONS WITH US PROVIDED THIS IS ON A RECIPROCAL BASIS. SUCH RELATIONS MUST ALSO BE ON EQUAL TERMS. EGYPTIAN AND ARAB LAND AND SOVEREIGNTY MUST BE RESPECTED. IS IT IN USG INTERESTS, HE QUERIED, TO GIVE EGYPTIANS LANDS TO ISRAEL? HE THOUGHT NOT.

14. FOR A THIRD TIME HE REITERATED CRITICISM LEVELLED AT HIM BY ARAB AND SOVIET AMBASSADORS FOR THE AGREEMENTS WHICH HAD BEEN WORKED OUT DURING YOUR VISIT. ISRAELI ARROGANCE WAS NOT MAKING IT ANY EASIER FOR HIM. HE HAD HOPED NEW ERA HAD BEEN IN WHICH USG WOULD BE "FAIR." HE DID NOT WANT TO CREATE OBSTACLES FOR A PEACE CONFERENCE OR REFUSE TO ATTEND. ON THE CONTRARY, HE WAS STILL READY TO GO. IT IS ISRAEL...
WHICH IS CREATEING OBSTACLES, HOWEVER. OF WHAT VALUE IS ANY PEACE CONFERENCE WITHOUT A CEASEFIRE? FOR THIS REASON HE HAD ASKED FOR IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATION OF PARA 2, AT LEAST FIRST PHASE OF DISENGAGEMENT. FINAL PHASES CAN BE DISCUSSED AT PEACE CONFERENCE.

15. SITUATION IS VOLATILE AND MAY AGAIN FLARE UP TODAY OR TOMORROW. IF IT DOES, THIS IS IN ISRAEL'S INTERESTS, NOT IN THOSE OF THE US OR GOE. DESPITE SERIOUS SYRIAN CRITICISM, SADAT REMAINED READY TO CONTINUE ALONG THE ROUTE HE HAD AGREED UPON. BUT USG MUST NOW HELP HIM. HE KEPT ASKING HIMSELF IS GOE PURSUING THE RIGHT PATH FOR A SETTLEMENT OR NOT? SO LONG AS ISRAEL GETS EVERYTHING WITH USG SUPPORT, HE WAS CONCERNED THAT HE MIGHT NOT BE ON PROPER COURSE. HE CONCLUDED BY SAYING HE HOPED THAT HE HAD ADEQUATELY EXPRESSED HIS DILEMMA.

16. I THANKED SADAT FOR HIS LUCID EXPOSITION AND ASSURED HIM I WOULD REPORT IT ACCURATELY. I THEN SAID I HAD A FEW OBSERVATIONS THAT I HOPED HE WOULD PERMIT ME TO MAKE. FIRST, I WANTED TO ASSURE HIM, CATEGORICALLY AND UNEQUIVOCALLY, THAT IT WAS NOT THE USG INTENTION TO LEAD HIM INTO ANY "TRAP." OUR TWO GOVERNMENTS SHARE THE SAME OBJECTIVE OF PEACE IN THE AREA AND, WHILE OUR RESPECTIVE VIEWS ON TACTICS MIGHT OCCASIONALLY DIVERGE, HE SHOULD HAVE NO DOUBT THAT WE WANT PEACE AS MUCH AS HE DOES. SECOND, I REMINDED HIM THAT YOU HAVE BEEN ASSIDUOUSLY WORKING WITH PUBLIC OPINION AND CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS TO ENLIST THEIR SUPPORT TO MOVE AHEAD TOWARD A CONSTRUCTIVE SETTLEMENT. I HOPED THAT HE RECOGNIZED THAT THE USG HAD TO BRING ALONG ITS DOMESTIC OPINION IF IT HOPED TO ACHIEVE ITS OBJECTIVES. YOU HAD ASSURED HIM THAT HE IS SERIOUS IN WANTING TO MOVE AHEAD. I WAS CONFIDENT THAT SADAT WOULD AGREE THAT HE MEANT THIS. (HE NODDED HIS HEAD.) SINCE ONLY USG HAS ANY INFLUENCE ON ISRAEL, I SUGGESTED THAT THE PRESIDENT'S AND YOUR VIEWS ON HOW TO PROCEED SHOULD BE GIVEN FULLEST CONSIDERATION. USG WAS NOT TRYING TO EVADE RESPONSIBILITY, BUT MERELY CONSIDERING WHAT FORUM ENABLED US TO MAXIMIZE OUR CONTRIBUTION.

17. I RECOGNIZED HIS PUBLIC AND ARAB OPINION PROBLEM, BUT HE WAS NOT ALONE IN HAVING ONE. I THOUGHT ALL OF US OUGHT TO TRY TO KEEP OUR HEADS ABOVE SUCH THINGS FOR
THE TIME BEING, AS THE PRESIDENT AND YOU
HAD POINTED OUT, CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN
SOLICITING HOMESIDE SUPPORT. WE REGRET MORE PROGRESS
ON IMPLEMENTING DISENGAGEMENT HAS NOT BEEN MADE IN
MILITARY TALKS, BUT THIS REALLY COMES AS NO GREAT SUR-
PRISE. THE SUBJECT IS SUFFICIENTLY COMPLEX THAT IT IS
PROBABLY BETTER HANDLED BY THE PEACE CONFERENCE. MEAN-
WHILE IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE MAINTAIN MOMENTUM, AND
EARLY EGYPTIAN APPROVAL TO ATTEND CONFERENCE WOULD BE
MOST HELPFUL.

18. I THOUGHT THERE WAS ALREADY SOME EVIDENCE OF
SERIOUS RE-THINKING ON THE PART OF PROMINENT ISRAELI
LEADERS AS TO THE DESIRABILITY OF A PEACE SETTLEMENT.
THIS, I SUGGESTED, WAS IN LARGE PART BECAUSE OF USG
EFFORTS. THERE MIGHT INDEED BE ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS IN
THE WEEKS AHEAD, BUT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT WE CONTINUE
OUR CANDID EXCHANGES AND WORK TOGETHER TOWARD A COMMON
OBJECTIVE. I HOPED NOTHING WOULD BE DONE WHICH MIGHT
DISRUPT PROGRESS ALREADY MADE. SPECIFICALLY, REQUESTING
US AND USSR FORCES WOULD SET US ALL BACK. USG WOULD
HAVE TO TAKE A STAND AGAINST ANY SUCH PROPOSAL. UN-
IMPEDED PASSAGE OF VESSELS TO AND FROM EILAT SHOULD ALSO
BE CONTINUED. USG COUNTING HEAVILY ON SADAT'S STATES-
MANSHIP TO HELP SEE US ALL THROUGH ADMITTEDLY DELICATE
PERIOD AHEAD.

19. SADAT ACCEPTED MY COMMENTS WITHOUT DEMURRAL. HE
THEN APOLOGIZED FOR HAVING USED OUR FIRST GET-ACQUAINTED
MEETING TO DISCUSS AT LENGTH SUCH BUSINESS MATTERS.
HE EXPLAINED HE HAD FELT, HOWEVER, IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT
HIS PERSONAL VIEWS BE CONVEYED TO USG AGAIN WITHOUT
DELAY. I ASSURED HIM I WOULD DO SO.

EILTS