are significant, amounting to $709 million as of June 30, 1977, and, because the balboa is by treaty permanently fixed at par with the dollar, claims in the two currencies are largely interchangeable.

Once local currency claims are included and the data on foreign currency revised the Comptroller reports that U.S. national banks had $1.7 billion in claims on Panamanian residents as of June 30; $1 billion of the total was in foreign currency claims, principally in dollars, with the remaining $700 million denominated in balboas. The 20 largest national banks held $1.5 billion, 89 percent, of these claims.

The revised data provided by the Comptroller make it clear that the U.S. banks most involved in Panama are nationally chartered banks not State-chartered banks as previously reported. The Federal Reserve Board reported that the 20 U.S. banks with the largest claims in Panama—which includes a few large State-chartered banks as well as the largest nationally chartered banks—had $2.162 billion in total claims as of June 30. Of the total, $1.432 billion was in foreign currency claims—principally dollars—and $730 million in local currency claims—balboas. By comparison the 20 largest U.S. national banks had $1.5 billion in claims on Panama, $802 million in foreign currency claims, and $709 million in local currency claims.

Mr. President, the revised submissions from the Comptroller's Office and the Federal Reserve Board contain few surprises. A few U.S. banks do most of the business done in Panama by U.S. banks. U.S. banks use Panama largely for short-term, interbank transactions and to book loans throughout Central America. When the maturities of the claims are considered no bank appears to have inordinate exposure in Panama. That conclusion must be tempered in the case of national banks, however, because the Comptroller does not collect data on the maturity structure of local currency claims, which are held principally by three or four large nationally chartered U.S. banks. It would behoove the Comptroller to collect data on the maturity structure of those claims.

PRESIDENT SADAT'S INITIATIVES

Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, the recent initiatives of President Sadat of Egypt have been both courageous and astonishing. At great personal and political risk he has sought to set the stage for serious and direct negotiations for a lasting peace between Israel and the Arab States. His efforts have been reciprocated by Israeli Prime Minister Begin who has indicated that he, too, is willing to strive boldly to settle peacefully the differences that have caused so much sorrow for Arab and Israeli alike.

The efforts of the Egyptian President merit the strong support of the people of America and their Government. I have no doubts that the American people and the vast majority of their representatives in Congress are ready to give such support. But, for some unexplicable reason, the administration has been lukewarm at best to President Sadat's efforts; indeed, one editorial has characterized the Carter administration's enthusiasm for President Sadat's diplomacy as able "to freeze the Nile."

It is impossible at present to decipher accurately the motives for this cool response on the part of the administration. A New York Times editorial this morning suggested six possibilities, and which I ask unanimous consent to be printed in the RECORD at the end of my remarks.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

(See exhibit 1.)

Mr. BROOKE. Mr. President, the suggested possibilities are:

First. Administration officials may resent President Sadat's "diplomacy by surprise" because it reduces the administration's potential to influence the Egyptian President's decisions before they take place.

Second. The administration may also be cool toward the Sadat initiatives because of "* * * an excessive attachment to the preferred American path to negotiations, a Geneva conference offered to all the parties through considerable diplomatic labor."

Third. Present administration behavior might also be motivated by deference to Soviet sensibilities, reflecting, as the Times editorial suggests "* * * a conviction that peace in the Middle East will never be achieved or preserved without Moscow's participation and commitment."

Fourth. The administration may also be trying to signal certain Arab States such as Syria and Saudi Arabia and possibly even the PLO that American leadership is their best hope for attaining their interests.

Fifth. It could be that the administration is concerned for President Sadat's safety which is so intimately linked with Egypt's stability and is more fearful of the risks he is taking than he is.

Sixth. Finally, there is the risk of diplomatic failure that is inherent in President Sadat's initiatives.

This last point is, of course, a legitimate concern. A failure of the Sadat initiative could lead rapidly to deteriorating conditions and ultimately to war. That is the inevitable risk of any meaningful act by the parties directly involved in the conflict to cut through the decades of suspicion and hatred. But, rather than shrinking from being associated with that risk, as the administration has apparently done, the United States should be doing everything possible to follow the lead of Egypt and Israel in order to reduce the risk.

It is the right of Israel and Egypt and the other Arab States if they will, to formulate the procedural basis for negotiations that would hold promise of a settlement that would bring a lasting peace to the peoples of the Middle East. President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin are asserting that right and the United States should be fully supportive of them as they do so.

We do not have the option to be involved in the Middle East only if events suit our preconceived notions of how things should be done. And we cannot avoid having to make difficult choices that entail significant risks. The proper course of action for the United States at this time is to endorse without qualification the efforts of those in the Middle East who have evidenced by their actions a true desire for peace. Our representation at the Cairo conference should be of sufficient stature to leave no doubts that we are indeed willing to encourage Egypt and Israel, in face-to-face negotiations, to prepare the way for a settlement. And, if others in the Middle East or elsewhere evidence an unwillingness to come to grips with the central issue of true peace, we should not delude ourselves into believing that our interest is in appeasing them. There is a time for fundamental decisions regarding Middle East peace, and the courageous acts of President Sadat have accelerated the pace of events to where the choices for peace must be made.

EXHIBIT 1

[From the New York Times, Nov. 29, 1977]

THE UNITED STATES AS SPHINX

The Carter Administration's enthusiasm for President Sadat's diplomacy could freeze the Nile. It has been grudging, chilling and altogether unworthy of the United States, which should be cheering and rewarding every act of moderation in the Middle East.

For the second time this month, the Egyptian President has signaled his genuine acceptance of Israel and a desire to get on with the negotiations for an epochal settlement. Both times, despite formal words of support, Washington has chosen to emphasize the dangers instead of the opportunities in Mr. Sadat's enterprise, thereby contributing to the risks. Over a long weekend, the Administration hesitated to accept his invitation to a Cairo conference, preferring instead to consult with the Soviet Union and other recalcitrants and giving no help whatever to the moderate Arab parties now torn among contending forces. The still informal decision finally to accept and urge others to accept is hardly a vote of confidence.

Consider the possible motives for this strange behavior in Washington:

1. Resentment of Mr. Sadat's diplomacy-by-surprise, reflecting not just injured pride but a desire to influence his tactics before they take shape.

2. An excessive attachment to the preferred American path to negotiations, a Geneva conference offered to all the parties through considerable diplomatic labor.

3. A deference to Soviet sensibilities, reflecting a conviction that peace in the Middle East will never be achieved or preserved without Moscow's participation and commitment.

4. A desire to signal Syria or perhaps Saudi Arabia or even the Palestine Liberation Organization that their best interests lie in accepting American leadership in the Middle East negotiations.

5. A fear for Mr. Sadat's safety and Egypt's stability, taking more seriously than he does the threats on his life and position.

6. A fear of diplomatic failure unless Mr. Sadat is restrained, with bitter consequences for all parties.

The evidence suggests that all these calculations have figured in Washington's responses, but only the last is deserving of serious consideration. Resentment and inflexibility have no place in a situation that has frustrated all peacemakers for 30 years. The Middle East conflicts have always been the primary burden of Israeli and Egyptian societies. Do we dare ask, how dare they now take diplomacy into their own hands?

The Soviet Union in its way, and Syria and the P.L.O. in theirs, have contributed mightily to the hostilities over the years; they should be persuaded that they may be

missing a historic opportunity to press their interests at the conference table, not encouraged to avoid the table. And surely Mr. Sadat himself is a better judge than any American of his relations with Saudi Arabia, or of his chances of survival.

Fear that he may fail is reasonable enough, but it should have produced an extra measure of American support, rather than coolness. Mr. Sadat could fail if moderate Palestinians, Jordanians and Lebanese, though tempted to join him, are frightened off by the Soviet-Syrian campaign of rejection. Courage does not usually come in multiple doses. The United States should be celebrating Mr. Sadat's invitations to Cairo, urging their acceptance and promising to reduce the risks and enhance the rewards for those who agree.

Mr. Sadat could fail also if the Israelis harden the terms for their other neighbors, and perhaps even for him. That temptation will grow to the extent that other Arabs refuse even a gesture of comparable recognition of Israel, spurn direct negotiation and force the Egyptians to back down or risk a separate peace. Here again the American obligation is to help broaden the talks.

The hesitation in Washington suggests that the Administration has still not grasped—or accepted—the radical turn of events that took Mr. Sadat to Jerusalem last week. He served notice that he would neither wait nor fight again for any Arab party that refuses even to negotiate with Israel or which belabors procedural issues to the point where Israel does not have to negotiate seriously. He thus rejected the American approach to a Geneva conference, and particularly the Administration's deal with Moscow to make a Russian co-chairman of every future bargaining session. Better Begin than Brezhnev.

Mr. Sadat may have been too ambitious, or too daring, or too trusting of Israel's readiness to reciprocate a dramatic break with the past. We think not; Egypt and Israel have not only earned the right to define the patterns of accommodation, they also have the power to do so, provided only that they have the energetic support of the United States.

In any case, Mr. Sadat has made his break and is trying to create a continuing process of negotiation to escape the cycle of frustration in both war and diplomacy. The place for the United States is at his side and at Israel's, so that their noble effort may proceed. It is too late to play the Sphinx.

IOWA'S OPERATION SKY SCAN

Mr. CULVER. Mr. President, as Congress continues its consideration of legislation to create a national energy plan, it is good to remember that Government is not alone in its efforts to bring about a reduction in energy usage. More and more individual citizens were buying additional insulation for their homes and businesses even before President Carter declared war on the energy problem.

In Iowa, several utilities have encouraged those individual efforts by instituting Operation Sky Scan in which infrared photographs are taken of cities and towns from low flying airplanes. The photos clearly show which buildings are well insulated and which are not. The photos are made available so that utility customers can determine the heat efficiency of their homes and businesses.

In early tests the photos have seemed successful in encouraging a significant number of people to buy insulation, and Iowa is now becoming the first State to use such a project statewide.

Mr. President, we certainly need the efforts of both the public and private sectors in our battle to conserve energy. This project appears to be a useful approach which utilities in other States might also want to institute. I ask unanimous consent that a description of Operation Sky Scan contained in the November 1977, Iowa Energy Bulletin be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the bulletin was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

IOWA'S AERIAL ENERGY STUDY

THERMOGRAMS

Utility customers in more than 800 cities and towns will have the opportunity to see energy loss through the roof tops of residential homes and other buildings this winter because of inadequate insulation.

Operation Sky Scan, a thermogram survey, is being sponsored by Iowa's investor-owned natural gas and electric utilities.

A thermogram is a black and white photograph taken from an airplane by a temperature measuring scanner. The infrared film which is used detects energy loss by recording roof top temperatures.

Heat loss is demonstrated on the photograph in various shades of gray, with poorly insulated buildings being light in tone and well insulated structures shown in considerably darker shades.

The "picture of temperature" project is the first of its kind ever done on a state-wide basis, according to John M. Lewis, President of the Iowa Utility Association.

Texas Instruments, Inc., of Dallas will take thermogram photos on clear nights from a twin-engined plane flying at 1,600 to 1,800 feet. Outside temperatures must be below 35 degrees Fahrenheit and roof tops must be clear of snow.

Each participating utility will announce plans for making the thermograms available to its customers and Texas Instruments, Inc., will provide training to utility employees on how to interpret the photos.

Utilities sponsoring the project include: Interstate Power Company, Iowa Electric Light and Power Company, Iowa-Illinois Gas and Electric Company, Iowa Power and Light Company.

Iowa Public Service Company, Iowa Southern Utilities Company, Peoples Natural Gas and Union Electric Company.

Other privately owned utility companies participating in the program are Keokuk Gas Service Company, North Central Public Service Company and Minnesota Gas Company. Lewis said municipally-owned gas and electric utilities have also been invited to participate.

TRAGEDY IN INDIA

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, one of the most devastating cyclones in over a century struck southern India last week, leaving in its wake a tragic trail of death and destruction. The loss in human life is almost beyond comprehension, and will perhaps never be fully known. The latest official estimates from the field indicate that the death toll will reach well over 20,000.

The cyclone washed away entire towns and villages, leaving more than 2 million people homeless. Estimates on the loss of property and crops now range well over $300 million. Within a few, tragic hours an already impoverished area was devastated, and millions of men, women and children dangerously close to malnutrition were left without food.

Despite many obstacles, not the least being the massive disruption of the area's transportation and communications system, the Government of India has moved urgently to meet emergency relief needs. International and voluntary agencies have offered a helping hand, as has the United States and other governments.

Hopefully, Mr. President, as the full scope of relief and rehabilitation needs become apparent—and the Indian Government assesses what, if anything, it may need from the international community—the United States will be prepared to draw upon available disaster relief funds to provide a significant contribution to India's recovery efforts. I stand ready, as I know others in Congress do, to offer special legislation, if necessary, to provide longer-term rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance.

In this connection, Mr. President, I commend to the attention of Senators an editorial in today's New York Times regarding measures that might be helpful in providing assistance for disaster preparedness. The United States, among other countries, has special experience in this area, and has already contributed to similar measures in Bangladesh—which is also subject to the devastating cyclones that come out of the Bay of Bengal. Hopefully the United States will offer its support for such disaster preparedness programs in southern India.

Mr. President, I know I speak for every American in offering deep sympathy and concern for the people of India who have suffered great tragedy. America's concern is already being expressed in the field through the actions of several American voluntary agencies, and I know it will be forthcoming when the Government of India identifies additional areas requiring rehabilitation and reconstruction assistance.

I ask unanimous consent that the New York Times editorial be printed in the RECORD.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

[From the New York Times, Nov. 29, 1977]

CURBING THE CYCLONE'S TOLL

The numbers defy comprehension. Harassed Indian officials estimated 10,000—a convenient round figure—when asked how many died in a cyclone and tidal wave that struck in the state of Andhra Pradesh last week. The number of persons killed will never be known precisely. And, whatever it is, many more will die of diseases spread by polluted wells and the breakdown of sanitation facilities.

In the wake of such a calamity, attention naturally turns to relief for the injured and ruined survivors. Other nations and international agencies will contribute, but the heaviest burden will fall upon the Indian Government. Yet all should give at least equal attention to assuring that future storms do not take such a toll.

Some ways are known. Buried in all the numbing numbers is a hopeful contrast: Only a week earlier, a cyclone of nearly equal force struck the neighboring state of Tamil Nadu. But there, soldiers evacuated the residents of coastal areas and held the toll to 500 dead, although property damage was immense. In Andhra Pradesh army units were