

Thus, we accepted the Rogers' initiative, in 1970, and thus was our positive reply to what Ambassador Jarring asked us, in regard to the peace obligations, in February, 1971.

To all this, I added another initiative, which I offered, and according to which I suggested reopening the Suez Canal to world navigation for Israel's undertaking the implementation of the first phase of total withdrawal.

This was not a partial solution for the problem of occupation of the Egyptian territory; nor was it a solution separating the necessity of withdrawal from all the Egyptian lands, and the necessity of withdrawal from all the Arab territories occupied after June 5, 1967. What I offered was a first step on the road to a total and comprehensive solution.

These steps, on our part, led to a number of results:

First: The question of the occupied territory has become the crux of the whole cause — whether Israel will withdraw or not, preliminary to peace.

Second: As it has been evident that Israel does not want to withdraw because it wants expansion and not peace, we were sure that its attitude will be unveiled to the whole world, which will lead to its complete isolation from the world community that does not have a road for security except in peace based on justice, the illegality of acquiring land through invasion and the illegitimacy of using force as a method of international conduct.

Third: The United States had to choose either to stand with us and with the international community and its principles, or with Israel and complete international isolation.

With our previous knowledge of the intentions of the United States and the destructive influences which adversely affect its policy towards the Middle East in particular, we wanted the U.S. to decide by itself and for itself while the world remains witness to see and judge.

The U.S. experimented; and though we were very impatient with some of its experiments, we preferred to take the position of wait and see in order to obtain the full result — and it was a branding evidence of the whole stance. The U.S. set aside the Security Council Resolution and we waited. Then U.S. overstepped the role of the U.N. Secretary-General and his special envoy to the region and we waited.

The United States ignored the role of the Big Four and the responsibility they bear of implementing the Security Council Resolution, and we

