Our action is represented in two main objectives: no relinquishing of one inch of our land and no bargaining over the rights of the Palestinian people.

We want peace.

«We want peace and I said we are ready to go to the end of the earth if that would prevent the wounding of one soldier in our army. But if the situation is that of dictating terms we will not bargain. In this case we will fight, depending on Almighty God and on our faith in our forces, cohesion, and steadfastness, as well as on an old friend who lends us support with honour — that is the Soviet Union.»

January 12, 1971

Some basic attitudes

First: The United Arab Republic assumes and meets all its commitments towards the Arab struggle. It does so in conformity with the logic and necessity of its international and na-
tional obligations, because the U.A.R. is a revolution and a state at one and the same time.

Second: The United Arab Republic fought, rebuilt its army in readiness to fight, and will fight in defence of the land and the right.

Third: The United Arab Republic cannot place its necessary and legitimate fight within a concrete context except in an atmosphere of world sympathy and international understanding that will make of its fight a humanitarian cause.

Thus we want to make of our struggle a cause that concerns the whole world; this cannot be achieved except through extensive effort.

If others think that they can simply issue their orders to be obeyed, or that they can impose on the world and it will yield to them, we must frankly admit that we do not belong to them. Consequently, our objective at this juncture, namely, our political objective, is a three-fold one:

One: To deepen the commitment of friends.

Two: To neutralise the opponent.

Three: To isolate the enemy.

Fourth: Consequently, we believe that the Arab emotional stance towards the current issues should not defeat its public, but it is reality and interact with it.

Liberation cannot be passionate turmoil, or by the enemy's reasoning and the purpose. In such an atmosphere, we concede it if those concede it to us.

Fifth: I want you to be that there is no such resolution, a Palestinian one or a Jordanian one; namely, an Arab one.

As for us, we refused was always available to there can be no partial that was perpetrated against was not directed against particular.
should not defeat its own ends, through making this public, but it is required to influence the reality and interact with it.

Liberation cannot be achieved merely by passionate turmoil, or by the mere desire for it. Liberation can be realised by the containment of the enemy's reasoning and the encirclement of his policy. In such an atmosphere, liberation can fulfil its purpose.

We do not belong to those who judge people by their words; we belong to those who want deeds to be the basis of judgement. We accept no other criterion from the comrades of our struggle; and we concede it if those comrades of struggle apply it to us.

Fifth: I want you to be fully aware of the fact that there is no such thing as an Egyptian solution, a Palestinian solution, a Syrian solution or a Jordanian one; there is but one solution, namely, an Arab one.

As for us, we refused an Egyptian solution that was always available to us, since we believe that there can be no partial solution to an aggression that was perpetrated against our entire nation, and was not directed against any one state in particular.
Sixth: There can probably be several strategies to be followed in our confrontation with the enemy. However, we deem it necessary and consider it vital that all these strategies should emanate from a single supreme strategy that will ensure the realisation of the Arab will.

The revolutionary Arab mind should define the necessary stages for the constant realisation of the various strategies in concatenation with the supreme Arab strategy. This is the challenge which we face now.

Seventh: We reject the narrow view according to which the Palestinian revolution is regarded as a mere reaction to what happened in 1967.

In our opinion, the Palestinian revolution — hence its value and role — is a part of a comprehensive Arab political, social and cultural awakening.

Perhaps this is the root of the special tie that exists between the Egyptian revolution and the Palestinian revolution, which is a physical tie, in its Arab character and providential in its sentimental character.

February 28, 1971

The U.A.R. stand.

— The basic principle which the United Arab Republic upholds and will continue to uphold under all circumstances.

We are not limited to the narrow view of the Palestinian revolution being merely a reaction to what happened in 1967. We believe that the Palestinian revolution is a part of a comprehensive Arab political, social and cultural awakening.

Perhaps this is the root of the special tie that exists between the Egyptian revolution and the Palestinian revolution, which is a physical tie, in its Arab character and providential in its sentimental character.

February 28, 1971

— The basic principle which the United Arab Republic upholds and will continue to uphold under all circumstances.
The United Arab Republic has opened, and continues to open, every way before peace. This has been demonstrated in two specific stands:

1) The United Arab Republic’s acceptance of Ambassador Gunnar Jarring’s proposals, whereas Israel refused to even answer his proposals.

2) President Anwar El Sadat came forward with an Egyptian initiative, in his speech on February 4, indicating the possibility of reopening the Suez Canal to world navigation in return for a partial withdrawal of the Israeli forces.
— The Egyptian initiative still stands; but it should be understood by all parties that the proposed partial withdrawal, according to that initiative, does not constitute either a separate or a partial solution; it is a procedural move which is physically tied up with the full solution on the basis of implementing the Security Council Resolution, with all its items, foremost among which is the withdrawal from all the Arab territories occupied after June 5, 1967.

— So that matters may be well-defined when putting this proposal into effect, it is important, so that we may be clearly understood, that the United Arab Republic reaffirms its conception as follows:

1) As soon as the partial withdrawal, which is the first stage of the all-out withdrawal, starts, the United Arab Republic is ready to start clearing the Suez Canal.

2) With the practical application of this, the United Arab Republic will accept extending the cease-fire for a definite period during which Ambassador Gunnar Jarring would be able to put the timetable for implementing the Security Council Resolution.

3) The U.A.R. Suez Canal administration has the full responsibility for the Suez Canal. I may hear in the United Arab Republic will take their regular eastern base, and the United Arab Republic for peace, with the arrangement of the belligerent cease-fire terms.

That is the period of Ambassador Jarring to work out crisis along with the cease-fire among them — foremost among them — withdrawal from all Jordan, Gaza and Sina.

If this period shows any tangible progress, the U.A.R. would be entitled to make complete adherence with the cease-fire, if it is concerned, to the negotiation of the entire occupation.

— The United Arab...
3) The U.A.R. Armed Forces will cross the Suez Canal to undertake their national responsibility on the eastern bank of the Canal. I repeat it again, so that they may hear it there: The U.A.R. Armed Forces will cross the Suez Canal to undertake their national responsibility on the eastern bank of the Canal. But the United Arab Republic, being solicitous for peace, is ready to accept practical arrangements realising the separation of the belligerent forces during the defined cease-fire term.

That is the period availed to Ambassador Gunnar Jarring to work out all items for resolving the crisis along with the time-table for implementing them — foremost among which is the complete withdrawal from all Arab territories in Syria, Jordan, Gaza and Sinai.

If this period should expire without achieving any tangible progress, the Egyptian Armed Forces would be entitled to maintain the freedom of action with complete adherence so far as principles and laws are concerned, to the necessity of the complete liberation of the entire occupied Arab territory.

— The United Arab Republic, absolutely rejects
any discussion concerning the demilitarisation of Sinai, but it is fully prepared, in accordance with the Security Council Resolution, to accept demilitarised areas, provided that these be established on both sides of the borders.

— The United Arab Republic would not allow any party whatever, to raise the question of an Israeli presence at Sharm El Sheikh, whatever its form may be. It considers that the suspect proposals which have been propagated by some parties — regarding the lease of Sharm El Sheikh to Israel for a definite period or the participation of Israeli troops in the U.N. Emergency Forces at Sharm El Sheikh — are tantamount to irresponsible talk which is neither permissible nor acceptable when a crisis of such dimensions as the Middle East crisis is tackled nor when it comes to the calibre of a nation — such as the United Arab Republic — which has long annals of staunch national struggle.

— In brief we will not accept any discussion concerning the crossing of our Egyptian Forces to the eastern bank.

We shall not allow fire indefinitely. One foreign soldier on Egypt's land, I mean our land.

The Treaty of Friendship between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Arab Republic

«One of the most important developments which took place with the conclusion of the Treaty of Friendship between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Arab Republic.

We wanted this agreement for world peace, people's respect of the U.N. prerogatives, for economic, technical and cultural cooperation.

But there is one new...
The Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation between the United Arab Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

One of the most positive and outstanding developments which took place recently was the conclusion of the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation between the United Arab Republic and the Soviet Union.

We wanted this agreement and signed it with determination because it adds to our general struggle new guarantees which were not defined before.

There are deep-rooted aspects of co-operation between us and the Soviet Union and any indications to them in the provisions of the Treaty are merely new assurances. By this I mean co-operation for world peace, people’s right to self-determination, respect of the U.N. principles and resolutions, and economic, technical and cultural co-operation.

But there is one new fundamental aspect which
made us conclude this Treaty with determination, and this point was mentioned in Article 8 of the Treaty which says:

«In reinforcing the defensive capacity of the U.A.R. the two high contracting parties will continue to promote co-operation in the military sphere on the basis of the suitable agreements between them. This co-operation will particularly include aid in training the members of the U.A.R. Armed Forces, and in their assimilation of arms and equipment supplied to the U.A.R. for strengthening its capacity to remove the traces of the aggression and for strengthening its capability to confront aggression in general ».

This is the new aspect. This is what we seek and adhere to believing that the battle will be imposed on us and the last word in the conflict will be in the battle-field.

We have followed and are still following political action.

We have not closed the door yet, and we will not let any chance slip from our hands, and if there is only 1% hope in peaceful settlement we shall not hesitate for one moment to work for it. But we shall fight at the end, whatever the circumstances,
to liberate our land, and this is our duty as well as our legal right.

It was our will and determination to give expression to what we want in the form of a treaty so that all the countries of the world may understand.

All the western press and its propaganda organs tried to portray some of our internal affairs as a change in our political line which the masses of our people drew up, namely:

- To liberate all our territory.
- To develop our economic and social life on the basis of the Charter and the Statement of March 30.
- To befriend whoever befriends us and to be hostile to whoever adopts a hostile attitude against us.
- To maintain national independence and to adhere to the policy of non-alignment in its positive and not in its negative sense.

They have attempted, by hinting that there is a change in our policy, to convince themselves that our friendship with the Soviet Union is for a certain stage only and that it is a mere tactic.

I wish to say before you — and I am certain that I am expressing your will and the will of the masses of our entire nation — the following:
— The friendship with the only ones who are helping us to fight and to achieve victory, is not a transitory friendship, nor is it tactical.

— The friendship we maintain with the only ones who are helping us to build our economy and our modern state, is not transitory nor is it a tactical one.

— The friendship we maintain with those who are helping us to achieve victory is not a friendship for a certain stage but for all stages, it is not a tactical one but one of a firm strategy.

We maintain this from a position of national independence and national will, for there can be no independence with the occupation of our territory, nor can there be a will with backwardness.

We have determinedly placed our will in this treaty to tell one and all : « Yes », we befriend those who befriend us and are hostile to those who are hostile to us.

Yes, we shall not budge from the aim of liberation whether we achieve it by means of war or peace. Yes, we are determined to achieve progress and to build the modern state.

We stood up against a psychological warfare directed at us by our enemies, to achieve its goals. This proposed to make out a friend in the enemy and without the capacity to think in the face of a threat. It is a psychological warfare directed against us, put us on the defensive. « You have made a mistake », we tell them.

The position of:

France:

Since the time of the explosion of Beirut airport, and of Pompidou's government, based upon justice and order, We, on our part, try to show that their position will remain firm to that end.

Britain:

After the return of the Government, there were statements from the Security Council's Repre...
We stood up against all propaganda of psychological warfare directed against us, for we know its goals. This propaganda seeks to leave us without a friend in the battle and in construction, without a power to help us face the military challenge and without the capacity to face civilisationary challenge. If they imagine that they could, through the psychological warfare they are directing against us, put us on the defensive, then let us tell them: «You have made a mistake, for we are on the offensive».

The positions of the big powers

France:

Since the time of De Gaulle; after the incident of Beirut airport, and even after the coming to power of Pompidou's government — its position has been based upon justice and understanding of our cause. We, on our part, try to do our best and I hope that their position will remain unchanged. We strive to that end.

Britain:

After the return to power of the Conservative Government, there was a noticeable improvement. There were statements by those interpreting the Security Council's Resolution — which they draft-
ed — to the effect that inadmissibility of annexing land by force meant that Israel must withdraw from all occupied territories. Before this, Britain abstained from making any interpretation. Under the Labour Government there was even some beating around the bush about the word « territories » or « the territories ». We hope that the policy of the Conservative Government will continue.

West European Countries:

All the countries of Western Europe have begun to understand the situation. The picture has changed. Italy understands the situation and so does Spain. Belgium and Holland have their own commitments but the picture is no longer that of 1967 when there was complete support of Israel.

Non-Aligned Countries:

All the non-aligned countries as well as the Afro-Asian countries adopt a true position of support. The non-aligned countries in Lusaka took a stronger position than ever before and issued resolutions of support. President Tito, in fact, adopted a grand attitude, together with other leaders who were responsible for the adoption of one of the strongest resolutions yet adopted.

January 8, 1971.
The stand towards the Soviet Union:

Our friendship with the Soviet Union is one of principle, and not transitory. It is a permanent friendship and not one of a certain stage.

We stood together and shall always stand together on the anti-imperialist world revolution front.

We stood together and shall always work together for a just peace, for international co-operation and prosperity.

The attitude of the United States:

The continued military and material support accorded by America to Israel, while the latter occupies our land, is tantamount to American participation in the occupation of our land and violating the sovereignty of our homelands. We cannot forget that the U.S.A. is the one that grants Israel all the potentialities of life and existence; and that it is the champion of the principle of the «Balance of Power» in the Middle East — the principle under which all the accomplishments of American science and progress are being placed at the disposal of Israel so as to keep the latter in a position of superiority over all Arab forces combined together — a principle which we have rejected, and insist upon rejecting.
The United States, in its determination not to change this policy which greatly jeopardises the present and future of the Arab nation, would thus be defining its position as a partner to Israel in its aggression and hostility against the entire Arab nation.

The strategy of America and Israel for 1971:

The strategy of America and Israel for 1971 aims at realising the following two objectives:

1. Not to implement the Security Council Resolution which stipulates in its very beginning the illegality of acquiring territories by force — i.e. stipulating withdrawal.
2. To make the ceasefire permanent — a perfect condition for America and Israel to introduce our issue among the issues of the cold war. Twenty years would pass, the enemy remaining on the eastern bank and the world would lose interest in the case.

Our strategy for 1971:

Our strategy for 1971 is this: not to allow this ceasefire to become permanent... We won recognition by world public opinion of the fact that...
ceasefire is only temporary as stipulated by the U.N. Resolution. We will not allow the ceasefire to become permanent unless there has been serious action, namely withdrawal and the implementation of the Security Council Resolution. Otherwise, we will not commit ourselves to a ceasefire.

The Egyptian Initiative:

In my speech before you here at the National Assembly of February 4, I called upon the international community, and on America as being the one that supplies Israel with everything from the loaf of bread to the Phantom aircraft — I called upon it to play its role as a big power, and to define its position. In the same speech, before you, I offered an initiative, I said we were offering an initiative in order to push the case forward. We were prepared to open the Suez Canal to international navigation in order to get the question moving, in return for which Israel should begin the first stage of withdrawal within the framework of the timetable of full withdrawal under the auspices of Jarring and the United Nations. They tried to twist the offer and to interpret it as a partial or separate solution, or an agreement on its own. I explained our position frankly in April. I said, and I am saying again before you today, and for
the first time so that the whole world may hear — when we say that we are willing to open the Suez Canal for international navigation, this does not mean that we are anxious to open it at any price. No, we are facilitating things for the world, and for Western Europe in particular, and we are showing our good will towards peace and want to get the question moving. But if this is understood to be a partial or separate solution, or that it is a solution which we want at any price, then we shall not open it. We should rather fill it up.

The month of our abstention from firing went by. We replied to Jarring whereas Israel did not reply to him and got stubborn. Our political mobility through our initiative and our acceptance of the document which Jarring had sent to us, as opposed to Israel’s abstention and taking the attitude which it took, exposed it to the whole world.

When Rogers came to me — and I have already told you this in the Parliamentary Body — the first thing he said to me was: «I have come and I am not asking for anything from Egypt, because Egypt did everything it had to do.» I say this and the whole world, as well as Mr. Rogers, are hearing me. «I am not asking for anything from Egypt, because Egypt did everything it had to do,» he said.

Well, let us speak about that. On the first of May I announced and am now declaring before you, prepared for it, but on the condition declared — which are not a test of peace. If there are those who seek peace, then our offer of a ceasefire and fulfilled, but if the intent is not genuine, namely, to beat around the issue so as to use the offer as a means of freezing the whole thing, I told you that we would not accept such a thing; as.

I made three conditions to Mr. Rogers. I repeat them. The first is that the forces must cross to the other side of the Suez Canal. The second is a six-month ceasefire only, which can be extended as long as there continue to be Israeli soldiers on our land. The third is a definite ceasefire, only six months, extending in the event of a ceasefire not achieved and if not carried out after these six months, we will then have the right to cease fire and freeze the whole of our territory. The third is that no surrender even one inch of
Well, let us speak about the initiative. On the first of May I announced our conditions for it. I am now declaring before you that we are still prepared for it, but on the conditions which we have declared — which are not conditions, in fact; but a test of peace. If there are genuine intentions to seek peace, then our offer should be understood and fulfilled, but if the intentions were otherwise, namely, to beat around the bush and water down the issue so as to use the opening of the Suez Canal as a means of freezing the issue for years to come, I told you that we would rather fill it up. We do not accept such a thing; and we say this clearly.

I made three conditions which I conveyed to Mr. Rogers. I repeat them before you here. They brook no argument. The first condition is that my forces must cross to the east bank. The second is a six-month ceasefire only to be fixed by a certain date as long as there continues to be a single Israeli soldier on our land. I will not go for an indefinite ceasefire, only six months. If a final settlement is not achieved and if the final withdrawal is not carried out after these six months, our forces will then have the right to complete the liberation of our territory. The third is that we shall never surrender even one inch of our land, by means of
leasing or bargaining. My borders are the international borders with Palestine.

These are the three conditions which I set for opening the Canal. My initiative stands until today.

The problem of opening the Suez Canal:

The problem of opening the Suez Canal is not a separate case, nor a partial settlement. It is merely one of the stages of the complete withdrawal and of the time-table for the implementation of the Security Council Resolution.

We will not accept any discussion on the crossing of our Egyptian forces to the eastern bank of the Canal.

We will not accept prolongation of the cease-fire indefinitely as long as there is one foreign soldier on our territories — our territories previous to June 4 with regard to us and the entire Arab territories.

When we say that we are willing to open the Suez Canal for international navigation this does not mean that we are anxious to open it at any price. No, we are facilitating things for the world, and for Western Europe in particular; and we are showing our good will towards peace and want to get the question moving. It is not to be a partial or separate solution which we want and we will not open it.

THE UNION OF ARABS

The creation of the United Arab Republic, the United Arab Republic, and the Arab Republic of Egypt is a great step along the national, a magnificent contribution to the world, the struggle of despotism, and in honour of those who waged the battles of the glorious history of struggle, and in realisation of which the hero of this nation worked and died.

I thank God Almighty for the guidance of our nation, at on critical stages, with the strength from which and by which the honourable war against the enemy has threatened its march.

The enemy wanted to provide us with more futile
get the question moving. But if this is understood to be a partial or separate solution, or that it is a solution which we want at any price, then we shall not open it.

THE UNION OF ARAB REPUBLICS

The creation of the Arab Republics which the United Arab Republic, the Arab Republic of Libya and the Arab Republic of Syria agreed to establish is a great step along the path of unity of the Arab nation, a magnificent consolidation of its power to wage the struggle of destiny whose challenges it is facing, and in honour of the martyrs and heroes who waged the battles of this nation throughout its glorious history of struggle for liberty, socialism and unity, and in realisation of a great hope, for which the hero of this nation, Gamal Abdel Nasser, worked and died.

I thank God Almighty who honoured the struggle of our nation, at one of the most difficult and critical stages, with this magnificent Arab base, from which and by which it can wage its just and honourable war against the gravest danger to threaten its march.

The enemy wanted to weaken us, but God provided us with more faith and strength, the enemy
wanted to divide and isolate us, but God gave us increasing integration and unity; the enemy wanted to sow despair in our hearts, but God further increased our perseverance, belief and hope.

April 17, 1971.

The Arab liberation powers

They believed, that the 1967 blow meant the annihilation of all powers of liberation in the Arab nation. However, the Sudanese and Libyan revolutions were launched and the Tripoli Charter was signed by four Arab States in order that we may establish the first nucleus for Arab unity based on sound, pre-studied scientific foundations.

God wanted to compensate us in 1969. The Revolution of the Sudan broke out in May 1969 and the Revolution of Libya broke out in September 1969. The two revolutions had a tremendous effect on the battle, not only from the psychological and moral points of view, but also from the strategic point of view.

The object behind the 1967 aggression was to destroy Egypt and liquidate the forces of liberation in the area. The aggressors thought that we were finished in 1967.
The United States strategy and objectives, from the very beginning, were that after destroying Egypt it would become easy to liquidate the forces of liberation in the area. They began to take into consideration all possibilities for eliminating the liberal regimes in the area. But the inception of the revolutions changed the whole situation in the area and foiled all their plans, especially as regards the Revolution of Libya which was considered a strong blow directed against America.