

01401

1974/11/06

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *NIIV 009031*

By *SOM* NARA Date *8/1/80*

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

President Sadat
Foreign Minister Fahmy
Secretary Kissinger
Under Secretary Sisco
Ambassador Eilts

~~1-20~~
2-58
SENSITIVE
fil

Wednesday Morning, November 6, 1974 - Cairo

(Meeting was held in Sadat's bedroom since he was suffering from a heavy cold.)

K: The Greek Community and the Jews have gotten together in America in attacking me. I think it is important that the Greek Community not become ^{the Jews} of excessive encouragement. I am sure that President Sadat knows that we face a difficult situation with respect to Isarel. And it is important that U.S. policy seem to have ^{to have} broad support. When I get back, I am going to tell President Ford that we need greater discipline in our own government. Take for example, this ^{whole} held question of Israeli arms and the press reports ^{our press} regarding them. The Israeli Ambassador to the United States used the meeting he had with Defense Minister ^{Sullivan} Schulseinger to give the impression that some new decisions had been taken. No new decisions have been taken. You will not be surprised by any new decisions. As you know, our strategy is to use arms assistance to get the Israelis to take the kind of decisions which will make practical reconciliation ^{in negotiations} possible.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NIUV 009021

By SJM NARA Date 8/1/00

-2-

There will be no new decisions on Israeli arms unless the question of negotiations is clarified.

I want also to mention the question of Egypt's interests in arms as you discussed with me previously. I have concluded Mr. President that it cannot be done in the way in which we discussed it together. I will discuss this with President Ford when I get back. President Ford must decide what he can do on the question of arms for Egypt and whether he can do it openly. If it is to be done, it cannot be done in any other way than openly. I suppose this would raise a huge public debate in the United States.

S: We can handle the public debate question. What is more difficult is how to manage ^{the} the Arab world.
(implying if arms are not provided)

K. The Israeli strategy is to push you back to the Russians.

S: Yes.

F: In the Arab world Egypt is criticized that our improved relations have brought ~~about~~ nothing for us.

K: ~~This is a~~ dilemma.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NIUV 009021

By SJM NARA Date 8/11/00

-3-

F: The Arabs have to see that your policy is paying off for us.

K: If Sadat had not achieved disengagement, we would be in a more difficult position. I believe we need to discuss further the next steps. My concern is that the Israelis will leak matters.

S: In shaping our next moves with the United States, it is important that U.S. support be public and open.

K: I think we need to discuss what way to do it. I think the possibilities are still good.

F: The next move has to be a substantial Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai.

K: We can help make some progress through diplomatic channels. I want you to know that President Ford called in the Israeli Minister today and he was told ^{about} ~~that~~ we hold ^{the Israelis} ~~you~~ responsible for the negative results of Rabat and that we cannot jeopardize the American position in the Middle East because of Israeli intransigence. I will be in a position to judge tomorrow what the mood is in Israel. You recall that I thought that when we discussed the question of neutral zones Egyptian-Israeli talks

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *NIIV 009031*

By *S.M.* NARA Date *8/1/80*

-5-

K: If the Syrians were not fools they would understand that your success is a success for them and that an impasse means no progress any where and possibly war. Syria gains nothing by blocking you from negotiations. If you are blocked Syria gets nothing. It is nonsense for Syria to say that nothing could be done on the Golan until 1976. I would never have mentioned 1976 specifically ^{which} ~~which~~ is an election year. '76 is precisely the year ⁱⁿ ~~in~~ which nothing could be done. Possibly '75, possibly '77, but not '76. I never made any such statement. ~~All of this is a lie~~

It is just like this matter of Israeli arms. Dinitz came in and said unless we gave in on a couple of points -- points that I had never heard of -- he could not leave his post to return to Jerusalem for the Rabin discussions. I ~~threatened not to go to Jerusalem for the Rabin discussion.~~ I threatened not to go to Jerusalem if they pulled this sort of thing and the matter was quickly ^{taken care of} ~~set aside.~~ *The Ambassador has left for Jerusalem.*

^{to Cairo} Incidentally, I am not planning on coming back again during this current trip since it will make it look as though I am pleading.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *NW 009031*

By *SOM* NARA DWS *8/1/00*

-8-

S: Yes, I agree with you.

K: I will give you ^{*my*} ~~and~~ assurance that if the Israelis make a military attack unprovoked, we will be against it.

S: Why not proceed on negotiations on both fronts. Why not do both -- Egypt and Syria.

K: I cannot make a proposal on Syria. Of course, if Syria would negotiate openly then you could negotiate openly.

S: Asad will assist Egypt to negotiate for progress.

K: What shall I tell Asad regarding your views.

S: Nothing. Tell him nothing. Tell him we discussed the situation at Rabat. Tell him that you have not offered anything concrete. Incidentally, I cannot open the Suez Canal until there is more progress.

K: You will be blamed for breaking the Disengagement Agreement if you do this. I need to tell the Israelis that you are going to go ahead on the opening of the Canal.

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *NIUV 009031*

By *SOM* NARA Date *8/11/00*

-9-

S: I gave my word regarding cargoes.

K: You need to find something which offers the possibility that progress will also be considered political progress and have a political content.

S: This time, Henry, you must put the squeeze on them. The situation needs it. They must feel that you and we are planning together.

K: The Arabs must help.

S: In a war we could gain to the Straits militarily. The Syrians would lose.

K: I do not believe we could get El Arsh *for you in a negotiation.*

S: I need to get the oil, and I need to have the passes. This is the minimum, Henry.

K: The last ~~Lanchi~~ ^{*by Smach*} proposal made was so bad, I refused to transmit it to you. It consisted of the East end of the passes, ~~and a circle around~~ ^{*withdrawal to*} The distance was ^{*was 60*} 30 to 50 kilometers, and they want five years for it.

I would like to say against that if Faisal could support our approach on oil and prices it would be very helpful. A small reduction would even be helpful. It is more than a symbolic matter however. It would

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *NIIV 009031*

By *SOM* NARA Date *8/11/00*

-10-

be more politically even though it would not be decisive economically.

F: We have got to finalize matters before Brezhnev arrives in mid-January. ~~The~~ President Sadat is planning on coming to the United States on January 20.

K: We must know just what we can do. I will talk over the whole matter with the President. We cannot ~~however~~ finish everything by mid-January. *Maybe* we can make some progress before then.

S: Henry, I urge you to urge President Ford to apply pressure on Israel.

K: I will recommend that President Ford go to great lengths.

I believe we should proceed through diplomatic channels rather than you be vulnerable in the beginning to more public talks. *The maybe when matters have been brought closer* We can conduct our end through Herman. Maybe Israel can send some representative to Washington. Otherwise such *early* discussions will become public. We can say that there are no formal negotiations going on, that we are having an exchange of ideas constantly to see what can be done.

S: What do you intend to tell Asad.

Together, I can take this or three weeks to bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion

K: First, that he has created a calamity. That I never made a concrete proposal to Egypt and that if he succeeds in blocking Egypt, he will not get anything for himself either.

Secondly, that I made no offer of a separate peace settlement with Jordan.

Third, I will reassure him regarding the Ford message that we are willing to use pressure on Israel in order to get Asad something on Golan at the appropriate time.

F: Don't give Asad any satisfaction on blocking the Egyptians.

K: I will tell him he is blocking himself. You know when Asad talks to me he is critical of Egypt, particularly when I did not give him answers that he was seeking regarding Egypt.

S: Asad made a very strong statment in Rabat. He wants peace. *Rabat's speech on the Kuneit*
to keep the door open.

said he

stated

END