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By SOM NARA Date 7/3/00

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

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Reviewed by H. D. Brewster *HDB*

PARTICIPANTS:

- Anwar al-Sadat, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt Date: 2-28-1978
- Ismail Fahmy, Minister of Foreign Affairs
- Mahmoud Abdul Ghaffar, Under Secretary
- Dr. Ashraf Marwan, Presidential Assistant for Foreign Contacts
- Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
- Ambassador Hermann Eilts
- Peter W. Rodman, National Security Council Staff *PR*

CLASSIFIED BY FRANK WISNER
SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DOWNGRADED AT TWO
YEAR INTERVALS AND DECLASSIFIED ON
DECEMBER 31, -----

DATE AND TIME:

Thursday, October 10, 1974; 9:02 - 11:50 p.m.

PLACE:

The President's Giza Residence, Cairo

SUBJECTS:

Next Phase of the Negotiations; Contacts with Iraq; Saudi Arms for Egypt; Khmer Representation in the UN; U.S. Ambassador in the North Yemen; Egyptair Overflights over South Vietnam; Suez Mineclearing; Contacts with North Korea.

[President Sadat welcomed Dr. Kissinger warmly, embracing and kissing him before the assembled press and photographers. The Secretary told the President that he and Foreign Minister Fahmy had had a good talk. The Secretary and the President answered a few questions from the press. (See Tab A) Then the press were dismissed.]

Next Phase of the Negotiation

Sadat and Kissinger decided to confer tete-a-tete, and the other members of the party left. The private meeting lasted from 9:08 to 11:20 p.m. and covered the following points:

-- Sadat told Kissinger he understood the U.S. position on the PLO vote in the UNGA. He saw no other way we could do it. He said he would explain it to the other Arabs.

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-- Sadat basically agreed that the next phase of talks with Israel could have a political character. He needs to send a military man there so he can say it has a military aspect, but he would in any case send a senior political man in the delegation. Sadat was prepared for the talks to take place in the neutral zone in the Sinai, with a United Nations presence. He did not want this known before the Arab Summit in Rabat October 26. The Secretary agreed not to tell the Israelis immediately.

-- The Secretary agreed to stop in Egypt sometime around November 4 to 5 on the way back from his South Asian trip.

-- Sadat was prepared to agree to almost any of the elements of non-belligerency except the declaration of non-belligerency itself. If the Israelis want ten things, Sadat said, he would probably accept eight, including assurances of passage through Bab el-Mandeb. Sadat was confident he could handle it tactically provided there was a substantial withdrawal in the Sinai.

-- The precise line in the Sinai was not discussed. Sadat wanted the line to go from El-Arish to Ras Mohammed, but Kissinger told him he couldn't get it. Sadat was counting, however, on getting the Abu Rudeis oil fields. He also needed to get Egyptian forces up to the passes.

-- Sadat agreed that a new agreement could be supervised by UNEF with a mandate of one year, instead of six months. Renewal for a second year was assured. After the agreement, Geneva would be convened, and everyone understood that nothing could happen there.

-- Sadat agreed to permit the Israelis to resume body searches in Egypt without conditions, at the discretion of Secretary Kissinger.

[At 11:20, Fahmy, Marwan, Ghaffar, Eilts, Sisco and Rodman joined the meeting.]

Kissinger: I have told the President that whatever happens, I won't leave until 2:00, because that's what we have announced to the press.

I think we've covered everything.

[Marwan confers with Sadat in Arabic.]

Contacts with Iraq

Sadat: About contacts with Iraq, the Iraqis told us it should be through his Foreign Minister in New York.

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Marwan: But you should start the contact.

Kissinger: They started it already.

Marwan: Shibib in New York -- you sat next to him once at a luncheon and he sent a message about it to Saddam Hussein.

Kissinger: We sent an approach through the head of our Interests Section to the Foreign Minister in Baghdad, and he said he wasn't ready.

Marwan: But he says it should be done through his Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Kissinger: When is he coming?

Marwan: In the next two weeks.

Kissinger: Tell him to come to the UN.

Fahmy: He has probably gone now.

Sadat: He's probably gone to Rabat.

Kissinger: Tell him either to come to New York or to suggest some other way for getting in touch with him.

Saudi Arms for Egypt

[Sadat and Marwan confer in Arabic.]

Sadat: We're talking about the arms deal with the Saudis. You say you'll be ready to talk to the King about applications for us. If it can be signed before December, we are ready to sign for \$70 million this year.

Kissinger: We have the most extraordinary difficulty getting the Saudis to sign anything themselves. They've outraged our Protestant Ambassador by saying they want girls and money. They've never asked for themselves yet. They cover over, and it's totally amorphous. But I'll raise it with the King.

Marwan: The King will give it to Sultan, and Sultan is unhappy about the ammunition, which you now say will take 14 months to deliver.

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Kissinger: [to Sisco] Joe, you work it out. What we need is an orderly delivery schedule for the Saudis. Then we can increase some items for the Egyptians. Get Clements to do it. Before the Arab Summit.

We need a list. We have to get a list. The problem is they want to be paid off. We have no objection, but we need a way to do it.

Marwan: Leave it between the companies and the Saudis. Not government-to-government.

Sisco: We can't do it. We need licenses.

Marwan: The State Department should stay out.

Kissinger: But the Defense Department has to operate with fixed prices. Let me discuss it with Clements.

Cambodian Representation in the UN

One issue that's close to our hearts, Mr. President, but that you probably haven't heard about, is the issue of Cambodian representation. I know you can't vote against it, but if your Ambassador could be sick on the day of the voting . . . [laughter]

Fahmy: And if your Ambassador could be sick on the day of the PLO vote . . . [laughter]

Kissinger: No, I've talked to the President [Sadat] on that.

Fahmy: There is flu in New York now, which they could both catch.

Kissinger: [to Sadat] He's a hard bargainer.

Sadat: No, it can be done. Yes, yes.

Fahmy: It's very dangerous for you and him to sit alone!

US Ambassador in North Yemen

Marwan: The people in North Yemen expect a US ambassador.

Kissinger: He will be picked within three days when I get back. The question is whether my Foreign Service will explode if I choose an NSO. I'm thinking of my DCM in Damascus. I'll decide on the trip. There are a number of good

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Egyptair Overflights over South Vietnam

Kissinger: Your request to overfly South Vietnam. They're willing to do it if some Arab approaches them. They'd like to open an information office here.

Sadat: They have a consulate here.

Kissinger: I don't think so.

Eilts: Saqqaf could do it.

Sadat: It can be done.

Eilts: You've already approached Saqqaf. It's a question of his doing it.

Kissinger: You can do it.

Fahmy: After January.

Suez Mineclearing

Kissinger: [to Eilts] Has the mineclearing been raised with them?

Eilts: It's been raised only informally. They've been asked not to raise it until we know if it can be done.

Kissinger: The problem is money?

Eilts: The problem is money, but it probably can be handled out of \$20 million already allotted for the Suez Canal.

Kissinger: From the \$250 million?

Eilts: Yes.

Sisco: Which we don't have yet.

Eilts: [to Sadat] Your Navy, Mr. President, has suggested that a decision was going to be made to clear the fields off Port Said. They asked if we were willing to do it. Our Navy concluded that the quickest way it could be done -- which could be done in two weeks -- is to have six helicopters flown in, then followed by a check sweep done by the Egyptian Navy. Your people would prefer to do it this way too. But they have delayed a formal request until we decided if we were willing to do so.

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Kissinger: We're certainly willing to do so, if the money is there.

Eilts: Can it be done with part of the \$250 million?

Sadat: Yes.

Kissinger: All right. We'll do that.

Eilts: The alternative is that the Soviets do it.

Sadat: Because it's Soviet mines!

Kissinger: We'll get it done.

Let me get word to the Navy in Washington. I don't want it to be kicked around until I get back.

Eilts: The Navy knows about it.

Kissinger: Let me get to Scowcroft.

One problem is what we say to the press tonight. We shouldn't say anything too specific; we shouldn't say anything that our press, in its present state of hysteria, would interpret as failure. Which would not be true.

Fahmy: General words, not a statement.

Kissinger: Yes. Could say that we reviewed the entire situation, that we discussed the modalities of getting further forward movement, and some concrete ideas of how it might be achieved? That I'll of course come back Monday. The talks were friendly, and positive.

Fahmy: There should be more on bilateral relations.

Kissinger: I can brief our people on the plane tomorrow, but they're capable of sending messages tonight that it was a failure.

Sadat: We have to give something positive.

Kissinger: Something to show warmth.

Sadat: I give you the lead!

Kissinger: No, you're more skillful!

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Contacts with North Korea

Fahmy: The North Koreans want you.

Kissinger: That depends on how they behave in this session.

Fahmy: They're pleased to have this contact.

Kissinger: I'll give you a written statement. I'll tell you now that we're in principle prepared to have contact with them. We'll beat them anyway, because we have the votes. And we're willing to settle that issue amicably. We're willing to abolish the UN Command, but we need a legal basis for the armistice. We want the US and South Koreans to replace the UN Command. It changes nothing. But we're willing to abolish the UN Command, which is a concession to them. But it depends on the debate in the UN.

Fahmy: If they hear from you, it would be good.

Kissinger: I'll give a message to Hermann.

Eilts: The North Koreans have been approaching our people in the Embassy, reminding us of their message to the Congress.

Kissinger: They have to learn a lesson about our government. They can't deal with our Congress and they can't deal through the Embassy.

Do you have a copy, Hermann? Of the North Korean message?

Eilts: Yes.

Kissinger: Get me a copy tomorrow. We'll send Ismail a message Saturday or Sunday.

[At 11:50 p.m. the President and the Secretary rise and go out to speak briefly to the press on the front steps. Transcript at Tab B.]

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