MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:
Anwar al-Sadat, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt
Ismail Fahmi, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ashraf Marwan, Presidential Advisor [intermittently]

Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Hermann Eilts
Mr. Harold H. Saunders, NSC Senior Staff
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

TIME AND DATE:
11:35 a.m. - 3:00 p.m.
Saturday, May 4, 1974

PLACE:
Maamura Rest House
Alexandria

Secretary Kissinger: [takes out arms list, Tab A] This is the list we agreed to the other day. [He gives it to Sadat.] It is very important that this doesn't leak out of the Arab countries as something we agreed to do with Egypt because this would cause an explosion in America.

President Sadat: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: The only thing we omitted is what you requested. You know what you requested. In some categories ours is more.

President Sadat: It is very generous. Thank you.

Secretary Kissinger: We have to be thoughtful, discreet in how we do it, because it could lead to my political destruction in America. Not to mention my physical destruction!
On the helicopter pilots, that is taken care of. We will extend an invitation. Whom should we get in touch with? McCauley?

President Sadat: Ismail will get in touch.

Secretary Kissinger: Let McCauley do it through General Guay. And I have begun taking steps on seeing whether we can leave some of these helicopters behind.

President Sadat: Say it is for the Suez Canal authority.

Secretary Kissinger: We will find some way to do it. I would prefer to wait until I get home before going into detail.

President Sadat: Very good.

Secretary Kissinger: I understand the equipment Marwan is interested in is being taken care of.

Ambassador Eilts: Let me make sure I understand: Egyptian pilots will go aboard the helicopters to fly them, to learn to fly them, not just as passengers.

Secretary Kissinger: That is right.

[He looks at his checklist, Tab B.] This is the checklist of things I gave orders to do. Maybe the Suez Canal photographs of October 13 I can get.

President Sadat: From October 13 on, would be helpful.

Secretary Kissinger: I will look into it.

President Sadat: Very good.

Secretary Kissinger: Shall we talk about Syrian disengagement?

President Sadat: Yes!

Secretary Kissinger: I am in favor of reinstituting the union of Syria and Egypt! [Laughter] To put all the authority in your hands.

The situation in Israel is desperate. With a Prime Minister going out, with no confidence, and a new one coming in, with no authority. It could only be a very weak government. There will be elections in early November.
The wisdom of yours in January, not going into petty details, is confirmed. They couldn't have done this agreement today.

She doesn't want to end her career in surrender.

President Sadat: Surrender!

Secretary Kissinger: And Rabin wants to stick her with the responsibility. [Laughter]

One complicating detail is that they have put settlements on the Golan Heights. I don't know if you knew this.

President Sadat: We knew they had some.

Secretary Kissinger: And each settlement belongs to a political party. So it is practically impossible for them to give up the settlements as part of the disengagement, though as part of peace they must. So this is a complicated situation.

While I was there, there were constant demonstrations against me. I met with Golda, then with the whole inner Cabinet, and then with Dayan. Dayan is the best, but he is practically out of the picture. Rabin will be good but he is not yet in control.

The only hope Israel has is on your course. If they go the route of military confrontation, they will never survive.

Let me show you Israel's thinking. This is the map Dayan brought to Washington. [Tab C]

This is the October 6 line, Damascus is up here.

You can hear the guns from Damascus; I could hear them last night.

They are proposing they go back to here [The blue line]; the Syrians advance to here [The red line]; and a UN buffer here.

But they say the Syrians can return to here with civilians.

President Sadat: Refugees.
Secretary Kissinger: Yes. So it is an improvement.

I have told them I would refuse to present this map in Syria -- it is not consistent with the dignity of Syria. I told them I would not support the Syrian map, but also would not transmit this. I said if it breaks down on this, we wouldn't support them.

I have not told Asad this; he would get too confident.

President Sadat: It would make him more adamant.

Secretary Kissinger: That is right.

I don't want to bore you with the emotion this produced. I went through the consequences, internationally, for your position, for Asad's position. I went through the same thing with the Cabinet in the evening. Then I asked Dayan to come to my hotel room. I asked him, "As a friend, what do you think can be done?"

President Sadat: Straightforward.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, and I then went back to Mrs. Meir in the morning to see her views.

What I am going to discuss now should not go to Asad yet because it may not pass the Cabinet. I will only discuss it with Dayan, and carefully with her.

Let me show you an aerial map of Kuneitra. [He shows aerial map from briefing book, Tab D.] You know Kuneitra. I have insisted on Kuneitra.

Their Chief of Staff insists any line less than this [Shows on map] jeopardizes Israel's national security. He is one of those generals who looks at life through the eyes of a platoon commander [Laughter] Their previous one, Elazar, was very helpful on Egypt.

President Sadat: You told me.

Secretary Kissinger: [Indicating on the aerial map] They say they have electronic things here, and settlements here. We have to look at the realities. I have not discussed it with Asad.
President Sadat: It is much better not to at this stage.

Secretary Kissinger: Incidentally, this picture was taken from 80,000 feet.

President Sadat: Amazing. Very precise.

Secretary Kissinger: Dayan said he is willing to support turning part of Kuneitra east of the main road over to the Syrians. The whole town, you know, is destroyed. To have UN buildings put in on the other side of the road, and then a buffer zone up to the foot of the hills, in which there are no Israeli forces. The Israeli forces would start up here [Up in the hills]. The whole thing would become a buffer zone. Here is an Israeli-built reservoir. Maybe we could get them to build a new road. So he thinks a substantial part of Kuneitra could go to the Syrians.

Also he thinks this salient here, which includes the town of Rafid, could return to the Syrians.

He is also willing to give the intervening territory -- up to the Israeli line -- to the Syrians so they can bring the civilians back. On this [In the northern sector], he is willing to go back to this line [The old Syrian October 6 line] and have the rest as a buffer zone.

[Takes another map from his briefing book.] They would get all these villages.

[He asks Eilts to get from Sanders the map showing what Israel might mean.]

This is what we think is obtainable. It may be a little optimistic. The blue line is....

President Sadat: 6 October.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. I am not sure we can get it. I have to give you a new wrinkle. What Dayan wants is, if they go back 2 kilometers here or whatever [In the south], the Syrians have to go back 2 kilometers and enlarge the buffer zone. The Syrians have their administration anyway. My view is the Syrians will not go back.

President Sadat: Inconceivable.
Minister Fahmi: Will they give up those hills?

Secretary Kissinger: No.

Minister Fahmi: They can hit Kuneitra any time.

Secretary Kissinger: But that is silly because they can hit it anyway.

President Sadat: Even from 10 kilometers.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. Both are silly arguments. If I were the Israeli Prime Minister, I would accept close to the Syrian line because it isn't worth it.

The problem with the hills is the settlements they have there.

President Sadat: It is insane.

Secretary Kissinger: Politically insane.

President Sadat: They should not have done it.

Secretary Kissinger: I thought they were just in the Golan Heights.

President Sadat: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: Of course if the Syrians could get this whole bulge, they would get Kuneitra, would get Rafid and would get something here.

President Sadat: I have asked Marshal Ismail and Gamasy to come, because he has discussed it with Asad. The question is whether we can get something behind the 6 October line; this is essential. If we can get that, we are on the right road.

Secretary Kissinger: They will get Kuneitra.

President Sadat: That is very important.

Secretary Kissinger: They will get it if you support it. If I can tell the Israelis you will support it. This [Dayan's Washington map] is the Cabinet-approved map.
What she says is, whether they like it or not, you were across the Canal and they [Syrians] are not.

President Sadat: Ismail told Asad this.

Minister Fahmi: Where will the UN be?

Secretary Kissinger: The UN will be [indicating] from here to here. But with Syrian civil administration and police; the UN will not administer it.

Minister Fahmi: Has President Asad changed his view between UNEF and observers?

Secretary Kissinger: He won't allow anything called UNEF but he agreed there should be no Russians, and there can be more observers, and they can be armed. I don't know what the difference is.

President Sadat: As I told you in November, because the Golan is populated, when there is a final settlement, he does not want UN forces. It is not like the Sinai. So he agreed to observers. I told them it has to be UN forces as I did.

Secretary Kissinger: We strongly want the UN there. On limitations of forces on both sides, they want lines here, at 10, 25 kilometers.

President Sadat: They cannot accept this. In Sinai, you had 200 kilometers.

Secretary Kissinger: But there should be some limitation, maybe a simple rule about no artillery that can reach the other line.

President Sadat: We can arrange it. Can the UN move in on the other side [west of the line]?

Secretary Kissinger: If you were dealing with sane people. But here are Israeli settlements, and here. It is insane. If they were back here, it would be part of the peace settlement.

President Sadat: We can't approach this frontally. We have to have some flank approach.

Secretary Kissinger: See, I just showed this to Asad. I said I was not endorsing it but I just wanted him to see the difference. But he got extremely angry. He said it would start a war of extermination.
President Sadat: Who would be exterminated?

Secretary Kissinger: He thinks Israel. But our assessment is that Syria would lose.

President Sadat: We must make a flank approach, Henry.

Secretary Kissinger: See, what Syria would get is Kuneitra, Rafid, and the rest, for civilian administration.

President Sadat: Then, if we can start the United Nations from here, it would be acceptable. And I would support it 100%.

Secretary Kissinger: That puts the Israeli settlements in the UN zone.

President Sadat/Minister Fahmi: But it is Syrian territory.

President Sadat: And Syrian villages are in the UN zone.

Minister Fahmi: And would be to Israel's advantage to have the UN there, to guard them against subversion, and so on.

Secretary Kissinger: They would never accept it. Not on this trip. It would have to be from the President.

Minister Fahmi: Why not do it from here?

Secretary Kissinger: He has already written a very tough letter to Mrs. Meir. It looks inadequate to you, but I will be able to get it only with the most massive pressure. It is not even remotely agreed to.

President Sadat: As I told you, let us have a flank approach telling them something we can do in Egypt here, or agree to, to play a role in this.

Minister Fahmi: This would be essential -- because if the Syrians only get the pocket.....

President Sadat: The Soviets will be raising difficulties with us and the whole Arab world.

Secretary Kissinger: Even getting this [pocket] back?
President Sadat: Yes.

Minister Fahmi: They see it very simply. It is a psychological problem. We had a pocket; they have a pocket.

Secretary Kissinger: But you had five divisions in Sinai.

President Sadat: Ismail told them that, but they want what we got. I tell you frankly, Henry, the whole thing can be managed if they get the pocket and anything beyond that.

Secretary Kissinger: Which pocket?

President Sadat: Containing Kuneitra. And any kilometer beyond October 6.

Secretary Kissinger: What about Rafid?

President Sadat: Very good. But then they want the UN there.

Minister Fahmi: The President's proposal.

Secretary Kissinger: Israel has not agreed to anything here.

President Sadat: It is a question of what I can sell to the whole Arab world and support. Give them something beyond the October 6 line including Kuneitra.

Secretary Kissinger: But no UN. The Israelis say the Syrians can come back as civilians but no military forces.

President Sadat: No military forces, I agree.

The UN starts after that -- I think it can be managed.

Minister Fahmi: Short of the settlements. Israeli settlements are not included in the UN buffer zone.

Secretary Kissinger: It will not work, probably, but let's discuss what you can support, and secondly, let's discuss on the hypothesis that it works and on the hypothesis it doesn't.
The President sent a very tough letter to Mrs. Meir from his plane, saying we couldn't support Israel if they are unreasonable. It will be delivered at 6:00 p.m. today. If it fails, we could combine the next phase with the President's trip, unless you think it should be finished.

President Sadat: This should be finished first.

Minister Fahmi: It would change everything.

President Sadat: For many reasons, not just for his visit, but for the future of the whole area.

Secretary Kissinger: Can we bring Saunders in? [Saunders is brought in]

Hal, what we are discussing is this: You know the map better than I do. I have told the President what might emerge from the Israelis, though it hasn't yet. To extend the buffer zone, with Syrian civilians and civil administration. That is a progress for Syria. The President believes this must be Syrian, and demilitarized, and that the UN zone should start at the far end of the Syrian line and extend short of the settlements. The distinction between UN-occupied territory and Syrian demilitarized territory.

President Sadat: Quite right. The whole theory is based on this: Let's give the Syrians the whole pocket first and any distance we can have with the Israelis, including Kuneitra, beyond the October 6 line. It is purely psychological. Anything like that I can support 100%, even in the Arab world.

Secretary Kissinger: What is attainable is, Syrian civil administration can return to this buffer zone. So the difference is, I believe the Israelis will insist on UN observers in this zone.

Minister Fahmi: What is the sense of UN observers? To observe Syrians against Syrians?

Secretary Kissinger: No, to observe whether the zone is demilitarized.

Minister Fahmi: How can you put the UN with Syrians?

Secretary Kissinger: Israel may be able to justify it to its Parliament as widening the buffer zones and putting the UN in.
Minister Fahmi: There will be thinned-out forces.

Secretary Kissinger: I am not sure the Syrians will agree to any reasonable UN forces.

President Sadat's point is that before there is a UN zone, the Syrians must be able to say they get something beyond the October 6 line which is Syrian.

Minister Fahmi: We had a pocket; they have a pocket. What the Syrians would like, to save face in the Arab world, is to get exactly what President Sadat got. It is taken for granted they will get it, and something beyond October 6.

Secretary Kissinger: Everywhere but in Israel! Which is a slight problem.

Mr. Saunders: You are coming to a very thin UN zone.

Secretary Kissinger: The Israelis will never agree to give it back to Syria.

Minister Fahmi: Give it to the UN.

Secretary Kissinger: I had the idea of giving the Syrians the buffer zone, much like the President's, then a UN zone starting on the other side. Even that the Israelis have rejected. The President is saying, give this to the Syrians, then put the UN in a very thin zone.

Mr. Saunders: Probably only 1-2 kilometers.

Secretary Kissinger: [Takes out the aerial map and checks the scale.] From here [middle of Kuneitra] to here [the road to the west] to the UN.

Is this SR-71 or satellite?

Mr. Saunders: I think it is satellite.

Secretary Kissinger: So it is even better photography, 80-100 miles.

You think they will not accept just civil administration in Kuneitra? I mean, that they can have. You mean, no UN force?

President Sadat: Yes, just give them Kuneitra, full.
Secretary Kissinger: Thinking out loud, if one increased the buffer zone, in effect it would be a demilitarized zone, with Syrian administration, and then a sliver of UN.

Minister Fahmi: This would make the trip.

Secretary Kissinger: Can that be done?

Mr. Saunders: It would change the concept of the UN line, very thin.

President Sadat: We had that in some places.

Secretary Kissinger: I need your estimate of what is attainable. If I could get this pocket [Kuneitra] and this [Rafid] as part of the buffer, with no UN but just civil administration. With the UN elsewhere. But they get two areas clear.

Minister Fahmi: Where are the Israelis?

Secretary Kissinger: The Israelis are on the other side.

Minister Fahmi: The UN must separate them. You can't put Syrians and Israelis face to face.

Secretary Kissinger: No, because Syrian military forces will not go further than this.

Minister Fahmi: I am not talking about demilitarization or thinning out.

Mr. Saunders: You don't want the Syrian civilians across the road from the Israeli military.

Minister Fahmi: There should be 2-3 kilometers between the Syrians and the Israelis; they shouldn't even see each other. Here, in Kuneitra, it will be only 1 kilometer, but here [further south], where there are settlements, there is more depth.

Secretary Kissinger: They want to stay on the hills.

President Sadat: Why not UNEF on the hills? Then you could pressurize Asad to allow UNEF, not observers.

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[Kissinger goes out for a moment, and President Sadat continues with Saunders.]

**President Sadat:** A very difficult problem, but it should be approached from a political aspect and not only from the military aspect. It is to their benefit, and ours too, that this fire should be ceased. Both sides are suffering casualties. And at the same time we have the Soviet Union which is maneuvering for extreme positions. For Israel's internal problems, they need quiet, a breathing space, to sort out their house. I, myself, want breathing space to prepare everything for the next step. Can't they understand this? Asad is raising hell for me in the Arab world. They should have an understanding of this. It is in their benefit, 100%. We are not trying to get their settlements, but we are saying that psychologically they [the Syrians] must have something behind October 6. What it is, we can discuss. It must include Kuneitra. I can sell it to the whole Arab world, and save face for Hafez Asad.

**Minister Fahmi:** And save trouble for June 1, when they consider the oil embargo.

**President Sadat:** We are looking toward the next step.

[Kissinger returns.]

I was just telling Saunders: They shouldn't look at only the military aspect. How am I going to sell it to the Arab world and save Asad's face? They need quiet too. And then there are the maneuvers of the Soviet Union. And then, I was telling Saunders, we are aiming at the next step. It does not give me any arguments to use in the Arab world.

**Secretary Kissinger:** My view of the next steps -- we should make Egypt the leader.

**Minister Fahmi:** And anything we agree to, they will do too.

**President Sadat:** But the settlements raise a very difficult problem for us.

**Secretary Kissinger:** I didn't know about these settlements. Did you [Hal]?

**Mr. Saunders:** I knew they had them; I didn't know they were so far forward until we started mapping them.
Secretary Kissinger: Can I say a few words to you alone, Mr. President?

[Kissinger and Sadat confer alone 12:40 - 12:57. The meeting then resumed.]

Secretary Kissinger: I have no objection to moving it to your Committee.

I told Fahmi that Gromyko is coming to Damascus tomorrow. They said they wouldn't let him if I said not to, but that was too dangerous for me. I couldn't be in the position of blocking his trip. They would tell him. Secondly, I thought, if he came, it was better if he came before I presented the map than after.

For the Syrians, the Israelis in the pocket on the west bank of the Canal were in a much better position than here. It is not a pocket, with Mount Hermon behind them. The Jordanian Chief of Staff agrees.

President Sadat: It appears to me, Henry, that you stopped Israelis outside of Damascus.

Secretary Kissinger: I did.

President Sadat: [Laughs] I told my people that.

Secretary Kissinger: What is agreed is, they get something back and their police can come back. I am trying to get clear what is the difference between what we have and what you say we need.

President Sadat: The question is: Can Hafez Asad have a few kilometers beyond October 6 to save his face?

Secretary Kissinger: He gets civil administration in Kuneitra, Rafid, and a few kilometers in the buffer zone. What he cannot get is to move his forces there.

President Sadat: I agree.

Mr. Saunders: We can let the UN have the right just to inspect.

President Sadat: On both sides.
Secretary Kissinger: We can write any number of things. The Israelis have not agreed to anything beyond October 6, except maybe Rafid. I think I can probably get Kuneitra. The only other thing is to widen the buffer, but Dayan's idea is that they can do it only if the Syrians withdraw too.

President Sadat: It can't be.

Secretary Kissinger: Dayan says he can work it out with the Syrians that nobody has to move the military line at all. But the whole buffer is called Syrian.

Minister Fahmi: We have to distinguish between the map and the secret document on thinning out forces.

President Sadat: It is no longer secret; I declared it before the Central Committee.

Minister Fahmi: It is thinning on both sides. Here [south of the pocket], the Syrians will thin out. And this should satisfy Dayan, and he can thin out too.

Secretary Kissinger: Dayan's idea is, the Syrians can show on the map that all this is now Syrian territory.

Minister Fahmi: That is exactly what I am talking about, but Dayan is giving the Syrians sovereignty over Syrian territory.

Secretary Kissinger: What I mean is, it can be shown as Syrian.

President Sadat: The Israelis want everything reciprocal.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. Assuming I can get them away from that -- what is the maximum that we can get?

Hal, which road in Kuneitra do you think they mean?

[There was a discussion about the two north-south roads shown going through Kuneitra.]

Mr. Rodman: The way Dayan described it, the western portion was smaller.

Secretary Kissinger: If that is the road, there is no problem.
Asad said he would stop the raids.

When I showed him this map, he got extremely angry. He said the Israelis are expansionist and he can never live in peace with them. Which is probably true.

President Sadat: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: He insists on his map and said he can give not one kilometer more. [He shows Sadat Shihabi's proposal, Tab E.] That is totally impossible.

President Sadat: Yes.

Dayan thinks he can give something here beyond October 6?

Secretary Kissinger: Dayan thinks he can give Kuneitra east of some road, whichever it is.

President Sadat: The main bulk would be given.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, and he said if I am very brutal, they might build another road. And it would be under total Syrian civil administration, including police. And the same down there in Rafid, in that triangle.

In addition, he [Dayan] thought -- and he would have to work it out -- he would be willing to give to Syrian civil administration all the territory before their main line of defense. But he didn't know if it was one kilometer or two kilometers -- he would have to work it out. But only if the Syrians do the same.

President Sadat: Israel's military line would move back?

Secretary Kissinger: The legal line does, but his real defense line is on the ridge behind and it would not have to move. But no one has to know that. The map would be drawn with his line here instead of here.

Minister Fahmi: What about up here? [In the far north]

Secretary Kissinger: This is very mountainous and raises another problem. I don't think they will give anything up there.
President Sadat: With this concept, I think you will have it.

Minister Fahmi: You didn't show Hafez this?

Secretary Kissinger: No, on the theory that if I showed this, any other map will look good.

President Sadat: I think we can agree to this, with Kuneitra.

Secretary Kissinger: There are two possibilities. This is what I can get while I am here. If we don't settle with this, I have to go back to America. It is not enough to get the President to send a letter. Because I am the one who has to testify to the committees and defend it.

Minister Fahmi: The problem now is not Israel but Syria.

President Sadat: The problem is both.

Secretary Kissinger: My estimate is that Asad will not buy it.

Minister Fahmi: That is my point. The problem is Asad. Dayan supports it.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, but he is on the way out. My estimate is Asad wants it.

Minister Fahmi: That's the first time.

Secretary Kissinger: But he is not like you. If I may be insulting, he thinks like an Israeli -- every time you make a point, he makes a counterpoint. Before, I thought you made him do it. But this time I got the impression he really wants it. Khaddam -- I don't know what it proves -- made a speech at lunch praising me to the skies.

You should not give this to the Syrians because I don't have this from the Israelis.

President Sadat: Yes, but between ourselves. We can not decide for the Israelis or for Asad.

Minister Fahmi: Henry really must finish on this trip.

[Sadat and Fahmi confer in Arabic.]
President Sadat: I am discussing with Fahmi the other issue, on the theory that something can't be reached on this stage, and it would be discussed in that committee, without the two powers.

Secretary Kissinger: That's no problem for me!

President Sadat: It will be coming from me. First, Asad agrees to come to my committee; second, I say I will proceed further as I did before, without the two superpowers.

Minister Fahmi: You are cutting out the Russians twice.

President Sadat: Yes! I say before the whole Arab world I am proceeding this way.

Minister Fahmi: Maybe Asad will not agree without the Russians.

Secretary Kissinger: Once the Russians are there, there will be no agreement.

Minister Fahmi: If you work on Asad, he will buy it, in my judgment.

Secretary Kissinger: This?

Minister Fahmi: Yes. I am not talking about the Israelis.

Secretary Kissinger: You do not think Asad would make the whole thing there a buffer zone? His administration goes forward anyway.

Minister Fahmi: Thinning, or demilitarized, has to be in a separate document.

Secretary Kissinger: Let me explain what I know -- what I am confident -- I can get. Almost confident. This salient [in the north], this salient [Kuneitra], and this [Rafid]. This line [south of Kuneitra] I am almost certain to get if there is something on the Syrian side. Assuming I can talk them out of symmetry, they will want a force there. Because we can call them observers and give them the characteristics of a force. Is this a problem for you?

President Sadat: Yes. From my point of view, yes.

Secretary Kissinger: Asad can show he has gained something.

President Sadat: Something beyond October 6.
Secretary Kissinger: Kuneitra and Rafid.

Minister Fahmi/President Sadat: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: It is not that he is not gaining anything. The only remaining issue, Mr. President, is whether there is UNEF or UNTSO.

Minister Fahmi: The President said he will support it.

Secretary Kissinger: Support it?

President Sadat: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: If I can tell them that, that gives them a positive incentive.

Minister Fahmi: Suppose they leak it, before you tell Asad?

Secretary Kissinger: I will tell them it is their entire responsibility.

President Sadat: And I will deny it.

Secretary Kissinger: I will tell them you will deny it.

I will not tell the whole Cabinet; I will tell Golda.

I am willing to stay here 10 days. It will be a nightmare because I am dealing with two maniacs. [laughter] Then we have moved, and we can do things.

I think Boumediene will support it. All I told him is that I would try to get Kuneitra and something south of it.

Maybe if the Israelis accept it tomorrow, you [Hal] could go to Algeria. The only problem is, how do we get you there?

President Sadat: We will give you a plane. And I will send Ashraf [Marwan] with him.

Secretary Kissinger: Very good. Then I will delay Damascus until Tuesday.
President Sadat: I quite agree. You must use Boumediene. He can save Hafez's face.

Secretary Kissinger: I think he really wants a settlement.

President Sadat: Boumediene.

Secretary Kissinger: Hafez. Boumediene is really eager to get into an economic relationship with us. We will do it after we do it with you. We will keep him one step behind. So he has an interest in a Syrian settlement.

President Sadat: I shall be informing Faisal too. Boumediene and Faisal.

Secretary Kissinger: After we have this map. We could both send somebody. Do you have enough planes? Maybe I will send you [Saunders] and Atherton.

We can get one of our planes, too, if it is necessary. It is up to you.

Minister Fahmi: Henry, Ashraf can go today to Faisal.

Secretary Kissinger: We don't have a map.

Minister Fahmi: He can give him a general idea. It is very dangerous, anyway, to talk with Faisal with a map. He [Marwan] goes from Faisal to Amman and comes here with Saunders and Nancy.

Secretary Kissinger: Good idea.

For five years, Saunders told me I was too mean towards the Arabs. I told him there was a strategy. I told him in politics, timing is everything, and when I move, I will move more towards the Arabs than anyone. But I couldn't do it during Vietnam, and until I had more control.

Mr. Saunders: [Pointing to map] This is what you are trying to get?

President Sadat: Tell him, for psychological reasons, that you are getting Kuneitra and something more than the October 6 line.

Secretary Kissinger: Tell him this is what I am working on in Israel.

I think it's a very good idea.
Mr. Rodman: Should it be in secret?

Secretary Kissinger: Should we say we are sending Saunders?

Minister Fahmi: Why? Marwan will just go; no one will know.

Secretary Kissinger: All right. If it leaks out, we will confirm it. I will tell Golda. Should I tell Boumediene Saunders is coming?

Minister Fahmi: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: I will send him a message that I am sending Saunders and someone from President Sadat's staff.

President Sadat: I will send a message too.

Secretary Kissinger: I think it is a very good thing.

President Sadat: It is pressure, and saving face for Hafez. Pressure and saving face.

Secretary Kissinger: How can I keep you informed? I can send a message. I can come here Monday.

Minister Fahmi: He can't be away from Nancy for two days!

Secretary Kissinger: I will send you a telegram about the Israeli position.

If I feel I should come, can I?

President Sadat: Always. Of course. Whenever you wish.

Minister Fahmi: This is important psychologically, when they see you coming here.

Secretary Kissinger: Should I tell Faisal I am sending someone?

President Sadat: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: Hermann, tell His Majesty I want to keep him informed. I have just briefed President Sadat and we both feel His Majesty should be briefed.
Would he be offended if Saunders comes on an Egyptian plane?

President Sadat: Not at all.

Secretary Kissinger: And send one to Boumediene. Tell him it is a very difficult negotiation, and so complex that I thought it better to send a personal messenger.

Should they see a map?

President Sadat: Boumediene, yes, he must have a map.

Secretary Kissinger: Show him the Israeli map we started with, too. With Faisal, you don't need a map.

President Sadat: Just say Kuneitra and something beyond the October 6 line.

Secretary Kissinger: Say he is getting Kuneitра, Rafid, and some movement, and return of Syrian administration to all these places.

President Sadat: Very good.

Secretary Kissinger: If I know the King, he will be terribly jealous that I am doing it all through you.

Ambassador Eilts: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: I have learned not to praise you -- to praise you, but not too much. [laughter]

[to Saunders] I will give you a message in writing.

[to Eilts] Get the Station Chief in Cairo to send it to the Station Chief there, to give it to Kamal Adham. Can we risk not telling Saqqaf?

Mr. Marwan: For the CIA channel, Saqqaf is out.

Secretary Kissinger: Saqqaf is out.

Mr. Marwan: When he arrives, Saqqaf will know.

Secretary Kissinger: [to Saunders] You will have a whole day. I will give you a message to give Saqqaf. You should make an effort to see him.

SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS
President Sadat: You really understand the psychology.

Secretary Kissinger: The Arabs have humanity. It is time-consuming, but...

Ambassador Eilts: To Boumedienne?

Secretary Kissinger: Tell him I am sending my oldest White House associate Saunders, to get his counsel.

President Sadat: And understanding.

Secretary Kissinger: When I talk to the Israelis about you, I can say it is the first step towards peace. About the Syrians, I cannot honestly say this. We need an agreement with Syria to enable you to go forward.

[to Saunders] The King does not need a map, or distances. Tell him it is a difficult negotiation but Syrian civil administration is going in.

Minister Fahmi: Tell Boumediene you need his support.

Secretary Kissinger: Right. [to Saunders] Tell him: To achieve everything we seek, we need his support. You can assure him that we are committed to full implementation of Resolution 242. This is not a final line.

Minister Fahmi: Fill him in on Gromyko.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. Tell him if this fails it will go into international forums. The Soviets will be active.

Now all I need to do is to get the Israelis to agree. [laughter]

President Sadat: Maybe I should say something to them.

Secretary Kissinger: Maybe a message saying the reason you need this is so that you can go ahead. Let me think about it.

Mr. Saunders: Sir, the press on the plane will notice if I am away two days.

Secretary Kissinger: I think tomorrow I will say I have sent him to Riyadh and then he will go to Algiers.

President Sadat: No, it is better not to.
Minister Fahmi: Asad will feel that you are pressurizing him.

Secretary Kissinger: All right.

One other problem is, the Syrians apparently promised the Russians they could be present at the signing. I have told the Syrians I will not be present at the signing and the U.S. will not be. We were not at Kilometer 101. I know the Israelis will not want them.

President Sadat: It will not work.

Secretary Kissinger: Frankly, I don't care about it.

[looks at the map] Ismail, you think even if the Israelis insist on something over here [symmetrical Syrian movement], he can still show that the Israeli line has moved west.

Ambassador Eilts: How secure is the phone?

President Sadat: 100%.

Ambassador Eilts: Because I will be saying these two messages over the phone.

Secretary Kissinger: [to Saunders] When you talk to Boumedienne there is no reason to give him 10 possibilities. Just tell him the situation.

President Sadat: When he shows him the Israeli map and what you are working on.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, and tell him he has to understand our domestic situation, the Israeli domestic situation, and our long-term objective. In Washington he told me, "Don't demonetize President Sadat." That is an exact quote. You can repeat to him what I told him privately: We do not consider this a final line. But we have to get the Israelis thinking about withdrawing.

Minister Fahmi: Tell him about the commissions.

Secretary Kissinger: Tell him, when we get this, the whole evolution will change -- economic commissions, political relations.
Minister Fahmi: Linkage is really necessary.

Secretary Kissinger: [to Saunders] Draft a letter to Saqqaf. Put it on the basis that I am dispatching you on short notice -- when the possibility of the Egyptian plane presented itself.

[Sadat, Fahmi and Marwan confer in Arabic.]

Mr. Saunders: When I see Saqqaf, should I brief him along the same lines as the King?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes.

Supposing I do not finish it, should I still visit [in the Persian Gulf]?

President Sadat: Oh, yes. Yes. Better.

Minister Fahmi: We have some people there.

Ambassador Eilts: We have someone in Qatar.

Secretary Kissinger: My people say I should go to Oman also.

President Sadat: I do not recommend it. It would be unpopular in the Arab world because of his new relations with Iran.

[Bremer is called in and told to intercept the outgoing cable with the projected Oman stop.]

Ambassador Eilts: Does the Minister have a copy of that arms list?

Minister Fahmi: Yes.

Ambassador Eilts: I do not need a copy.

Minister Fahmi: I will give you one.

Ambassador Eilts: What do I have to do in exchange? [laughter]

Minister Fahmi: When will you give us that other list? [The Secretary's Checklist, Tab B.]
Secretary Kissinger: Here, you can look at it.

[The Secretary lets him read it. Later the Secretary agreed that a copy, minus the headings and certain of the items, could be given to Fahmi.]

[The Secretary and the President, and members of the party moved into the next room for luncheon, at about 2:15 p.m.]

President Sadat: I have been telling the Arab world it is only a cease-fire agreement. It is so we can have the opportunity to go forward to deal with the whole problem.

There is no point in delaying this.

Secretary Kissinger: It is a weird experience to be in Israel these days. There is no one there with any strategy or political conceptions. Rabin, Dayan -- but the rest are children.

President Sadat: We lived with this for six years.

Secretary Kissinger: It is stupid. A nation of 3 million cannot survive against the whole Arab world.

President Sadat: But in peace.

Secretary Kissinger: When you see Cairo, which has twice the population of Israel....

President Sadat: When they were on the West Bank of the Canal, they talked about going to Cairo. I said, let them come to Cairo and see.

Secretary Kissinger: I asked them, if you defeat them, where will you go?

Minister Fahmi: Golda will go?

Secretary Kissinger: Actually, she is a stronger person. And she has learned something. You have given them a terrible blow. It is more psychological than territorial. This is what Asad has to learn.

Actually, the Egyptian disengagement agreement overthrew Golda, because the concepts of the whole generation had been overthrown.
Rabin is more intellectual, better educated. Golda is more emotional. He wants her to take responsibility. [laughter]

President Sadat: We have a saying: Let the other fellow tell the dirty jokes; then I am clean. [laughter]

Ambassador Eilts: Is she strong enough to do this?

Secretary Kissinger: This she might barely do; beyond this, no.

Ambassador Eilts: Might Dayan join Likud?

Secretary Kissinger: No. He is very bitter. Although he has been badly treated, and he is a good candidate, he will not join the opposition.

He dislikes Rabin, unfortunately, although the two of them usually agree.

Minister Fahmi: Allon?

Secretary Kissinger: Allon is a pretty good man. But he will have to leave too. His settlement is right near the Golan Heights.

Mr. Saunders: Also, he is the leader of the movement which sponsored some of those that are up there.

Secretary Kissinger: It is absolutely irresponsible. Absolutely irresponsible. All these years they were talking about negotiations; what the hell would there be to negotiate about?

What is your judgment of the Israeli generals, Mr. President? Are they able?

President Sadat: Militarily or politically?

Secretary Kissinger: Militarily.


Minister Fahmi: Especially on the field of battle.

Secretary Kissinger: Politically, they are idiots.
President Sadat: It appears so.

Secretary Kissinger: I have asked our military to give us their idea of what a strategic arms agreement with the Russians would look like. They proposed that the Russians be limited to one-third of what we knew they are planning, that we be allowed 250 more than we are planning, and add 15 submarines, and that I should take this up with Gromyko the next time I see him! You think he will accept it? [laughter]

[to Marwan] I am told all the other equipment is in good shape.

Mr. Marwan: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: If there is anything wrong, let me know.

Ambassador Eilts: The walkie-talkies will be coming on May 1.

Secretary Kissinger: My Director of the Central Intelligence Agency was hurt: He told me he has never seen anything move so fast in 20 years, and that I should scold him for not moving it faster!

Ambassador Eilts: Mr. Secretary, have you any idea when you might come through here?

Secretary Kissinger: I would have to check with the President. My idea was that if it succeeds, I would come through on the way out of here.

President Sadat: Either way. It would be better.

Ambassador Eilts: Mr. President, will you be here or in Cairo?

President Sadat: I will be here as long as the Secretary is in the area.

Really, I haven't had one day of rest since I was elected President. So I am working here.

Secretary Kissinger: It [rest] is essential.

President Sadat: I had no rest in October. Until you reached me in November and we did the Six Points.

Secretary Kissinger: It was a historical turning point.

SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS
President Sadat: The historical turning point was when you saved the two divisions. No other Secretary of State would have done that.

Secretary Kissinger: There are many articles now in Israel that I prevented their victory.

   I must say, in retrospect, I never have understood what strategy you were pursuing with Hafez Ismail. He was very careful, and not as imaginative and creative as your Foreign Minister.

President Sadat: He is very rigid. When I made the decision to expel the Soviet technicians, he presented his resignation. He said, "Why do you do this? I do not understand!" It was beyond him. He was too slow.

Secretary Kissinger: And not very inspirational. A nice man. He didn't intimidate me like your Foreign Minister does. [laughter]

   As you have found, when there is a crisis, everything becomes very quiet around it. You can ignore trivia.

President Sadat: And concentrate on essentials.

Secretary Kissinger: In November I could not understand why you would send your Minister of Tourism. Now I know. [laughter]

Ambassador Elits: In November you were here touring.

President Sadat: We were preparing him.

[General Gamassiy arrives and joins the luncheon.]

Secretary Kissinger: Did you come from Cairo just now?

General Gamassiy: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: By helicopter?

General Gamassiy: By Ilyushin.

Secretary Kissinger: President Asad makes even General Gamassiy look moderate. [laughter]

   How many regular Army divisions does Egypt have in peacetime?
President Sadat: In peacetime, not more than five. Because we cannot afford more.

Ambassador Eilts: But they are all heavy divisions, 25,000-man divisions.

President Sadat: Quite right.

Secretary Kissinger: Do you have separate armored divisions or tanks with divisions?

President Sadat: Separate.

Secretary Kissinger: But you still keep tanks with the divisions.

President Sadat: Still. In October, during the Deversoir operation, they wanted me to withdraw all my tanks east. Then all my divisions would have been wiped out.

Secretary Kissinger: Why?

President Sadat: Because they thought I was in a fix. On the 19th.

Secretary Kissinger: It would have made the subsequent negotiation very difficult if they had been wiped out.

President Sadat: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: You moved your armored divisions rather late.

President Sadat: On the 13th.

We were trying to help Syria. We suffered losses. Instead of three-to-one, we did it with two-to-one.

Secretary Kissinger: We will try to get you the photos of October 13.

President Sadat: The Russians covered the whole thing with their Luna.

Secretary Kissinger: They told me that evening I was there [in Moscow] for the cease-fire negotiations that they were showing pictures of the military situation to the Politburo.

SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS
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SECRET/NODIS/CHEROKEE

MEMORANDUM

TO: Secretary Kissinger  Dated: May 3, 1974

FROM: Ambassador Elts, Cairo

SUBJECT: Check List of Items Requiring Attention in the Context of US-Egyptian Relations

REF: Memoranda of Conversations of April 30 and May 1, 1974.

A. The following are items which you told President Sadat you would look into in his behalf:

1. PL-480—You told the President that after July 1, we will give Egypt top priority for PL-480. If not already done, the appropriate AID and Department of Agriculture people will have to be advised.

2. Tobacco—You indicated that we hoped to make $10 million worth of tobacco available for Egypt. Although Agriculture indicated on April 30 that tobacco has been included as an eligible commodity for CCC credit, it limited the available amount to $4.5 million (State 87334). Arrangements will presumably have to be made to obtain authorization for an additional tobacco availability in the amount of $5.5 million if the $10 million amount mentioned to the President is to be achieved.

3. Bilateral Commission—You agreed that an announcement of the establishment of a bilateral US-Egyptian commission should be made on the occasion of your final visit to Egypt during your current ME tour. Thereafter, the modalities of such a commission will have to be developed.

4. FSG and UK Economic Aid for Egypt—You agreed to use your influence with the UK and with the FSG to urge that they provide economic aid for Egypt.
(5) **Arms Sales**—You undertook to provide a copy of the retyped list of proposed arms sales to Egypt.

(7) **The Leopard Tank**—You agreed to try to prepare a brand new Egyptian request to obtain some five or ten Leopard tanks through Yugoslavia. Alternatively, you suggested that the GOE might send some officers to Yugoslavia to look over the Leopard tank.

(7) **EXIM Bank**—You undertook to discuss with Mr. Casey of EXIM:

(a) The desirability of a more sympathetic EXIM posture toward Egypt;

(b) The status of the Cairo West and Nuclear Power Plant loan requests;

(c) Arrange to have Casey visit Egypt.

(NOTE: Without a more sympathetic EXIM posture toward Egypt, American businessmen have little hope of being competitive.)

(8) **Debt Rescheduling**—You indicated that we might be able to help with some debt rescheduling. Appropriate action needs to be taken with the concerned USG agencies to set this in motion.

(9) **Helicopters**—You undertook to let the President know in two weeks' time what might be done to transfer some or all of the helicopters aboard the _Iwo Jima_ to the GOE once the mine clearance mission is completed. In this connection, you also agreed to look into the possibility of Egyptian pilots training on our helicopters now here.

(10) **Suez Canal Photographs**—You told the President you would look into the possibility of getting for him the US photographs taken of the Suez Canal area on October 13 and thereafter.

(11) **Visit by Senator Jackson**—You told the President that you would try to suggest to Senator that the latter visit Egypt.

SECRET/NODES/CHEROKEE
(1) DC-9/10's—you told us you would approve some DC-9/10 sales to Egypt. The President said he would be in touch with us when this subject is finalized within the GCE.

(2) "Hot Line"—Once the Egyptians have worked out with the Japanese arrangements for an earth station, they are to let us know when to proceed on the matter of the "hot line."

(3) Egyptian Naval Requirements—Once the President has decided upon his naval strategy, he said he would be in touch with you in connection with his naval requirements.

(4) Libya—You told the President that the radar system and the eight C-130's which the Libyans have requested will be held up pending word from the President that the equipment might now be delivered. The President could use this in his dealings with the Libyans as he saw fit.

(5) North Korea—In response to the President's query, you indicated that you had no objection to a dialogue with North Korea, provided it is secret and conducted through President Sadat. It is now up to him to set this in motion if he thinks desirable.

C. I have not included the Presidential security equipment in the above since it is on my understanding that there is at the present time no real problem on this matter.

AMP: "Trills:sc 5/2/76"

SECRET/RED/CHEROKEE
SEPARATION OF FORCES PLAN

ISRAELI PROPOSAL

Legend:

- 67 CEASE FIRE LINES
- 73 CEASE FIRE LINE

Presented by Dayan to Kissinger
29 March 1974
Shokebi - April 13, 1974

Proposal of the Syrian Arab Republic

The line to which the Israeli Forces "would withdraw in order to achieve disengagement on the Golan Front.

1. The RED Zone is the zone east of Line A, in which the Syrian Forces will be located.
2. The GREEN Zone is located between Lines A and B. It is the zone separating the Syrian and Israeli Forces and will be placed under Syrian civil administration, but elements of the international supervisory force are to move about in it.
3. The BLUE Zone falls between lines B and C and in which the Israeli Forces will be located on a provisional basis.

(Translator's note -- Line C follows the boundary established between Syria and Palestine in Mandate times.)
Shihabi - April 13, 1974
Proposal of the Syrian Arab Republic

The line to which the Israeli forces would withdraw in order to achieve disengagement on the Golan Front:

1. The RED Zone is the zone east of line A, in which the Syrian forces will be located.
2. The GREEN Zone is located between lines A and B. It is the zone separating the Syrian and Israeli forces and will be placed under Syrian civil administration, but elements of the International Supervisory Force are to move about in it.
3. The BLUE Zone falls between lines B and C, in which the Israeli forces will be located on a provisional basis.

(Translator's note - Line C follows the boundary established between Syria and Palestine in Mandate times.)