SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Anwar al-Sadat, President, Arab Republic of Egypt
Ismail Fahmy, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Hermann Felt, Ambassador to Egypt
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

TIME AND DATE: Thursday, May 30, 1974
3:00 - 5:30 p.m.

PLACE: The President's Giza Residence
Cairo

KISSINGER: Here is the agreement and all the attachments. Here is a map. (Everyone laughs at all the wriggles on the map.) And all the letters attached.

You'll see that after a heroic struggle of five weeks they got exactly what you got in five days. (Laughter)

One thing I told your Foreign Minister: When this terrorism issue arose, the Israeli Cabinet unanimously voted to reject the agreement. We would have been in a difficult position in America. If they, two weeks after the Ma'alot massacre, could have said I brought pressure to legitimize it, I would have been destroyed.

Sadat: Of course.

Kissinger: So she will say in the Knesset that if there are armed attacks across the line they will treat it as a violation of the ceasefire and we will support them politically. It is not a US statement, but something she says. This may cause a problem with the Palestinians. But they should follow your strategy: If they make a tremendous uproar against us it will change nothing and make it more difficult for us to contact them.
Sadat: There is a big difference between Arafat and the others. Arafat visited me in my village when you were here.

Kissinger: Yes, I know.

Sadat: And he and I are in complete accord on strategy. The others are trying to get him in accord. You need not worry about Arafat.

Kissinger: Incidentally, this issue is why I went to Syria again. Asad said he understood but couldn’t say I discussed it with him. It was not very heroic. (Laughter)

Sadat: There haven’t been attacks across his line for two years!

Kissinger: He told me it wouldn’t take place. He told me that he’ll stop it, that there will be no armed attacks.

Do you think this is a problem?

Sadat: Not at all. In the next stage you will have contact with Arafat.

Kissinger: Yes.

Sadat: In Morocco.

Kissinger: Yes. At first, at a level below me. As soon as disengagement is completed.

The Israelis are very nervous now. It was psychologically very difficult for Israel. You remember the demonstrations against me there.

In July, I will establish contact with them. After I come back from Moscow.

Sadat: And about Kim Il-sung. He danced when I said you were willing for contact and would do it in Cairo. Literally danced. You will have contact?

Kissinger: Personally?

Sadat: No.

Kissinger: We got an overture through Romania. But you tell him we will reject the Romanian one and he should understand.
Maybe Hermann can do it initially.

Sadat: Very good. Very good.

Kissinger: That's easiest to deny if anything happens. When I am here with the President I'll talk to you about it.

Sadat: Very good.

Kissinger: But in principle we are prepared.

Sadat: On the Commission.

Fahmy: He has a draft.

Kissinger: We have a draft. But I wondered if we should do it when the President is here. What do you think?

Fahmy: We thought this would be the occasion, after your success in Damascus.

Sadat: And the Saudi Commission being announced next week.

Kissinger: All right. We'll do it.

Fahmy: Asad will resume diplomatic relations?

Kissinger: After disengagement is completed.

Is it all right to show him all the Soviet messages from the October 6 war?

Sadat: It is all right.

Kissinger: And we would be willing to show them to you too.

Here is a draft (TabA) on the Commission. Do we want to call it the Joint Commission, or the Joint Economic Commission?

Fahmy: It would have a political sense.

Kissinger: We'll change a few words.

Should we do it at the airport?

Fahmy: We can do it here, when you and the President meet the press.

Kissinger: Could we delay the official announcement until
our arrival in Washington?

Fahmy: We can say we've agreed on the Commission and the announcement will be later.

Kissinger: Good.

Fahmy: Noon local time!

Kissinger: So we just say we've decided to establish a Joint Cooperation Commission.

Fahmy: Yes.

Kissinger: For intensified cooperation in economic, scientific and technical fields.

Fahmy: Yes.

Kissinger: Should we say military? We'd get some attention.

Fahmy: I'm ready. If your Congress will only agree.

Kissinger: You notice we've gotten our Secretary of Defense to say increasingly friendly things about you.

Fahmy: Yes.

We need not at this juncture say anything about the first meeting.

Kissinger: (After spending a few minutes editing the draft at Tab A) May I read it?

Sadat: Yes.

Kissinger: (reads): "The Governments of the United States and Egypt agreed today to the formation of a Joint Cooperation Commission which will be designed to promote intensified cooperation in the economic, scientific and cultural fields between the two countries. Both governments are convinced that such a Joint Commission will enable the United States and Egypt to develop far-reaching programs to their mutual benefit.

"Today's agreement is a result of a series of discussions between President Anwar Sadat and Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and reflects the deep desire of the two countries to strengthen their overall relationships. In agreeing to establish this Joint Commission, both governments are further reaffirming their hope that a lasting peace in the Middle East will be realized thus helping the
people of the area enjoy the rewards of stability and development.

"The Commission will be chaired by the Foreign Ministers of each country. It will establish working groups. Its first meeting will take place in the near future."
(End text)

Fahmy: May we add one word -- "just" -- "a lasting and just peace." In Arabic our people are used to it.

Kissinger: Good. (He adds the word and gives the draft to Eilts, who goes out to get it retyped.)

Sadat: Houari Boumediene will be establishing relations?

Kissinger: Yes, I think after Syrian disengagement.

Sadat: Better send him a message. (Sadat talks with Fahmy in Arabic.)

Kissinger: I'm wondering about one other thing. Could you hold off the release until 6:00 tomorrow afternoon? Eleven o'clock from the White House. It is a much better time. It will be carried over our networks and the press. We could read it in the morning to our Congressional leaders whom we are briefing. Noon would be better, in fact. It would be 7:00 here. Yes. Is there any problem?

Sadat: Not at all. Any time.

Kissinger: This has another advantage. We're announcing tomorrow the President's trip to Moscow. If this is announced in the same news cycle, it will be clear where our priorities are.

Sadat: I understand.

Kissinger: Is this any problem?

Sadat: (Laughing) No, Henry. You know me.

Kissinger: I've been thirty days in Syria! (Laughter)

In the last days they were reopening issues we had settled.

Sadat: This is their way. They're traders. Traders.
Kissinger: And next week we announce the trip of the President to Cairo. It's a tremendous buildup.

Sadat: (Laughing) You're a magician!

Kissinger: You made me a magician. Without your first letter about Kuneitra, and Gamasy's visit later, and your help throughout, it wouldn't have happened.

We hope it is a turning point.

Fahmy: In the last three days we sent General Fuad.

Kissinger: What should we do now about Geneva?

The Soviet strategy is to raise as many issues as possible, as fast as possible, and try to make us the lawyer for Israel.

Sadat: Quite right.

Kissinger: Whereas, as you know, our strategy is to avoid in public forums any frontal attack on Israel.

Sadat: Yes.

Kissinger: There were attacks on me.

If every issue is raised at one time, it can't be done. The Israelis, especially in the current government, can handle one issue at a time. And (to raise) the Palestinians too! My idea is to have Geneva as a sort of window dressing and to handle the real negotiations elsewhere. Let them sign it, ratify it.

Sadat: In principle I quite agree. In principle. But how do we show it to the people?

Kissinger: The surest way to a stalemate is to propose, as Gromyko will, a package deal on the Palestinians, the 1967 frontiers. It will surely fail.

Sadat: I have to ask you: Will Rabin stay without elections?

Kissinger: It's a profound question. He has, to all intents and purposes, no majority. The trip of the President will help. But he'll lose a vote and then call elections. Then he'll be a caretaker government. Don't forget our two

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disengagement agreements were done with caretaker governments.

Sadat: Does he have guts like Mrs. Meir?

Kissinger: I admire your question. A superficial question would have been: "Is he a hawk or a dove?" She doesn't like to yield territory; she's a Russian peasant. But without her, it wouldn't have been pushed through the Cabinet.

No, he doesn't have her guts. He's more intellectual. But we can get him to move in the right direction. The pity is, the one next to her who could do it is Dayan. He believes it's time for rapid movement toward Egypt.

No, he doesn't have her guts. We need a few months to work on him.

Sadat: My problem is this: You know my oil fields in Sinai?

Kissinger: Yes.

Sadat: It's another $300 million a year. Another pushback. It's long communications for them. Once they left the Canal, it has no importance for them.

Kissinger: Yes.

Sadat: Would we use the visit of the President to them to arrange something for the future?

Kissinger: How far in the future?

Sadat: Is Rabin on his legs? I don't want to be imaginative (sic); I want to be practical. I have confidence in you, you know. Can it be done during the summer?

Kissinger: I can't be sure now. If it were Dayan, he'd do it. You know I favor a next stage with Egypt.

What would they get in return?

Sadat: What would you ask?

Kissinger: I don't know what I'd ask. What do they use it for?
Fahmy: Domestic consumption. It is one-half their consumption.

Eilts: They want some arrangement to use it.

Kissinger: Yes. Even if it's your oil, they want some arrangement. Under the table.

Sadat: That is impossible.

Kissinger: Let me think. What if they recognize your sovereignty to the 1967 borders but for some time have some bases near there? I suppose it's impossible. For the end of the war, but... And give three-fourths or four-fifths of the Sinai immediately.

Sadat: Could be. Could be.

Kissinger: I'm talking about the end of belligerency, not peace.

Fahmy: The President was talking about Geneva.

It is impossible to have a package deal with all parties in a few months.

Kissinger: Impossible.

Fahmy: So we do it in stages. We have to go to Geneva. We cannot do a permanent settlement without the Syrians. But a wider disengagement in Sinai.

Kissinger: Yes.

Fahmy: And a peace settlement at the proper time.

Kissinger: I have spent all of my time this last month on Syria, so I'm just thinking out loud. The way Israeli mind works, and the way their political systems works, they have to seem to have gotten something in return. In disengagement, you know, they've given up tangible territory for appearances --- because if you decide to go to war, you will. But they have to show something that they have got.

To them, the end of belligerency means a great deal.

Fahmy: There have to be balanced concessions.

Kissinger: What does it mean? Suppose they give the oil
fields.

Fahmy: If they give a very wide disengagement, and coupled with this they are ready to declare their intention that when a permanent peace settlement is arranged they are ready for a complete withdrawal from Egyptian territory.

Kissinger: We don't have to use the term, "end of belligerency."

Fahmy: No.

Kissinger: They have this obsession with Sharm-el-Sheikh. Suppose they withdraw up to the line of Sharm-el-Sheikh to El-Arish and said they recognize your sovereignty over all of it to the 1967 line pending the final peace -- would you end belligerency?

Fahmy: Not "recognize sovereignty," because it is our own territory.

Sadat: But it is wording only.

Fahmy: We said we would give it to the UN.

Kissinger: That is what they won't do. They're crazy about Sharm-el-Sheikh anyway, because if you want to close Eilat you'll do it at Bab el-Mandeb. You did it.

Sadat: It has to be a line: El-Arish-Ras Mohammad. If they couple it with a statement of intention regarding final peace, we'll give them a statement of intention regarding the end of belligerency. Dropping belligerent rights.

Kissinger: What they want is dropping of belligerent rights when they withdraw to that line. Dropping belligerent rights is inherent in a final peace settlement.

Fahmy: Yes. But we'll declare our intention once there is final peace, because what do we have as a political card? The end of belligerency means peace. It's our sovereignty; they can't claim they give us sovereignty.

Sadat: But they must have something to save their faces.

Kissinger: They must seem to gain something.
Sadat: Pill by pill, as Henry did with disengagement.

Kissinger: Disengagement again has been a unilateral withdrawal.

Fahmy: They've got Bab el-Mandeb, and cargo in the Canal.

Kissinger: Bab el-Mandeb -- that they had before.

Fahmy: But it means the embargo goes.

Sadat: It needs thinking, Henry.

Kissinger: The direction of your policy is clear.

Fahmy: I'm thinking about Geneva.

Kissinger: We have two problems: the procedure at Geneva, and what do we do concretely? For face-saving we need some quid pro quo for them.

They're almost as difficult as the Syrians, exactly as shortsighted.

Fahmy: We must do more on the Egyptian side because it will be much easier on other fronts.

The political meaning is tremendous. We are accused of betrayal.

Kissinger: If Dayan were the Prime Minister, I could tell you what he would do. I had him educated, until a series of accidents -- including that Commission --

Sadat: Yes.

Fahmy: But Rabin is your boy.

Kissinger: But I need a few months to work on him. First we should work out with you what we want to work on him for. They need some time. They have had three shocks: first, the war, then Egyptian and Syrian disengagement. The Syrian disengagement was almost solely the result of American action. And pressure. They need some time.

Sadat: That's why I asked about Rabin.

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Kissinger: We should talk when the President and I are here in June.

Now, what do we do about Geneva? Gromyko will make a violent speech.

Fahmy: He'll raise all the political issues.

Kissinger: I think the later the better. I'll go for one day, then send Bunker.

Fahmy: It all depends on a wider disengagement. When will you start contacting the Palestinians?

Kissinger: This I can tell you: We'll start contacting the Palestinians the second half of July.

Fahmy, Sadat: Very good.

Fahmy: The President will prepare Yasir Arafat mentally.

Sadat: We'll need some time.

Fahmy: And how do we handle the Russians?

Sadat: How do we handle the Russians? You and we will need time. And Israel needs time.

Kissinger: Above all, Israel needs time.

Fahmy: And we should prepare them mentally.

Sadat: And as Henry says, when the President goes there he'll drop the idea.

Kissinger: I had a conversation with Rabin. Unfortunately he has no experience with Egypt. He is still thinking in 1971 terms. I told him that a prolonged statement will lead to war and would not be supported or tolerated. But he was just giving me his speech from his last experience -- which was with Rogers. All those who have gone through the negotiations with me -- Alon, Peres...Peres is a good Defense Minister.

Sadat: Peres! He thinks I'm a Nazi.

Kissinger: (laughs) No, he doesn't think you're a Nazi. You're the unlikeliest Nazi.

I've invited Rabin to come to the United States, and maybe spend sometime at Camp David with me.

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What we need now is a respite.

Sadat: Quite right.

Kissinger: But not a respite from strategy.

Sadat: Right.

Kissinger: So when the President is here, depending on your and the President's schedule -- maybe when the President is sightseeing, you and I can talk.

The problem now is Geneva. I want to avoid going myself. If I have to... I'll leave Bunker; he's a good diplomat. He's a genius at getting nothing done if that's what you want.

(Typed copies of the draft of the Joint Commission announcement are brought in. Also at Tab A.)

Is that all right?

Fahmy: Yes.

Kissinger: So we'll make it at noon Washington time, 7:00 p.m. here.

Fahmy: Right.

Kissinger: What is your view about how we should handle the Jordanian problem?

Sadat: As far as I know, they want disengagement. Is this true?

Kissinger: Ismail thought I should wait two or three months.

Fahmy: Because Arafat would be very upset if there is disengagement now. The Palestinians will be upset if there is disengagement now.

Kissinger: I am slowing down things.

Fahmy: We have to be sure we haven't broken the King. The President sat with him. But we have to build up Arafat first.

Kissinger: Geneva?

Sadat: I won't be ready until September. Leave this to us.

Fahmy: We will establish a contact, and adjourn a contact, etc.
Sadat: We'll maneuver it.

Kissinger: If the Russians contact us, we'll say we'll start consulting.

Fahmy: And everyone will consult everyone else.

Kissinger: All right. We'll have some trouble at the Summit but we can handle it.

Fahmy: How can you agree when the Arabs aren't ready?

Kissinger: What Brezhnev will want is an American commitment. But what good is it? Rogers made it but what good came out of it?

Fahmy: They'll try to "expose" your position.

Kissinger: Exactly.

Fahmy: They will say that they want complete withdrawal but you don't.

Sadat: But hailing President Nixon here with millions will make your position clear.

Kissinger: They can make commitments but they haven't produced 1 kilometer, in 6 years.

Sadat: I would like him to arrive on the 12th. Because I have an African Conference I don't want to go to. If he comes on the 12th, that will take me on to the 15th, when it's all right for me. (laughter)

Kissinger: I have to go to Ottawa for a NATO meeting. I may not go to Saudi Arabia. Faisal won't say anything spectacularly new.

If we start here on the 12th, we can go from Damascus to Israel. I have to be there when he is in Israel. They exhaust you with details.
Eilts: Is Saudi Arabia the only one you won't go to?

Kissinger: Maybe Jordan.

Eilts: If Saudi Arabia is the only one, he'll take it amiss. Before, he was suspicious of you, but now his opinion has turned around.

Kissinger: He now says I'm a human being!

Sadat: He now prays to God in every prayer to help you, five times a day. He sent me a letter and told me this.

Kissinger: Really?

Eilts: I hate to say this, knowing your schedule. But there are so many murmurs and whispers in Saudi Arabia in the King's ear if you don't go. I know how their system works.

Sadat: Quite right.

Kissinger: When is the African Conference?

Sadat: The 15th.

Fahmy: If the President comes on the 12th, he won't go.

Kissinger: My problem is, I don't see how I can miss the NATO meeting.

Fahmy: When is NATO?

Kissinger: The 18th and 19th. Or the 17th and 18th. I can miss the first evening. If he starts here on the 12th, then on the 15th to Syria, 16th to Israel and Saudi Arabia on the 17th, I could leave him in Saudi Arabia.

Eilts: It's just a matter of touching base, Mr. President.

Sadat: Quite right.

Kissinger: I know. When I was in Aswan and didn't go to Saudi Arabia, they were jealous. Can he come on the 11th?

Sadat: Starting on the 10th we are ready.

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Kissinger: If he comes on the 11th, he could leave on the 14th.

(To Eilts) Any problem with spending three nights here and one night in every other capital?

Eilts: The Saudis like the three days, the traditional three days, but they understand us by now.

Kissinger: (To Eilts) With all due respect to your former clients, I don't know what I would talk about for three days. (laughter)

Sadat: But he mentions you in his prayers, five times a day.

Kissinger: But he is a man of integrity.

Sadat: And he keeps his word.

Kissinger: As I told you about terrorism, tell him (Arafat) if he can keep things quiet till the second half of July ...

Sadat: You can assure the Israelis that no Fatah will be joining the disturbances. This I can assure you.

Kissinger: Good.

On the Soviets, we can discuss it when the President is here.

For one day the President will go to Alexandria?

Sadat: The first full day we'll go there. Then he'll come by train here the second day. The first day there will be a banquet here in the Abbé Palace. On the second day we will go to Alexandria and spend the second night there. On the third day we will return. We will have time for discussion.

Kissinger: The first day he arrives in the afternoon, and there will be a banquet. The first full day you will go to Alexandria.
Kissinger: The next day you will come back.

Sadat: But we can make any performances in the afternoon.

Kissinger: Where do you think he should go from here?

Sadat: If you ask my advice, Saudi Arabia. Right, Hermann?

Eilts: Yes.

Fahmy: And Israel at the very end?

Kissinger: No, he can't go to Israel at the end.

Eilts: From Saudi Arabia to Syria,

Kissinger: The King would take it very ill if he went from his country to Israel. From Saudi Arabia, then Syria to Israel -- the Syrians are accustomed to the shuttle. Then I'll leave him when he is in Jordan. No later than Saturday. I will be in touch with a proposed arrival time. The schedule we know.

There will be time for talks with the President on the train.

Sadat: On the train.

Kissinger: And maybe schedule one here.

Sadat: In Alexandria, and in the morning when he leaves, if he delays the departure time. Jidda is an hour and a half from here.

Kissinger: We need Omar Saqqaf to explain what's going on. I told you he once told me after a meeting, "The King has decided to lift the embargo." I said, "That's odd, because he told me he would not." Saqqaf said, "But that's the best proof. Because he was afraid it would leak and therefore couldn't tell you." (laughter)

But the man who lifted the embargo was President Sadat.

Fahmy: By the time you come back you may not find him as Minister of State.

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Kissinger: Oh really? Who would replace him?

Fahmy: They are talking about Yamani, or the Under Secretary.

Eilts: Mr. Secretary, you may be interested to know that Minister Ismail will be going down to talk with the Inchon people.

Kissinger: (takes out checklist) I haven't done anything on the helicopters. I wanted to do it orally. I'll do it when I get back.

I'll discuss the arms problem with Prince Fahd when he comes. We want to establish the precedent of direct sales.

Sadat: I don't want to hasten it. There is no need. Give it to Saudi Arabia.

Kissinger: Excellent.

Sadat: I want to give some time to the Israelis also. It is very hard for them to swallow.

Eilts: Mr. President, do you foresee any problems with the Oil Ministers Conference?

Sadat: After everything Henry has done, I was prepared for a battle even if it failed. After 36 days in the area and all your efforts. But I was preparing myself for the battle.

Kissinger: Really?

Sadat: We will not go back on it.

It is the building of a new image of America that I'm taking time for.

Kissinger: Is it time for cooperation with Syria and Algeria?

Sadat: They're not ready for it.

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Kissinger: They do want it.

Sadat: But they don't really have the courage. But Algeria, yes.

Eilts: They'll receive an Ambassador soon?

Kissinger: By August at the latest. By July 15.

Eilts: Mr. President, what will this Palestinian Council do that is going to meet here?

Sadat: I met with Arafat. They will be making a very important decision -- that any part of Palestine that is liberated will be ruled by the Palestinians.

Kissinger: And not Jordan?

Sadat: And not Jordan.

Kissinger: This is a maneuver of Arafat. He will not go to Geneva?

Sadat: There is still great opposition.

Kissinger: We would have been in a very difficult position.

Fahmy: In principle they will.

Sadat: But at a later stage.

Fahmy: It was originally in the letter.

Kissinger: But we had to take it out.

Sadat: A Palestinian state, with the West Bank, Gaza, and a corridor. They (the Israelis) should consider this. Because it will mean coexistence with them. With this long corridor, and no army, only an administration. This will solve the whole problem for us.

Kissinger: This will take time to get into their heads.

But this really means terrorist activities should be halted, eliminated, for awhile.

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Sadat: They should be eliminated completely. And the main activity of them will be against themselves.

Fahmy: Against themselves.

Kissinger: When is this Palestinian Conference?

Fahmy: June 1st. If Arafat is here, we can bring him here!

Kissinger: I've done enough controversial things already on this trip!

Each step of the way I've had to break down some opposition in Israel.

Fahmy: There was a Gallup poll that said 75% of the U.S. population wanted Henry as permanent Secretary of State.

Kissinger: Regardless of the party in office! Only 11% opposed it.

Rodman: The Harvard Faculty.

Kissinger: I mention this not to praise myself but to show there is some stability there in what you and we are doing.

Eilts: Who will be at the Conference? Habbash?

Sadat: Yes.

Fahmy: Hawatmeh. If he decides.

Kissinger: The Israeli newspapers will say a lot about terrorism for a few days. I explained this to Asad. And terrorism should stop. It really does them no good. It strengthens the hardest elements in Israel.

Sadat: Exactly. And it's just the fringe groups.

Kissinger: And it makes it impossible for a senior U.S. official to meet them. And in the Congress, I could have briefed the committees if it had failed on another issue, by saying Syria was difficult but Israel should have been more flexible. But on terrorism, that would have been impossible.
Fahmy: Fulbright is gone.

Kissinger: Very sad. I'll use him somehow after he leaves office.

Fahmy: Why did it happen?

Kissinger: Partly because of his stand on Vietnam. The people don't like to lose a war. He may have been right that our involvement was a mistake, but the American people still don't like those who said we should lose. But also because it's a bad year for incumbents. Someone new and fresh has an advantage. In Ohio, Glenn, an astronaut, who had lost twice before, beat Metzenbaum, a rich Demo-
crat.

Rodman: A liberal.

Kissinger: A liberal.

I understand the Europeans will approach the Arabs. We have no objection. Our objection was not to contact with the Arabs, but to the procedures by which they did it.

Fahmy: I told them.

Kissinger: You told the President?

Fahmy: I told the Europeans you never said you objected.

Kissinger: Frankly I do think it is a mistake to get all the Arab Foreign Ministers together in one room (laughter). From what I've seen. To get the Libyan, and Khaddam, and some of the others ... (laughter).

Schmidt is better for us.

Filts: We must some time give some thought to avoiding the duplicating of work in all these bilateral commissions.

Kissinger: We'll sort that out.

Fahmy: It is easy.

Kissinger: We consider the lead country is Egypt. Sometimes we may not take your advice but normally we would.

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Eilts: When we were in Alexandria, we talked about the nuclear power plant. Our people, the AEC, said that a policy has to be made on this. I gather there is a June 30 date.

Kissinger: Do we have discretion? Or do we go to Congress?

Eilts: I think there is consultation, but it is an NSC matter.

Kissinger: If it is NSC, it will be approved -- since I'm in charge of the NSC. If there is discretion, it will be approved.

Mr. President, let me ask: What do you think should come out of the Summit?

Sadat: Let me think. Let me think. One time I thought there would be a new disengagement, but I think the time is not ripe.

Kissinger: That was one argument for not doing this Commission now.

Sadat: But we should do that. With the Saudi thing ...

Kissinger: Some time before the visit, tell us the outstanding problems which could be solved by a Summit.

Sadat: It will be arranged.

Kissinger: (to Fahmy) I read you're going to China.

Fahmy: Yes. But not the date.

Kissinger: I think this is a very positive thing.

I read Brezhnev is coming here.

Sadat: (laughs) Not yet. Not yet. First we must have a meeting on the ministerial level to work this out. He sent me a message, which I didn't tell you about -- to tell me what will be the future of the relationship between us. I didn't send him a reply. I wanted first to declare our policy. I will then answer him and ask for a ministerial meeting.

I must tell you, Henry, they are very eager to send us whatever arms we ask for. More than we ask for. Very eager.

Kissinger: Our problem is the Jewish community in America. If you seem to be a Soviet client. My advice would be to take the arms. Everyone knows your policy. Be sure
you get spare parts.

Sadat: Yes.

Kissinger: It would make it very difficult to get American arms.

Sadat: Then we would like some sort of link with the Pentagon.

Kissinger: What sort of link? A visit of the Defense Secretary would be too obvious. The trouble is, they don't have anybody very thoughtful. Let me think about it.

Eilts: I'm told the new Chief of the JCS is very good.

Kissinger: Brown? Yes.

The next time Ismail is over, I can give a dinner at which the Defense Secretary is present, so he at least knows an Egyptian. I'll do that.

Eilts: And it would be a start to have middle-grade officers come. After the President's visit, it can be done.

Fahmy: And meet the Marshal.

Eilts: And take it step by step.

Sadat: Quite right. I met your people from the War College.

Eilts: That was a great success.

Kissinger: Oh really?

Eilts: The President was there and gave a toast. They thought this was one of the three places that they were most impressed with: Egypt, Iran and Israel.

Kissinger: I've started a program to send Senators and Congressmen here. Carefully selected. I'm still thinking of Jackson. We have nothing to lose. If he leaves with his present position, nothing is lost. But if you can influence him ... His major concern is Soviet influence.
Sadat: Let him come!

Kissinger: If you can reassure him, that will be very important. Javits. A Jewish Senator.

Sadat: Yes, I know.

Kissinger: I won't send any except key ones, ones who control some votes or who might become Presidential candidates.

I'll think about it.

It depends on who becomes the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. It could be Church.

Fahmy: Church. I know him.

Kissinger: So I may see you in two weeks.

Sadat: It will be a pleasure to see you. I'm very happy.

Kissinger: Do we say something to the press?

Sadat: I think so, yes.

Kissinger: Should we say we're creating a strong cooperation commission?

Sadat: You say it.

Kissinger: No, why don't you say something?

Sadat: I'm going to say something about disengagement.

Kissinger: You have a statement?

Sadat: Yes.

Kissinger: May I see it? (Sadat gives it to him to read. Kissinger suggests some changes.) My only concern is, when I'm here...

Sadat: About the Ramadan War.

SECRET/SENSITIVE
Kissinger: I'm worried about the reaction in Israel.

Fahmy: Why don't we start with "Egypt welcomes."

Kissinger: The Israelis won't be enthused if I'm standing next to you when you talk about the rights of the Palestinians.

Eilts: Your press is at the airport, Mr. Secretary.

Kissinger: Can I have a copy (of the draft statement)?

Sadat: Yes.

Kissinger: I'll get it retyped to give to our press.

(At this point, the press were admitted and President Sadat and Dr. Kissinger spoke briefly and answered questions. Text at Tab 6)
The Governments of the United States and Egypt agreed today to the formation of a Joint Cooperation Commission which will be designed to promote intensified cooperation in the economic, scientific and cultural fields between the two countries. Both governments are convinced that such a Joint Commission will enable the United States and Egypt to develop far-reaching programs to their mutual benefit.

Today's agreement is a result of a series of discussions between President Anwar Sadat and Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and reflects the deep desire of the two countries to strengthen their overall relationships. In agreeing to establish this Joint Commission, both governments are further reaffirming their hope that a lasting and just peace in the Middle East will be realized thus helping the people of the area enjoy the rewards of stability and development.

The Commission will be chaired by the Foreign Ministers of each country. It will establish working groups. Its first meeting will take place in the near future.