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By JA NARA Date 8/9

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Simcha Dinitz, Israeli Ambassador to the U.S.
Mordechai Shalev, Minister, Embassy of
Israel

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs

Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary
for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff *PRM*

DATE AND TIME:

Wednesday, June 4, 1975
4:35 - 6:10 p.m.

PLACE:

The Secretary's Office
Department of State

Kissinger: I didn't want to make it a monumental event so I sent the photo-graphers away.

Dinitz: That's all right.

Kissinger: Where did you get these tanks? I didn't know you had so many.

Dinitz: We moved some from the northern front to the Sinai so we could withdraw them! [Laughter]

You don't like our gesture?

Kissinger: I said good things about your gesture.

Dinitz: Sadat said better things about it.

Kissinger: He did it at our request.

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SUBJECT TO GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED AT TWO-
YEAR INTERVALS AND DECLASSIFIED ON
DECEMBER 31, _____

CLASSIFIED BY Henry A. Kissinger
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5(B) (1, 3)
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Dinitz: The numbers of tanks changed -- sometimes we had eleven, sometimes seven.

Kissinger: You never had more than 3,000 troops.

No, I think it was good.

Dinitz: We knew it wasn't a substitute for negotiations.

Kissinger: On the talks [in Salzburg], there is not really much to say. Most of it was hearing their views on the overall and reviewing their positions in the previous negotiation.

We told them there were two choices -- either a new effort for an interim, or Whatever their last position was, there had to be some modification. We put particular emphasis on duration and called their attention to the warning station.

Incidentally, the President instructed me to say this cannot leak.

We put particular stress on those two, plus whatever could be done in the boycott area. He said no agreement was possible for him that didn't move Israel out of the passes and give him unbroken access to the oil fields.

We asked him for no specific proposal because we didn't want to get into a joint U.S. -Egyptian proposal. He said if we could tell him there would be a forthcoming Israeli position, he might look at his position again.

Dinitz: He gave no indication of what he might do on these three points?

Kissinger: No. He gave the impression of some flexibility. On the warning station, I don't know what He said he can't have Israelis on his territory. He considers the UN zone his territory. He said he would study it.

He hasn't lost interest in an interim. We told him we won't get involved in negotiations that last more than a week to ten days and or that have a chance of failing. I won't get into an endless barter.

Dinitz: Did he give you any indication on the two parts of the duration? The agreement, and the time of no pressure on us.

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Kissinger: One is UNEF, the other is the duration of the agreement. On UNEF, we pointed out your need for reassurance on the point of a one-year agreement. They said it would be difficult with more than a one-year extension. But they said they would look at ways of getting around it, outside of the agreement.

Dinitz: And the time frame for negotiations on the next step?

Kissinger: I don't know what time frame you have in mind.

I saw a statement by Allon that said you wanted three-five years.

Dinitz: No. I remember press reports of that.

The question of when an Egyptian-Israeli negotiation will be recommenced.

Kissinger: There is nothing in the agreement that will prevent Geneva.

Dinitz: I understand that. And about Syria too.

Kissinger: Nothing has changed about the resumption of Geneva at some point. We can't say at Geneva that Egypt won't be discussed.

Dinitz: We wanted an agreement with Egypt to stand on its own feet and not be modified or reopened.

Kissinger: My impression is that at Geneva there will be discussions of the overall thing and it is likely to be protracted.

Dinitz: So, there was no discussion of time frame.

Kissinger: I tell you frankly I have lost so much confidence in the ability of your government to operate, I am not eager to deal with you except with diplomatic precision.

I have the impression they are interested. Nothing more. And since we have nothing precise from you, how can we start a negotiation?

You can report to your Government that we stressed particularly the UNEF extension point, and assurances about its period of time. They clearly

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understand there is a time frame in which pressure beyond a certain point isn't possible. He said they would look into it. I think they are interested in an interim agreement. I don't think you can get assurances from them that they won't raise their concerns at Geneva. I have always said this is something you can get from us, not from them.

Dinitz: When is Geneva?

Kissinger: Probably six months after the agreement.

Dinitz: And Syria right afterward?

Kissinger: That would be easiest for them.

Dinitz: Before Geneva?

Kissinger: Yes.

Dinitz: Did they say anything about the overall perimeters for a solution?

Kissinger: Their position is no different. They made a strong case for the Palestinians but in the sense of getting it off their backs. It would be a Palestinian-Israeli problem instead of an Arab-Israeli problem, if it were negotiated with the PLO.

He said that if the Palestinians in Palestine could meet with the PLO, it would have a moderating effect on the PLO.

Dinitz: The West Bank Palestinians.

Kissinger: Yes. We had only two meetings of an hour and a half each.

Dinitz: Did anything happen on the bilateral that should concern us?

Kissinger: They asked about economic aid but we said we couldn't make a separate decision on Egypt, until there we have a decision on overall aid. There was no decision on arms, if that is what you mean. You heard the President's statement that we would make an effort for aid from Congress, and in the press conference I said we would make an effort to get other countries to help.

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Dinitz: There is no possibility to tell the Government about a time frame?

Kissinger: I don't think they can change the position about annual renewal. Maybe we can do something about a Soviet veto.

Dinitz: And on the early warning station, they said there would be no Israeli soldiers on their territory. And on UNEF.

Kissinger: I have to say, we have a bad taste about how the last day of the [March] negotiations is being represented -- including to the Jordanians, who know better. To say that everything was going fine until the last day when Fahmy sent an ultimatum. Rabin told me not to raise expectations about any change in the Israeli position.

We did not make a formal proposal to the Egyptians or elicit any formal ideas because we didn't think this was the way to proceed now. So I can't tell you exactly what they'll come up with.

We told them it had to be more than a year; we had to have some assurance about a Soviet veto. In addition to their already-given assurance about an annual renewal.

Dinitz: Where did I hear about three-five years?

Kissinger: I don't know. Not from us. We gave no numbers. Roy, look up the reports we got. I read it somewhere; I thought it was an Allon or Rabin statement.

Dinitz: From Salzburg?

Kissinger: No. You can see my briefings and Sisco's briefings.

I think their mood is to try to do something. Whether it is enough, I don't know.

Shalev: May I ask one question, Mr. Secretary? Before you left you suggested we might come up with a total idea of how we see an interim agreement.

Kissinger: Right. Then you told the press you wouldn't because you didn't want to pay the price twice.

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Shalev: The Prime Minister told you if there was a change in Egypt's position he would recommend to the Cabinet a change in our position. How do we know which comes first? How do we know what the change in Egypt's position is, so the Prime Minister can go to the Cabinet, which he has to do, unlike the Egyptian President.

Kissinger: That is something that should be discussed with the President and Prime Minister next week. Including how to see that it doesn't get into the papers.

Shalev: That is why Rabin doesn't want to go to the Cabinet with a hypothetical question.

Dinitz: I don't think he has anything to go on to the Cabinet. But that is something he has to decide.

Kissinger: That is something he can discuss -- whether what he has from the Egyptians and from the United States enables him to go to the Cabinet afterwards. Or whether he can give us something to go to the Egyptians. I don't think there is enough time. It is not a good idea to get more press speculation.

Dinitz: The press is speculating on everything from the Rogers Plan to three-five years duration.

The question is, what do we do in substance? With a report such as this, which I appreciate, I feel there is nothing to go to the Cabinet.

Kissinger: I told you before we left that I didn't expect an Egyptian proposal, and I expected that if we got one we would be accused of colluding with the Egyptians.

Dinitz: We said we would reconsider our position if there was an indication of a change in their position.

Kissinger: Now they have told you the same thing, which is more than they have done before.

Can I see you alone for five minutes?

[From 5:10 to 6:10 the Secretary and Ambassador Dinitz conferred alone.]

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