MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Golda Meir, Prime Minister of Israel
Simcha Dinitz, Israeli Ambassador to the United States
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

DATE AND TIME: Tuesday, January 15, 1974
4:00 - 5:30 p.m.

PLACE: Mrs. Meir's Residence
Jerusalem

Meir: You did well.

Kissinger: I'm losing my standing as an expert. Every time you give me a proposal that I consider outrageous, he [Sadat] accepts it.

I think you call him first and agree beforehand.

Meir: We like to let the Americans feel they did it. How did you find him?

Kissinger: Unless he is the greatest actor -- when we were in the middle of a discussion of the UN force, he said, "The time isn't right yet but I hope the time will come when we can have high-level secret political contacts."

I first presented your proposal to him alone. He wasn't overjoyed. Even then he asked an intelligent question: "Is this really final Israeli line?" I said in my honest judgment it is. He didn't accept it.
Then he called in Fahmi and Gamasy and I explained it to them. All their questions were designed to show that Israel had bad faith. Then he took me into the next room and said, really there is one issue -- the arguments for going fast and for going slow. We went over all the pros and cons. I told him I could see the advantages of going slow -- because pressures would build up against Israel -- but events might not be controlled. So I said, "If we go fast, you have to be prepared not to haggle over every detail." He said, "Okay, we'll go fast, and I'll bear that in mind."

The next morning we met again and we agreed. We then had a working group to take care of the details. Gamasy left the meeting saying he couldn't justify it on military grounds and it was a political decision. I saw him [Sadat] at 7:00 and he reinstated every detail Gamasy had objected to.

I'm afraid if we don't move at a reasonable speed, he won't be able to sustain the momentum.

I believe Fahmi and Gamasy are not happy with this.

Meir: The big question is, is he doing this in good faith?

Kissinger: [gestures ignorance] I've thought about this, too. It has been tormenting me. I don't exclude that as soon as you are back to the disengagement line, he will go back to the Russians. I don't think he will. But even so, I think it is to your benefit. For the reasons I've explained to you privately. If you stay on your present positions, it will be easier for him to keep the war going.

He has promised me he will get the oil embargo lifted within a week. We will reach an understanding that you won't move an inch if it is not lifted.

Dinitz: Will you get into your bureaucracy that we did it to help get it lifted -- to ease our situation in the bureaucracy?

Kissinger: I think it is in your interest anyway. Don't give the impression you did it for us.

Meir: I asked the Chief of Staff what are the advantages to Sadat of the new line and the disadvantages to us. His answer was, it is easy; he will have several bridges -- if he has a change of heart -- over which he can get his armies across.
Kissinger: Certainly, but if you stay on the West Bank....

Meir: That to me was the big question.

Kissinger: If he does not now clear the Canal and resettle the area, he will trick us too. I'm convinced he is really anti-Soviet. It comes through in many ways: the way he handled Fahmi's visit to Moscow. He invited me to attend the signing. I would be the only foreign minister. I'm not sure I want to do it.

Meir: I don't think so.

Kissinger: I don't mind annoying the Russians, but I like to get something for it.

He asked me -- this is for you -- to send an expert to check the debugging of his office, and airplane security -- in other words, his personal security. He wants me to come often, because every time I do, the Soviet Ambassador comes and offers more military equipment.

Meir: Don't go too often!

Kissinger: He said we can fly SR-71's, and give him the photos, and when we do that he will kick out the four Soviet Foxbats.

Maybe he is a total trickster.

The other day he said at lunch, "I really want to make peace with Israel; but does Israel really want a moderate leader of a strong Egypt or a fanatic leader of a weak Egypt?" It is not a stupid question. I don't know what I would answer in your shoes.

Meir: We don't want a weak Egypt. We want Egypt developing. I remember some Senators here who asked why pour money into the pockets of the rulers instead of spending it on schools.

You mentioned the Canal. To us this is one of the best guarantees.

Kissinger: I believe if you can keep your press quiet here, he'll certainly do it. But if you turn it from an Egyptian achievement into an Israeli demand .... He volunteered it the first time. He says your constant talking about it....

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE EXCLUSIVELY EYES ONLY
Meir: How can we link it somehow?

Kissinger: He'll do it. I'll tell you he told me he will. Asad told me Sadat wants a demilitarized zone ahead of him and the Canal behind him and cannot go to war.

Dinitz: The Israeli public is not stupid. They know one of the advantages of a reopened Canal is that it makes war much less likely. I tell you frankly. Maybe we can tell the editors. We can sometimes influence them to be quiet.

Kissinger: Can you?

Meir: Remember the paper we worked on in 1971? It was linked.

Kissinger: Yes. But I'm convinced that if you don't talk about it he will do it. He's asked me for a written guarantee that if he resettles the cities Israel won't attack them.

Meir: You can give him that and you give us the other thing.

But we are worried that 45 days will pass and we will withdraw and nothing will happen on the Canal, and then he says, "Take another step." I think we should wait until something significant happens on the Canal.

Kissinger: He can't fail to work on the Canal without risking what he has gained with us. He told me -- this is for you -- that he plans to end the Friendship Treaty with Russia in 1975, and this is why he is moving closer to us. He gave assurances that we won't have to accept Egyptian pilots on U.S. warships and can use U.S. pilots. It is not that I keep raising it with him; he keeps raising it with me. The other Arabs may trigger him -- but I think he will do it.

Meir: They will all say, "Israel isn't moving fast enough." We want an understanding with the United States that if nothing is happening with the Canal we won't budge. And there will be the danger of war.

I understand he can't give it to us, but he gave it to you. He said we could give it to you but not in writing.

Dinitz: There are two problems -- his intention and his implementation in doing it, that is one thing. The main problem is what is then required of us.
Kissinger: Insofar as I can influence things, the whole strategy has been to break the coalition of the Arabs, break the coalition of the Europeans, Japan and the Russians, and to get the embargo lifted, without mentioning the 1967 frontiers. This makes it easier for you to resist. When all is said and done, it won't be so easy for them to reimpose it. Our government won't be able to link the embargo with pressure on you.

The Soviets have two choices. If they hate Sadat, they will not start to reopen Geneva. They will certainly try to do that. And they will press. Or, we have the visit of the President coming up -- I can tell them that if they raise too much hell, it won't go all that smoothly.

I told your colleagues at lunch: I know it is not wholly in your control, but if it at least looks like it [MFN] is possible, I can use it to moderate Soviet behavior on the Middle East. I don't give a damn about MFN.

The other problem is the radical Arabs. We should try to lure the Syrians into disengagement talks. You will have no problem with us if you insist on the lists. If we can get the talks going with Syria, it will give us two months before anything is even on paper. That will get us to the Congressional elections.

We live hand-to-mouth. I can't give you a long-term promise. But you have a real fear.

Meir: It is all linked to the opening of the Canal.

Kissinger: We will write something instead in the memorandum of understanding. Your assurance to us is not in this memo, but I'll do it.

Meir: I know.

Kissinger: On MFN...

Meir: I can call the editors. It is a free press, but I can try.

Dinitz: And on disengagement too.

Meir: There is nothing in the agreement that says what Egypt is doing; it is all about what Israel is doing.

Kissinger: But there is a clause about the zone of limited armaments.
Meir: But we have to say something.

Kissinger: He said it must be kept secret, his idea of the U.S. proposal. I told them there is no way it will stay secret. He said, "Then you must tell them that if it comes out before it is signed, it is a disaster; if it comes out afterward, it is only an embarrassment.

Meir: Monday there is the new Knesset; Tuesday my intention is I go to Parliament and make a statement on this. And then the Parliament will ratify it.

Dinitz: No, we can sign subject to ratification.

Meir: I'm not so sure.

Kissinger: If you don't sign before next Wednesday, it will come apart. I am sure.

Meir: Suppose we sign and I go on Tuesday; I have to tell them what is involved.

Kissinger: Once it is signed, you are freer to explain it. He said once you leak it -- which I told him you will do -- he doesn't want official U.S. declaration. If you will sign it, and ratify it Tuesday, he will have two-to-three days to explain it his way. He doesn't want before signature to have to explain the limitations and so forth.

Meir: [referring to draft at Tab A] The way it is worded: Instead of saying "Israeli redeployment" ...

Kissinger: This is what he has agreed to. I have no objection to bringing back certain changes.

Meir: Why don't we say "the parties will redeploy" instead of "Israel will redeploy." Because this rubs it in.

Kissinger: There is no problem doing this in stage one. Stage two will be harder -- "Parties will redeploy their forces."

Dinitz: The document is drafted in such a way.

Kissinger: No, Simcha, only in one place. I will drop paragraph 7 altogether.
Dinitz: Paragraphs one and two could be combined, so it would look mutual. In one paragraph, in exactly the same language.

Kissinger: That is easy.

Meir: Another one, on page 2 "Stage one, to begin 48 hours .... Stage two will be completed .... Redeployment of Israeli forces will be completed ...." Always "redeployment of Israeli forces."

Kissinger: We can either drop the last sentence of paragraph three or we can say "redeployment of both sides will be completed."

Dinitz: Yes.

Kissinger: They want it completed by a fixed date.

Dinitz: All to make it more objective.

Kissinger: I can do that but how do we get it in that you will leave the Canal? I understand ....

Dinitz: You understand the problem.

Kissinger: And it is fixable.

Maybe you can give me the assurance when you will be on the Canal and I will give it to him, and it won't be in the agreement.

Meir: Right.

Kissinger: Tonight, can your Chief of Staff tell me when he is prepared to be across the Canal? Better if it is earlier rather than later.

Dinitz: Yes.

Meir: Were his prisoners mentioned?

Dinitz: Madame Prime Minister, the Secretary can tell you his difficulty. Moshe called me and said if the Secretary finds it impossible to achieve, maybe there can be an understanding de facto that he tells Sadat that we are anxious to return his prisoners and we figure that within 45 days of the agreement something will break with the Syrians.
Kissinger: He will know better than that. Sadat considers them savages. He said he has no evidence, but he thinks the only rational reason for keeping them is that they have so few left that giving the list is the worst setback for them.

Meir: The opposition has got the families all stirred up -- to link the Egyptian prisoners with the Syrians. The parents are going through hell.

Dinitz: They don't know whether they are alive or dead. It puts us into a worse position. When it is finally revealed, the Government will be in a worse position because people will say we should not have agreed to everything before.

Kissinger: He told me it was his judgment they were killed during the war.

Meir: We have heard many stories that the Iraqis killed them, that the Moroccans killed them.

Kissinger: That we have heard too. My concern is, Mme. Prime Minister, if you link this and if the agreement fails because of it, which I believe will happen, then you have thrown the Egyptians and the Syrians together. I don't think he can do it.

Meir: I don't either.

Kissinger: Then you won't get the prisoners. Asad is torn between his fanaticism and his covetousness. He has made so many feelers for us -- he told us, for example, that if we will draw a line, he will go to the Conference. I think we can get the lists as the entrance price to negotiations.

Contrary to what Richard Perle is saying, the Russians have got next to nothing in the Middle East. The trouble with detente is I've got next to nothing to offer them. If I were in the Politburo, I would say this against Brezhnev.

I think the best course is to induce the Syrians into separate negotiations. It is certainly not a good idea to link them. If they don't care about 8,000 prisoners, why should they care about 86 Egyptian prisoners? If Sadat went to Asad and brought pressure for 86 Egyptian prisoners, they would look at him with nothing but contempt.

Sadat told me the chief villain is Khaddam.
Dinitz: Moshe said if the Secretary cannot get this, perhaps the Secretary can talk to Ehud Avriel.

Meir: He is one of the old timers.

Dinitz: He is close to the families. So they at least understand why it is not in their interest to link them.

Kissinger: Is he a reasonable man?

Meir: Oh, yes.

Kissinger: I'll do it Thursday.

Dinitz: By the way, I've told Begin you can't see him this time.

Meir: You are old friends.

Kissinger: I saw him once.

Dinitz: He said you have never forgotten that conversation.

Kissinger: That's true. [laughter]

Meir: We may not be able to form a Cabinet. We will need a new election. The negotiations with our two possible coalition partners are not working. Not because they don't agree with each other, but because we don't agree with them.

Kissinger: Really?

Meir: Some right winger, Rosenblum, of Likud, wrote an article that some outside force is preventing a coalition.

Kissinger: I believe you are better off even if Sadat does go crazy. You know your interest is in this. It gives you a buffer, etc.

Dinitz: Mr. Secretary, we are not under attack on the separation of forces but on not getting a more concrete next step.
Kissinger: What I'm proudest of is getting all this without saying anything about the next step. I haven't even allowed any paper to be done on this in the State Department. But I can't give you the assurance because it is not under my control. The Syrians are not under control.

MFN is a problem. If we could at least get a possibility that the Senate might vote for it...

Dinitz: Jackson is a problem.

Kissinger: Yes, he is now autonomous.

Dinitz: He is doing it for his own reasons.

Kissinger: Yes, he is not doing it for Israel.

Meir: And the Russians are terrible on the Jews.

Kissinger: They are terrible on everybody.

Dinitz: The three articles in the Times by Solzhenitsyn did more damage than 30 speeches by Jackson.

Kissinger: The Russians are brutal. In May, 1971, we agreed on a SALT agreement. They published an English text with a translation that had every disputed point his way. I called Dobrynin and told him he had three hours before I gave a briefing; I would either discuss the agreement or explain what happened. In an hour the Soviet Embassy published the correct English text, and we distributed it on the Soviet Embassy letterhead. On my first visit to Russia, we agreed on the text of an announcement but the next day Gromyko gave me a different text. He said Brezhnev is at a Politburo meeting and it can't be changed. I said that is your problem. So he changed it. Dobrynin later said to me, "I told them they couldn't get away with it." [laughter] The Chinese you can hate, but at least they're an intelligent people.

Dinitz: I had the idea, once you push the Soviets out of the Middle East, could we restore relations with China?

Kissinger: The first time I saw them they said you had to be destroyed. Now it is a little different. He [Chou] will do anything to reduce Russian influence in the Middle East.

Sadat told me he was wondering if the Chinese could build MIG factories for them.
Dinitz: He shouldn't -- it will be harder to get them out! They are cleverer.

Kissinger: They don't play little tricks. To show you the difference, in every document we had with them, when they had to translate, when there were two possible words, they always chose the one which was most favorable to us. When I just saw Mao, he said the Europeans were disgusting. He said we didn't consult him on the alert, but he welcomed it! [laughter]

Dinitz: One more point in the memorandum of understanding.

Meir: Bab el-Mandab.

Kissinger: On Bab el-Mandab, you will get from me, in addition to the letter from Sadat to me and the letter to the President, we'll also put it in the memorandum of understanding. And I've told Sadat I'd do this.

Sadat asked me to give him the assurance that you would implement it, and we could give you the same assurance.

Dinitz: On the other points, he brought you 10 [battalions] but we said he could settle for 8.

Kissinger: And on the map, he wants a little more in the South. Just so he can say he didn't just accept your line.

Dinitz: We will see what Dado [Elazar] brings.

Kissinger: He is a good man, your Chief of Staff.

Meir: We have been very lucky with our Chiefs of Staff.

Kissinger: All the ones I've met are outstanding.

Meir: They are all the generation of the Palmach.

Kissinger: Oh, really?

Meir: They were youngsters then.

Dinitz: What is there on the question of the SAM's? The Secretary said he will try for five kilometers more.
Kissinger: I think I have one chance in three. But I strongly urge you not to raise the artillery question. Gamasy is strongly opposed to the artillery limitations. Now I can say he [the President] has already agreed to it and you, after an all-night session, agreed to it and I can't go back. In the north he in fact has to have the SAM's further back because the marshes are there. I can raise it, because the worst he can say is no. He is saying the effective range now at high altitude is 35 km. but you never attack at high altitude. He says the real range is at low altitude and is 25 kilometers. Their new ones, he says, have a range of 45-50 km.; they estimate 37-40 km. at high altitude.

Dinitz: Dado says 50. [Prime Minister smiles] I know what the Prime Minister is thinking.

Kissinger: That he [Sadat] is lying!

Dinitz: About all the equipment they get from the Russians.

Kissinger: I sent a violent cable to the Pentagon saying of all the days to give you your equipment, this is the best, because even if it leaks we will say it was to get you to sign this. My personal view is a strong Israel makes the Arabs come to us.

Meir: The SCUDS are terrible.

Dinitz: We will have to raise LANCE in a serious way.

Kissinger: We have to maneuver on which issues to fight. I'll get some decision for you this week, but it won't be all you want and it won't be LANCE.

About the sequence, I'll go to Egypt tomorrow and then come back with just enough so I can send a telegram to him that it is all right.

I want to make sure we get the documents prepared.

Dinitz: If you get the number of battalions, that is part of the stipulation.

Kissinger: If he signs the document, it is not effective unless you sign.

Dinitz: She wants to see all the papers before you go.

Kissinger: Of course.
Meir: I asked that the Cabinet be called in this afternoon because the Cabinet should ratify it in any case.

But the Cabinet is a coalition now, and each one is a hawk now. All of a sudden they are all hawks.

Kissinger: My terrible concern is that these restrictions don't leak out before the signature.

Dinitz: For a few days, although it is not watertight, we have censorship only for security ....

Kissinger: Could you keep the restrictions vague? Well, I'll leave it to you.
SECRET

EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI AGREEMENT ON DISENGAGEMENT OF FORCES

A. Egypt and Israel will scrupulously observe the ceasefire called for by the UN Security Council and will refrain from the time of the signing of this document from all military actions against each other.

B. The military forces of Egypt and Israel will be separated in accordance with the following principles:

1. All Israeli forces west of the Suez Canal and Bitter Lakes will be redeployed to areas east of the Canal as delineated on the attached map.

2. The Egyptian forces on the east side of the Canal will be deployed along the line delineated on the attached map.

3. The area between the Egyptian and Israeli lines will be a zone of disengagement in which the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) will be stationed. The UNEF will consist of units from countries that are not permanent members of the Security Council. The procedure of Egyptian and Israeli liaison officers attached to UNEF will be continued.

4. The area between the Egyptian line and the Suez Canal will be limited in armament.

5. The area (as indicated in the attached map) between the Israeli line and a line 200 meters west of the north-south road which runs along the western base of the mountains where the Gidi and Mitla Passes are located will be limited in armament.
SECRET

6. Air forces of the two sides will be permitted to operate up to their respective forward lines.

7. In order to facilitate the transition in the areas involved in the separation of forces, all industrial, administrative, infrastructure and other civilian properties and facilities will be left complete and intact in all areas over which control is relinquished by one party to the other.

C. The disengagement of forces will take place according to the following schedule, the detailed implementation of which will be worked out by military representatives of Egypt and Israel. Forty-eight hours after the signature of this agreement military representatives of Egypt and Israel will meet at Kilometer-101 for this purpose. They will complete this task within five days.

1. **Stage 1**, to begin within 48 hours after the completion of the work of the military representatives and in no event later than seven days after the signature of this agreement. This stage is to last for **days**.

2. **Stage 2** will be completed within the next **days**. The redeployment of Israeli forces from positions west of the Canal will be completed.

3. **Stage 3**. Full implementation of this agreement will be completed **days** following the end of Stage 2. This will complete the redeployment of the Israeli forces to the Israeli line.
D. This agreement is not regarded by Egypt and Israel as a final peace agreement. It constitutes a first step toward a final, just and durable peace according to the provision of Security Council Resolution 338 and within the framework of the Geneva Conference.

Egypt

Israel