

**01044**

**1974/03/01**

MEMORANDUM

Authority NND 009031  
By WDP NARA Date 9/15/00

~~SENSITIVE MIDDLE EAST~~  
(S/S-7404967)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS

P

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Mrs. Golda Meir, Prime Minister of Israel  
Yigal Allon, Deputy Prime Minister  
Abba Eban, Minister for Foreign Affairs  
Moshe Dayan, Minister of Defense  
Simcha Dinitz, Ambassador to the United States  
Mordechai Gazit, Prime Minister's Office  
Ephraim Evron, Deputy Director General, MFA  
Eytan Benstur, Aide to Eban  
Mr. Mizrachi  
Colonel Bar-On, Aide to Dayan  
General David Leor, Military Assistant to  
the Prime Minister

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State  
Joseph Sisco, Under Secretary of State  
for Political Affairs  
Kenneth Keating, Ambassador to Israel  
Ellsworth Bunker, Ambassador-at-Large  
Robert McCloskey, Ambassador-at-Large  
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning,  
State Department  
Alfred L. Atherton, Deputy Assistant  
Secretary of State, NEA  
Harold H. Saunders, NSC Senior Staff  
George Vest, Special Assistant to the  
Secretary for Press Relations  
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff *par*

PLACE:

The Guest House  
Herzliyya (near Tel Aviv)

TIME AND DATE:

Friday, March 1, 1974  
1:15 - 2:00 pm

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS

2

PM Meir: Dr. Kissinger.

Kissinger: Mrs. Prime Minister, I spent an afternoon with Sadat yesterday. We reviewed the negotiations with the Syrians.

Incidentally, could I have the English translation of that Sadat interview?

PM Meir: Yes. [Gazit goes out to get it. See Tab A.]

Kissinger: Sadat called in the Egyptian press after I left and told him about the four necessary stages: the Six Points, Kilometer 101, Geneva, and the Aswan talks.

I went through it with him. I misrepresented your position somewhat, saying you were offering only half of the new territory, but I said with great effort I could maybe get you to the October 6 line. I said it wasn't clear to me if the Syrians were interested in a settlement or were playing to break matters up. The Syrians asked what he never asked -- a guarantee of a final line. Since I was in no position to discuss the final line without a negotiating process between Syria and Israel, we were in a procedural stalemate. He had had courage to start talks with you without the final line. This was a procedural, not a substantive problem. They could ask my mediation, etc., but to ask for a final guarantee was impossible.

Sadat took a very positive position. He wanted a Syrian disengagement for many reasons which I independently gave you Wednesday night. It would eliminate the Syrian capacity to make mischief in the Arab world; it would eliminate the risk of war started by the Syrians into which he would be organically triggered. I told him I was thinking of presenting concepts first, not tied to any particular line, and that Israel would send a senior official within two weeks of forming a new government, and Syria could send someone subsequently. He agreed with all of this.

He described his own position. He had no fixed views on where the line should be. He would do his best to present to the other Arabs the October 6 line as a significant achievement for Syria -- if I could get that from Israel. He personally thought Syria had to get something beyond the October 6 line; if Syria rejected it he wouldn't go to war. He could not make that commitment with the October 6 line. We didn't pursue the subject.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS

3

He agreed we had to prevent a blowup. He sent Gamasy to Damascus today. I said you would permit civilians to return to Syrian cities wherever the line was. Gamasy goes in the capacity of Chief of Staff of the Joint Command -- he stressed this on television, too. He has sent a message to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, etc., because Asad has sent letters to all these saying I brought nothing. He is prepared either for concurrent talks in Washington or to have the Syrian in the Egyptian military committee in Geneva. He would offer it immediately to the Syrians so they would be in the wrong if they turned it down.

If he is sincere.... He certainly put himself on television on record, urging patience, saying progress was being made, as much as could be expected. So if the Syrians blow it up tonight -- which I don't exclude -- it will be in opposition to Sadat's statement.

Eban: How could he blow it up? By not agreeing to further procedural stages?

Kissinger: He has never deviated from that position in any of my meetings. I won't present any plan -- I will draw on the ideas presented by your Defense Minister and Chief of Staff.

Eban: And procedural proposals.

Kissinger: Yes. The reason he and I always talk for four hours is we always talk past each other. I'm talking procedure, but he has never budged from the position he took three months ago: In his mind the procedure starts after the agreement; in our mind it is a way of getting an agreement. The other night I assumed we were going to have a procedure like the Egyptian negotiations; only the next morning I realized he still saw it as coming after the negotiations. So Sadat's public statement puts him in opposition.

PM Meir: He mentioned the four stages: the Six Points, Kilometer 101, Geneva and Aswan talks.

Kissinger: So Sadat is backing our procedure 100%, and moreover backing it with Faisal and the Syrians, and publicly. And saying that what I have achieved here this week is satisfactory.

He showed me the map of the Syrians' minimum line. You know it anyway.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS

Dinitz: It is the same map.

Kissinger: Yes, the same map I brought [on January 20]. He showed it to his generals, General Ismail, and he said he wouldn't support it.

I want to go to Damascus to discuss the concepts, procedures, like thinning out and release of prisoners.

[Allon arrives]

Kissinger: I've never seen Yigal and the Defense Minister both wearing neckties.

Gamasy: You see the American influence, as our opposition says.

Kissinger: They say Israel is a satellite of the United States [laughter].  
**So** I will be general on substance and precise on procedure.

Dayan: Is Asad's position in Syria anything like Sadat's in Egypt -- he is the only one who can make decisions, or he isn't in the same position?

Kissinger: How these two ever got together to start a war, I don't know. Not even Asad and Sadat, but Fahmi and Saqqaf. Never do I see Fahmi when he doesn't warn me about Saqqaf.

He says in Damascus everybody is bought by somebody. The Baath Central Committee is bought by the Iraqis, by Russians, but everybody by somebody.

Yesterday he spoke extremely ill of Asad personally -- "They are traders, merchants," he said.

Still, he said Asad is the best one to deal with. He said this again yesterday. He said he is making a record now to bring Asad to his knees.

The October 6 line is reasonable to get the talks started but not sufficient. So that is why he is saying it. He would also like to split off the Syrians from Boumedienne.

He spoke worse of the Syrians than of you.

I had to make it clear you had not accepted the October 6 line, and that you would never agree to give up any settlement.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS

5

This is the full extent of what I know of Sadat. He never raised a final settlement, but I felt the record should show something. So after he said on television that it wasn't time, I took him aside and said I want you to know I am not against discussing it. He said, no, there is no time now.

The cars were already lined up.

[Elazar comes in]

Eban: Have you changed your view of the consequence of failure to get an agreement?

Kissinger: No, my conclusions are essentially the ones of the other night. In fact, they are reinforced. I had no sense until yesterday that there were any limits beyond which he would not support Syria. He has given me a flat assurance on what these are.

That, for God's sake, must remain absolutely confidential.

He agrees it would be a mistake now tactically to offer them more than the October 6 line, because they would just pocket it and ask for more. He instructed Gamasy in my presence not to raise any line in Damascus.

I am in <sup>for</sup> one hell of an evening. The last thing he wants to discuss is procedure. He thinks it is irrelevant.

My basic objective has to be to get out of Damascus without it blowing up. His object is the opposite -- to show he did everything his brothers asked and got nothing. His basic analysis -- which is correct -- is that starting the process creates the illusion of progress, which is in itself a liability for him.

My assessment is he would want more than 3-5 kilometers. He has never given reason to believe he would accept it.

The issue today is whether I can give him enough substance, based on what the Defense Minister said the other day, amended by the Chief of Staff.

Eban: There was a statement from Damascus that you gave assurances of the final line.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS

Authority NND 009031  
By WDP NARA Date 8/15/00

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS

6

PM Meir: The Cabinet asked me to ask you, and I said I wouldn't because it was inconceivable.

Kissinger: Your answer should be that in Egypt I told the Egyptians I would discuss nothing but disengagement, and I have told the Syrians I would do exactly the same as with the Egyptians. With neither have I discussed the final line. He, of course, expressed his view vehemently on the final line; I didn't. I wasn't noncommittal; I treated it as a nonsubject.

You can deny it flatly -- but not on the basis of what the final line is but that it is not part of the disengagement agreement.

PM Meir: You want us to send someone to Washington, and then they do?

Kissinger: I can't prevent them from wanting it concurrently, but I want to space it close.

Dinitz: Mizrachi would be released?

Kissinger: Yes, I saw him give the orders in my presence. I told him you would give all of the 73 you could find but keep the Russian.

Allon: Did you raise the possibility of keeping this joint staff together even after the disengagement implementation?

Kissinger: I mentioned it but he laughed. We didn't discuss it.

Dayan: Civilians can go into the areas where UNEF will be, but I assume they won't let them when it is still under Israeli occupation. On one hand, I would like to see some movement, such as a return of civilians, but on the other hand I realize there was a problem, because if we were there, they won't like it. That's a problem. I just wanted to mention that.

Kissinger: If we could even get them into negotiations on the return of civilians separated from the final line, we would be in great shape.

PM Meir: The reason I brought you that statement by Sadat is to show he is willing to do it in stages.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS

Kissinger: You are absolutely right, Madame Prime Minister. Sadat could have said this is between Syria and Dr. Kissinger and the nuances aren't for him. But his public statement yesterday and his joint appearance with me, and now his statement this afternoon, shows he is putting the onus on Asad.

He himself says no discussion should go beyond the October 6 line now. I won't even go that far. It would be a grave mistake to risk that he didn't mean what he said yesterday -- because every other time he has stuck to his position.

It is better if it blows up at a subordinate level if it blows up.

Eban: Is there any information on the prisoners we think are alive?

Kissinger: No, he has no information.

Incidentally, he says the Russians have replenished no airplanes since the war.

PM Meir: Really?

Kissinger: Tanks they got; about two-thirds are replaced, and with better tanks, so he is not complaining about tanks. But no more planes. You are in a position to know.

Allon: Did he mention missiles?

Kissinger: Not this time. But he mentioned SCUD's before.

Allon: He is in financial difficulty.

Kissinger: His behavior is beyond what would be conceivable according to the double-track theory we heard the other day. Switching back to the Soviets now would cost him an enormous price. His behavior to the Soviets is really gratuitous.

They showed me a schedule for Gromyko. It was really very minimal.

Sisco: I don't see how he can go back to the Russians without a major reversal.

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS



TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS

8

Kissinger: He is imploring us to let him know what we are telling the Soviets. It is either an enormous game -- in which case he will pay the price -- or he means it.

I don't know what I will face tonight. And there is nothing you can do to change it, so I am not asking anything.

Maybe that final line they gave is only line they could ever possibly accept. In which case it will blow up.

[The meeting then broke for lunch.]

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE/NODIS

Authority NND 009031  
By WDP NARA Date 8/15/00

March 1

(A)

Sadat's Press Statement after his talks with  
Dr. Kissinger

MENA from Cairo, 28 February 1974

After Kissinger's departure from the villa where the talks had taken place Sadat met with Egyptian correspondents and issued the following statement:

Sadat stated: I thank Kissinger for his efforts and I believe that the U.S. has now a new position and which reflected openly good intentions, a development that enabled the resumption of relations between Egypt and the U.S.

He added that Kissinger's visit to the region signified American intentions to obtain a solution and on this basis the relations between our two countries would be renewed. Sadat talked about separation of forces on the Syrian front and said that Syria was directly involved and we (Egypt) cooperated on the basis that we fight a common battle. He said that we cooperated in this matter as a party ready to help.

Sadat added that he assumes that separation of forces on the Syrian front would be achieved in the manner that it was achieved on the Egyptian front, moving through four preparatory stages leading toward agreement: The Six Points, Kilometer 101, the Geneva Conference and the Aswan talks.

Sadat said that separation of forces on the Syrian front would profit from our (Egypt's) experience and begin based on this experience. He also said that disengagement on the Egyptian front was carried out precisely as planned and the main thing now is preparation for the next stage and we have already made (such) preparations.

Sadat said that the second stage of the Geneva Conference was conditional on separation of forces on the Syrian front and also the obvious fact that without the Palestinians one could not discuss peace in Geneva.

Sadat said that he had invited Hussein to visit Cairo after his visit to Washington. He also said that Nixon and Brandt would visit Cairo in 1974.

He added that he would contact Assad in the next few hours.

He said also that he would meet with Gromyko on March 2.

Sadat also talked about the areas of cooperation between Egypt and the U.S. and said that there existed cooperation in the field of clearing the Suez Canal, an effort that required technical means which were at the disposal of the U.S.