01043

1974/03/01
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS: Mrs. Golda Meir, Prime Minister of Israel
Simcha Dinitz, Israeli Ambassador to U.S.
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary Of State
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

TIME AND DATE: Friday - March 1, 1974
12:00 noon - 1:00 p.m.

PLACE: The Guest House
Herzliyya

Secretary Kissinger: Did you see the latest humiliation of the Russians
that the Egyptians staged? We arranged full diplomatic relations in
Egypt -- Sadat wanted the flagraising on the American Embassy grounds.

Prime Minister Meir: In honor of Gromyko's arrival! [laughter]

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. They made it a significant event. The whole
Foreign Ministry was there. Fahmi made an impassioned speech. It
will be on Egyptian television next to Gromyko's arrival.

Prime Minister Meir: Sadat made a statement on how good it was that
you came to the Middle East, and he mentioned the four stages of
Egyptian disengagement and said it should be the same on Syria.

The only mention of other superpower was that Gromyko was coming, but
he said that Brandt and the President would visit in 1974.

Secretary Kissinger: For your information, he's thinking of coming in May.

Prime Minister Meir: For my birthday.

Secretary Kissinger: When is your birthday?

Prime Minister Meir: March 3.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: [laughter]
Secretary Kissinger: Mine is May 27.

Prime Minister Meir: But I'm in the 19th century.

Secretary Kissinger: That's the century I'm supposed to have a special weakness for.

Incidentally, he won't come to the Middle East without visiting Israel.

Prime Minister Meir: I never thought I'd be doing it at this age -- going on.

Anyone who wants this job deserves it. [laughter]

Ambassador Dinitz: [reads from a cable] This is a statement Sadat made to the press after Dr. Kissinger left. He said, "I thank Dr. Kissinger on his efforts and I think the U.S. has now a new position which manifests good intentions, facilitating resumption of relations. It shows the intent of the U.S. to achieve a solution. Sadat spoke of separation of forces on the Syrian front, and said it is a primary interest of Syria in this regard, and we participate in it since we are one front and conducting one campaign."

Secretary Kissinger: That's helpful to you.

Ambassador Dinitz: "We participated as a helping side." He thinks separation of forces can be achieved in Syria as in Egypt if it passes through four preparatory stages, like the Six Points, Kilometer 101, Geneva and the Aswan talks. "Separation of forces on Syrian front will derive profit from our experience. It was achieved punctually and as planned. We already did preparations for it. Resumption of the Geneva Conference is conditional on the achievement of disengagement in Syria." He also said that without justice for the Palestinians, there cannot be peace at Geneva.

Finally, he said Nixon and Brandt will visit in 1974 -- presumably not together!

He is to communicate with Asad in the next few hours.

He spoke about U.S.-Egyptian cooperation on clearing the Canal and other technical devices that are at the disposal of the U.S. [A text of the Sadat interview was later provided, at Tab A]
Prime Minister Meir: I hope someone will kiss Gromyko in Egypt.

Secretary Kissinger: No.

Ambassador Dinitz: They kissed him in Syria -- their Foreign Minister.

Secretary Kissinger: We haven't reached that point with the Russians.

The Egyptians wanted me to stop in Egypt on my way out, after Gromyko left there, to indicate the differential in treatment.

Prime Minister Meir: Poor Gromyko. Khruschev once was discussing with the press -- "My Foreign Minister? You see Gromyko? If I tell him to lower his trousers and sit on a cake of ice, he'll do it."

Secretary Kissinger: They also use Gromyko as straight man.

Prime Minister Meir: Yesterday I called a Cabinet meeting just to tell them. But I am authorized on behalf of the Government to tell you how we appreciate having the list. They were all praising you. There is only one fool -- not a fool but a demagogue -- Tamir, who said the fact that the list was brought by Dr. Kissinger is inconsistent with the Geneva Convention. But everyone is happy.

Secretary Kissinger: On Mizrachi and Levy, Sadat in my presence gave orders to release them.

But the 73 you can release, but you can keep the Russian.

Ambassador Dinitz: We agreed on the 73.

Secretary Kissinger: Frankly, I think Sadat would have been willing to do it without it, but I offered it anyway, to show goodwill. I offered the 73 but not the one Russian.

Prime Minister Meir: Maybe we can use him to get some out of Siberia.

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, so I said you wanted to keep the Russian. So he said, fine.

On Mizrachi, they say he was Egyptian.

They said you can announce it today, that it was brought back.
Prime Minister Meir: When will he come?

Secretary Kissinger: It is purely a technical problem.

Prime Minister Meir: We would rather do it when he's here.

Secretary Kissinger: That's fine. I think in the next 48 hours.

Sadat says your intelligence made an approach to their intelligence in Morocco for getting together.

Prime Minister Meir: I don't know.

Secretary Kissinger: He said there was. It was a proposal for liaison. Through Hassan. He had replied it was all right provided you did it also with the Palestinians. But that was only because he didn't want to do it in Morocco. He wanted me to tell you that he is interested provided it is through me.

He asked me to tell you this.

Prime Minister Meir: It's because I haven't seen SviKa this week, my chief of intelligence.

Secretary Kissinger: He also said any contacts you want -- political, economic, intelligence -- he's willing to have, provided you do it through me.

Prime Minister Meir: Good.

Secretary Kissinger: He told me he's now released 200,000 [demobilized troops] and all his auxiliary transport. You told me you'd release one-half of your reserves.

Ambassador Dinitz: I told Dado [Elazar] we could get a more exact number.

Secretary Kissinger: If you could do it, I could send it to him as coming from you.

Ambassador Dinitz: Good.

Prime Minister Meir: How does he see political contacts?
Secretary Kissinger: I'll be back here in 4-6 weeks; we could discuss it then.

Ambassador Dinitz: Maybe there could be a meeting between the Prime Minister and Sadat, in your presence.

Secretary Kissinger: From our point of view, we would welcome it.

Prime Minister Meir: We heard that Sadat wants to help me against Dayan!

Ambassador Dinitz: I stayed with him until 1:30 last night talking to him.

Prime Minister Meir: He's really wounded.

Ambassador Dinitz: He doesn't want to hurt you.

Prime Minister Meir: He's a very complicated person. I was opposed to having him in 1967, but we've worked together well.

Secretary Kissinger: At dinner the other night, he was very constructive.

Ambassador Dinitz: He was for disengagement only for a respite.

Secretary Kissinger: That's the only reason I'm interested. You need time, and a new juxtaposition of forces. There is one chance in three of getting something from Egypt.

Prime Minister Meir: He said he thinks Sadat wants peace.

Secretary Kissinger: I think so too. He could have embarrassed me, and played Arab politics on the Syrian thing. He's no fool; he knows what our strategy is. You remember that Newsweek piece that I was delaying Kilometer 101 in order to complete disengagement on my trip. He saw it, and said, "Of course! That's the only way." Yesterday he didn't even raise the next stage yet. I took him aside just to say I wasn't against discussing it. He's never raised it. He said it wasn't time. He's never mentioned the 67 borders. On television, he was in civilian clothes and said yes, it has significance and it was the first time he had received a foreign guest in civilian clothes since the war. He was asked if the war was over; he said no, but it was a new era.

He says the Libyan Prime Minister is in Moscow to buy T-62 tanks and Foxbats. If that is true, that means Soviet troops will have to be in Libya,
because no Libyan will be able to fly Foxbats for the next 50 years. If this happens, he'll move against Libya either by a rebellion in Libya or with Egyptian forces. And he wants an assurance you will keep quiet. I said I cannot speak for you!

Prime Minister Meir: Certainly! You can assure him.

Secretary Kissinger: You want to break up the disengagement to save Qaddafi!

On reconnaissance, he has thrown out the Soviet Foxbats and he now needs our pictures as we agreed. He prefers the U-2 rather than the SR-71, which is cheaper, and we can tell other governments we are doing it with his permission, and your permission. We will fly on March 5. We will try to base a U-2 in Cyprus and give you both the track it will fly. Just down the --- you know. Here. [He hands over a map. They study it.]

Prime Minister Meir: Can we keep it?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. They wanted notification of our flight. I said we can't, because they will hide the equipment. He said yes.

He has agreed to the extension of UNEF. It will run out on April 25. He agreed we would jointly ask for a year. Normally it is six months. He agreed. I am certain you want it.

Prime Minister Meir: Of course.

Secretary Kissinger: That means it is guaranteed.

Prime Minister Meir: What will be the Russian attitude?

Secretary Kissinger: They first sponsored it, and if Egypt and Israel both ask for one year, on what grounds can they refuse it?

On the disengagement, let me give you the substance.

I told you he is eager to have an American military attaché in Egypt so he can show him some Russian equipment. That is why I disagree with Rabin's analysis -- it goes beyond a double-track policy. He didn't raise the second phase at all. I raised it at the end, only so the record would show I was prepared to discuss it.
On Syria, I explained exactly what happened in Damascus. He became very angry with the Syrians. He said there has to be a disengagement agreement; otherwise it would be a disaster all over the Arab world.

He would have wanted it one week, even though he would look bad because he had taken longer, but after the way they behaved, he said "Take your time." I presented your position worse than it was: I said you were willing to give one-half of the new territory and, privately, that with great effort I might get you back to October 6. He said there were two problems: One, what he could support diplomatically, and two, what he would have to do so he wouldn't have to go to war if the Syrians went to war again.

Madame Prime Minister, I must say that forming a coalition seems to agree with you. You look better rested than before.

Keating said that a member of the Religious Party came to him and said, "There is one issue on which we insist and on which we need United States support -- that conversion to Judaism can only be done by Orthodox rabbis." Keating asked me what the United States position was. I said "Stay the hell out!" [laughter]

Prime Minister Meir: A Bedouin is on the list. He said they will stay with us -- except if we form a Likud Government.

Secretary Kissinger: It would be a disaster for Israel. The margin of survival of Israel, I've said to you, is anyway difficult to maintain; with them it is impossible.

Prime Minister Meir: There is a sentiment to come together in the country. But we couldn't. Begin and Tamir are doctrinaire. Their view is that the United States is dependent on us!

Secretary Kissinger: How?

Prime Minister Meir: For our strategic position, etc. They want to know why we take orders from the United States? [laughter]

Secretary Kissinger: I will be happy to testify on that one! I think you are on the extreme margin of what is attainable.

There is one thing I disagree with your Ambassador about. You can't deduce from the number of people willing to vote money for you how many would be willing to run risks for you. Your domestic support in the United States in the strategic sense is more precarious.
In this sense the Wilson victory gives you a little more room.

I know how close it came in our bureaucracy -- not only in recent weeks, but in February 71. We were within six hours of moving against you.

Prime Minister Meir: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: Let me continue. He said he can present a withdrawal to the October 6 line as an achievement, and he could do that, but that if the Syrians reject it, and start a war, he would be in a difficult position to stay out.

In the meantime he is sending Marwan to Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to counter Syrian maneuvers. Asad is sending messages around.

He said, if you could get a small strip beyond it, he could tell me he could stay out of the war and would take a public position in support of that offer, and he told me I could assure you of that. Then he brought in Ismail and Gamasy and repeated it. I said: I know one thing: No Israeli settlement can be given up, in my view. And secondly, I knew Syrian forces couldn't move up beyond whatever line they are on. He said he understands that.

Ambassador Dinitz: The October line.

Secretary Kissinger: Right. He said he understands this; he is not asking for any particular width. But if a few kilometers could be offered, he would personally back that offer and would not go to war.

Prime Minister Meir: His position was different; he crossed the Canal and the Syrians didn't get anything. In Syria it means that withdrawal is all one-sided.

Secretary Kissinger: But optically it looks to the Arabs that you withdrew from territory you could have held.

Ambassador Dinitz: True.

Prime Minister Meir: But he had a foothold on the East Bank.

Secretary Kissinger: Asad sent messages to everyone that he had done everything they asked and I had brought nothing -- which was our understanding, until the Red Cross visits started.
Prime Minister Meir: Have you heard anything about them?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, we have had an official notification. Haven't you?

Prime Minister Meir: Yesterday the Red Cross Headquarters in Geneva said they knew nothing of it.

Secretary Kissinger: Eban told me in the car you had heard. Here. [Kissinger shows cable at Tab B reporting that visits have started.]

Prime Minister Meir: That is good.

About the men not on the list who we think are alive, did you raise it?

Secretary Kissinger: I did. Gamasy said he would look into it. I'll raise it tonight.

If I survive Damascus tonight, I better leave the area.

Ambassador Dinitz: Unless you want to come back for a flagraising at the Embassy you are going to open in Jerusalem!

If there is a new government with Begin, you will need a new Ambassador. Maybe you want it anyway.

Secretary Kissinger: No, I like you. Do you have a government yet?

Prime Minister Meir: No. We will have 58. But they cannot vote no confidence. The most they could get was 56. It's close -- 58-56.

Secretary Kissinger: What about the other six?

Prime Minister Meir: They are communists, and so on.

Ambassador Dinitz: They would probably abstain.

Prime Minister Meir: And there are the other four who would probably vote for us.

That is why we are thinking that some of our Ministers might resign from the Knesset. Otherwise they could never leave the country or the building [because of the close votes].
Ambassador Dinitz: Regarding the message you sent to them about the missing prisoners, could you get a reaffirmation that we will get permission to look for the missing bodies?

Secretary Kissinger: I raised it with Fahmi.

Prime Minister Meir: We had an agreement with their general.

Secretary Kissinger: He said that going three-four kilometers into their line is fine, but if you want to go deeper, they want it with UN personnel, not Israeli personnel.

Prime Minister Meir: We have maps of where the battles were.

Secretary Kissinger: He said they transferred 700 bodies to you. They gave 90 last week.

Ambassador Dinitz: The point is, we reached an agreement with them, and we want a reaffirmation.

Secretary Kissinger: I am just telling you what he said. He said he would let the UN go wherever you tell them they should go.

Prime Minister Meir: [to Dinitz] Why don't you ask Leor?

Secretary Kissinger: To get back to disengagement: I am not sure the Syrians will accept anything that even in your most extreme imagination you could accept. Because if they insist on their minimum line, which I brought you... If they were to reject a theoretically acceptable line, and the Egyptians say they won't fight for it, that would be not a bad outcome. On the October 6 lines, I told you what he said. I don't even want your answer today, even if it is negative, because I want to keep it going.

Prime Minister Meir: You should not tell them to hope we will do that.

Secretary Kissinger: I haven't. I said we haven't discussed it.

Prime Minister Meir: What will Gamasy say?

Secretary Kissinger: He will tell the Syrians to reject anything you might bring -- because it has to go through a long process. Second, if they
could get October 6, it would not be a minor achievement. I am not going
to discuss the October 6 line because he has already told me he rejects
it. We will discuss concepts, not lines.

I think it's a mistake to let this blow up while I am here, before I have
seen Faisal.

Tonight we will discuss concepts, thinning out of forces, etc.

Prime Minister Meir: I was encouraged by this statement of Sadat's,
spelling out the stages.

Secretary Kissinger: That's right. Also, Gamasy will tell them the
Egyptian military commission is open to them starting today -- so they
are in a position where they refuse everything. And offer them a
Washington venue. They will never accept Geneva. So don't worry.

Prime Minister Meir: They should begin with something, like the civilians
returning.

Secretary Kissinger: That he will raise.

Prime Minister Meir: Start with that, with an exchange of prisoners.

Secretary Kissinger: That is impossible. Leave it open. On the stages
as in Egypt, don't make a statement of what you won't accept.

I now think that all you can get on Syria is disengagement. What you have
to do is get the Egyptians out of the war. Whatever it is -- two or four
kilometers -- won't make a difference in the second phase.

Prime Minister Meir: The idea of crossing that border is in Israel
dynamite today. Just dynamite.

Ambassador Dinitz: You don't want a public statement.

Secretary Kissinger: I don't need a public statement that you will consider
it.

Mr. Gamasy: There is no danger of that!

Secretary Kissinger: But please make no statements of what you cannot
accept. I want to tell Sadat it is open.
If we could say that after a Government is formed you will send an official to Washington, I can ask him [Asad] to do it too. If I can tell Asad I am really discussing the ideas of your chief of staff in general terms, without telling where the line is.

Even if you could tell me now that you would do what I think is necessary, I would still offer a third of the new territory.

Sadat said his problem is solved if you offer Quneitra -- but he didn't want you to offer it.

The immediate tactical problem is not to have a blowup before the oil ministers' meeting -- which is now scheduled for March 10, after Boumedienne comes back from China. Sadat said he had promised he would get his friend Kissinger to the area.

I want to tell Asad you will agree to send a senior official to Washington and then afterwards he should. It buys a little time.

Nothing is gained by forcing it to a showdown now.

Prime Minister Meir: No, all we want is that he should not shoot. He is committed to a cease-fire.

Secretary Kissinger: It is not impossible that Asad will announce after seeing me that there is no basis for negotiation. That is why Sadat is sending his people around. The major problem is to avoid a blowup. We can say we just should follow Sadat's four stages, and he and you should send someone to Washington.

Prime Minister Meir: Not together.

Secretary Kissinger: Not at first. Let's see how it works. It is conceivable. Then we have done everything I told Sadat and Faisal I would do. I could do many things: I can disengage from the negotiations on the ground of the embargo not being lifted. Or Sadat could come out for the October 6 line.

Prime Minister Meir: They are committed to the cease-fire.

Secretary Kissinger: The reason I would like indirect talks is so you get a flavor of what you are up against. The Egyptians are tough but they are in a civilized framework. The Syrians are not a military problem, but
they pose the danger of radicalizing the whole Arab world. The advantage of an agreement is it keeps Sadat secure and the Russians out completely. Sadat could keep Geneva if he wanted, as a propaganda forum -- we couldn't object.

The advantage is political, not military. But it is politically essential to gain time this month.

What should I tell your colleagues? Who is there?

**Prime Minister Meir:** The same group. Except also Sapir, who wants to talk to you alone about finance.

**Ambassador Dinitz:** They say we are cheating on our aid requests.

**Secretary Kissinger:** Ash has seen the order. He knows what he has to do. How much should I tell your colleagues?

**Prime Minister Meir:** [thinks] It is... If it is Dayan, Allon, Eban...

**Ambassador Dinitz:** But it is also Gazit, Evron...

**Prime Minister Meir:** Not the details, but merely that after your talk in Egypt, Sadat wants to be helpful, that he has sent people there, that you didn't present a rosy picture of what we will do.

**Secretary Kissinger:** On the contrary, I understated it.

**Prime Minister Meir:** That there will be no discussion of lines in Damascus; that you want us to send someone there [to Washington] and there will be a Syrian too; and that Sadat didn't press on the second phase.

**Ambassador Dinitz:** I would not go into what Sadat would or would not do, depending on the lines.

**Secretary Kissinger:** I am just wondering about my people. Maybe I will just mention it, without arguing. I will say I am just reporting and we have to agree on what to say in Damascus -- and it will be less than the October 6 line.

**Prime Minister Meir:** I will have to present a government on Tuesday, and no doubt someone will ask about the Golan Heights. I will just say the government has not changed its position.
Secretary Kissinger: That's right.

Ambassador Dinitz: It might be helpful.

Secretary Kissinger: If you don't go into it in any detail.

I am really worried about my meeting in Damascus tonight. From Asad's point of view, it is dangerous. Once he is engaged, it's haggling over details; now he can fight over principle. This is why what Sadat is doing is extremely helpful -- telling everyone that everything is going well.

I don't exclude that Asad will say he won't talk unless I guarantee a line in the Golan Heights. That I would not do even if you offered it. Sadat didn't want me to do it. Therefore, it still could blow up. It is not excluded that tomorrow we will have a problem -- but it is not affected by what position you are taking.

Prime Minister Meir: Have you heard rumors about disturbances in Damascus?

Secretary Kissinger: No, today?

Prime Minister Meir: The other night. I got a phone call at 3:00 a.m.: They had declared a curfew. But I heard nothing yesterday, so I guess it was not anything.

Secretary Kissinger: It's an extraordinary scene in Damascus. The crowds are sullen. Never like Egypt. No one ever waves back, or smiles. We have an intelligence report that there is a Palestinian Commando Unit in Damascus to get me. We have given it to the Syrians -- so there is an armored car on either side of my vehicle. So it is not a very pleasant atmosphere.

Even if you offered what is theoretically but not politically conceivable, there is no sign he would accept it. I have never heard Asad say anything about Quneitra.

Send a Minister if you possibly can -- whoever it is. Then a Syrian will come. This will waste time.

Can Dayan be given a special mission? [Mrs. Meir shrugs, implying a negative answer.] I don't want to tell you how to run your government -- even though Dinitz is telling me how to run ours. [laughter]

Ambassador Dinitz: You are a satellite of Israel, according to Tamir!
Prime Minister Meir: Is Sadat working on the Canal?

Secretary Kissinger: Yes, and we have a team there. Libya wants 600 T-62s.

[At about 1:00 p.m., Foreign Minister Eban arrives, and the group moved to a larger meeting room for a plenary session.]
Sadat's Press Statement after his talks with Kissinger

MENA from Cairo, 28 February 1974

After Kissinger’s departure from the villa where the talks had taken place, Sadat met with Egyptian correspondents and issued the following statement:

Sadat stated: I thank Kissinger for his efforts and I believe that the U.S. has now a new position and which reflects openly good intentions, a development that enabled the resumption of relations between Egypt and the U.S.

He added that Kissinger’s visit to the region signified American intentions to obtain a solution and on this basis the relations between our two countries would be renewed. Sadat talked about separation of forces on the Syrian front and said that Syria was directly involved and we (Egypt) cooperated on the basis that we fight a common battle. He said that we cooperated in this matter as a party ready to help.

Sadat added that he assumes that separation of forces on the Syrian front would be achieved in the manner that it was achieved on the Egyptian front, moving through four preparatory stages leading toward agreement: The Six Points, Kilometer 101, the Geneva Conference and the Aswan talks.

Sadat said that separation of forces on the Syrian front would profit from our (Egypt’s) experience and begin based on this experience. He also said that disengagement on the Egyptian front was carried out precisely as planned and the main thing now is preparation for the next stage and we have already made (such) preparations.

Sadat said that the second stage of the Geneva Conference was conditional on separation of forces on the Syrian front and also the obvious fact that without the Palestinians one could not discuss peace in Geneva.

Sadat said that he had invited Hussein to visit Cairo after his visit to Washington. He also said that Nixon and Brandt would visit Cairo in 1974.

He added that he would contact Assad in the next few hours.

He said also that he would meet with Gromyko on March 2.

Sadat also talked about the areas of cooperation between Egypt and the U.S. and said that there existed cooperation in the field of clearing the Suez Canal, an effort that required technical means which were at the disposal of the U.S.
SECRET NODIS/CHEROKEE

Z 013743Z, FEB 74
FROM USIMT DAMASCUS
TO AMBASSADOR, TEL AVIV
FLASH 323
BY
SECRET DAMASCUS 0142

NODIS/CHEROKEE

E0 11052: GDS
TAGS: OVIP (HENRY A. KISSINGER)
SUBJECT: RED CROSS VISITS WITH ISRAELIS

DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER ZAKARIA ISMAIL HAS ASKED ME TO INFORM YOU THAT, AS PROMISED, AT 09:45 THIS MORNING LOCAL TIME RED CROSS VISIT WITH ISRAELI PRISONERS BEGAN.

SCTES

ST # 0142

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