on the run as a terrorist. "In the middle of the night," Sekina remembers, "British soldiers and King Farouk's police came crashing into our house, hurling us out of our beds, breaking furniture and crockery, tearing the place to pieces. They weren't at all genteel. They were looking for a war." That was during World War II. Sadat had graduated with Gamal Abdel Nasser from the Egyptian Military Academy in 1938; but if Nasser's brooding, Sadat was impulsive and bloodthirsty. They shared a talent for monstrosity, a shared taste for cruelty in all its forms, and a shared disillusionment with the Bernard Shaw of a revolution. By 1941, Sadat was concocting elaborate plots to expel the 14th Army from Egypt.

In 1948 the anti-British Sheikh Hassan el Banna, Supreme Guide of the fanatical Moslem Brotherhood, and General Anwar el Masri, the former chief of staff of the Egyptian Army who had been sacked by Winston Churchill. Twice, Sadat tried to smuggle General Masri through to the German lines in the Sahara (where Masri was to advise the Germans how to outflank the British), but on the first endeavor the general's car broke down, and on the second his airplane crashed at takeoff. Sadat's subsequent intrigues with a group of ex-Germans in Cairo, set up by a belly dancer. (Sadat himself was not particularly "pro-Nazi," as some of his critics still claim. He was an anti-British Egyptian nationalist—primarily.) He was court-martialed in 1942, cashiered out of the army, and dispatched to a prison camp in Upper Egypt. He escaped, demanded an audience with the King, was recaptured, and escaped again, hiding out all over Egypt in the teeming mosques of Cairo till the termination of the war. By that time he was demarcating that Nasser's clandestine Free Officers movement adopt terrorism as a political weapon. As Sadat later confessed in his writings, he pleaded with Nasser for permission to blow up the British Embassy and everybody in it, including the ambassador.

Nasser refused, but to keep Sadat happy he appointed him the head of a civilian auxiliary; Sadat then plotted to assassinate several pro-British politicians. He bungled an attempt on the life of Mustafa Nahas Pasha in 1948, but a year later some of his followers kidnaped and gassed Amin Osman Pasha, a former Minister of Finance. It came about that the bond between Britain and Egypt was "unbreakable as a Catholic marriage." He was arrested for complicity, but was eventually released. One of the stories he told was that he was asked by his chief—"a prince, surrounded by malevolent advisers, who eventually gets rid of them and establishes his own supremacy. The story was published in 1953, and Nasir was eventually to reappear in Sadat's real life.

Through the intercession of King Farouk's physician, Sadat's army commission was revoked and he was reassigned to act as a palace spy against suspected revolutionaries in the army, and glibly he became a double agent, telling everything he knew to both sides. By 1951, he was a lieutenant colonel and a governmentflaunted intelligence officer (intelligence has claimed) embroiled in yet another bungled plot—a mine was planted in the Suez Canal, but failed to explode when a British naval force arrived to assist it. In 1952, on the eve of the July 22-23 revolution, he was supposed to cut all communications in Cairo, but the signals got crossed; he took his family to the mountains, and at the crucial moment Nasser could not find him. From that moment on, though he held a succession of prestigious titles including that of Vice President until

Nasser died last September, Sadat's power in Egypt was far more nominal than real. Like Nasser, he is a man who does not flourish in a free political environment, a Seventh-day Adventist with a true intellectual and an ardent Moslem who has come to worship the trinity of the Koran, the Prophet, and the Qur'an. He is a man of no political principles, a man who has sought power immediately, and a man who has sought power for himself. He is a man who has never been content with anything less than supreme power, a man whose ambition is insatiable, a man who has never been satisfied with less than the top position in the land.

A man who has never been satisfied with less than the top position in the land.

A man who has never been satisfied with less than the top position in the land.

A man who has never been satisfied with less than the top position in the land.
He cut prices, eased numerous restrictions and sought out the civil establishment—the press, the universities, the judiciary—to coax them to his side.

After television, Sadat spoke softly in homely colloquialisms, asserted all of his rustic charm and began to acquire charisma. The values he invoked were not visions of order, but of the future. He seemed to be saying to those in the Egyptian village—above all, belief in God. In his visits to the army; he refused to do all of the talking, and engaged his officers in discussions that were meaningful. He was not a competent pilot when he embarked on tiny probing operations of the intelligence apparatus, not daring yet not to dismiss Sharaf and Gomaa, but inserting one spy here, another there, the better to be safe. He learned well what was required of him. It was a marvel of political craftsmanship, a masterly lesson of how to proceed from quasi-impotence toward supreme power, step by step.

In the meantime, Sadat was moving rapidly on the external front. He accepted the hitherto unmentionable idea of a peace treaty with Israel, he proposed reopening the Suez Canal and he invited Secretary of State William Rogers to Cairo. The reasonableness of his strategy won world opinion to Egypt's side, and put Israel on the diplomatic defense. The agreement with Washington was Mohammed Hassanin Heykal, the editor of Al Ahram, Cairo's leading newspaper. Heykal, Nasser's closest confidence in the government, had had even greater influence with Sadat. The essence of Heykal's argument, which he expounded repeatedly in his columns, was that Israel was not a power that could be peacefully treated with force, that peace was probably unattainable unless Egypt first improved its relations with the United States; only then would Washington apply the pressure on Tel Aviv. Al Gomhouria, the Government organ of the Socialist Union, replied with violent editorials which accused Heykal of selling out to the Americans; indirectly, the editorials were addressing the conversation about the possibility of any relations with Israel.

For the Arab Socialist Union was not merely the country's unique political organization, it was the citadel of Heykal's enemies and the center of the Nationalist control of Egypt. It was the power base of Vice President Ali Sabry, Cairo's leading leftist ideologue; it was the center of the Russian influence; it was the citadel of the Democratic Party, the state of the disfigurement of the proletariat. I have no evidence of this, but I suspect that the cunning Heykal may have written his editorials not only to improve Egypt's bargaining position abroad, but also to set a trap for his enemies at home. I suspect that with Sadat's consent he was encouraging them to tip their hand, and guiding them toward the confrontation that Sadat himself was setting up.

The confrontation with the Arab Socialist Union came not over the opening to Washington, not over their relations with Syria and Libya—which Sadat argued should strengthen Egypt against Israel, and protected his flank against the real radicals of the country—because the Soviet influence was almost incidental; for their part, Sabry, Gomaa and their partisans were determined to emasculate Sadat before he acquired strength, and they carefully chose the federation. It is true that few Egyptians were eager for more adventures in Arab unity. They voted Sadat in, but they voted for the Socialists, and were now determined to take the initiative of the larger central committee in their own favor. Perhaps sensing that he had gone too far too fast, Sabry tried to modify Sadat by sending him to Ramses, where he was booted from office. Sadat refused the apology, and decided to pursue the struggle to the end. He swore in a May Day speech that "I am responsible only to God, to the people and to myself,"—and on the eve of Rogers' arrival in Cairo—sacked Sabry from all his minister offices.

On July 8, a week after Rogers' departure from Cairo, Sadat visited a group of 170 key army officers at Inshas, near Ismailia in the Suez Canal zone. According to the most Western diplomats in Cairo, part of the dialogue went rather like this:

SADAT: My sons, our political and military position is squeezed between the two great powers.

OFFICERS: We accept this, but we insist on a solution—diplomatic or military—one way or another. We set a time limit.

SADAT: I'll give you one month. After that, in a few weeks, By God, I will walk to the ends of the earth to keep Egyptian soldiers from getting killed again, if I can still call it by any means. But there is another problem, my sons. I will never be able to achieve any solution at all if the centers of power in Cairo keep obstructing me.

OFFICERS: If you have rivals for power in Cairo, then we urge you to get rid of them—all of them. You are the President of Egypt. You are the leader of the Egyptians. We are with you.

SADAT: The centers of power are subverting this whole front, and by God, I will cut them to pieces, one after the other, until the Egyptians are facing you, my sons, and leave the home front.

Confident of the army's support in the immediate future, he moved to Cairo to prepare for the next round of confrontation. It was not long in coming. Briefly—according to Sadat's version—no sooner had he left Inshas office than he was visited by a young officer from the Ministry of the Interior who handed him a pair of tape recordings. Listening, Sadat discovered that Interior Minister Sharafi Gomaa had ordered his secret police round Cairo Radio in late April—to prevent the President from addressing the population. Thereupon, Sadat sacked Sharafi Gomaa and ordered the release of all political prisoners, including the Minister of the War, Gen. Mohamed Fawzi, and the shadowy Sami Sharafi, tendered their resignations, expecting that the weight of their defections would cause the entire Government to fall.

General Fawzi had been well forewarned of Sadat's suspicions—he had attended the meeting at Inshas. He joined the conspira- tors because he was beholden to Sami Sharafi by tribalist bonds of blood and marriage, and because he believed the conspiracy would succeed. Once the collective resignations were in, Sadat called the leaders of the Arab Socialist Union to the Daniele Palace, including the Ministry of the Interior, Moham- med Fawzi, and the shadowy Sami Sharafi, tendered their resignations, expecting that the weight of their defections would cause the entire Government to fall.

General Fawzi had been well forewarned of Sadat's suspicions—he had attended the meeting at Inshas. He joined the conspira- tors because he was beholden to Sami Sharafi by tribalist bonds of blood and marriage, and because he believed the conspiracy would succeed. Once the collective resignations were in, Sadat called the leaders of the Arab Socialist Union to the Daniele Palace, including the Ministry of the Interior, Moham- med Fawzi, and the shadowy Sami Sharafi, tendered their resignations, expecting that the weight of their defections would cause the entire Government to fall.

Sadat's consolidation of power was complete. The conspiracy against him was as real and personal as this; he intended to fall. Some Egyptians still have their doubts. Sadat had not last but that he was the President of the people. He had purchased a precious peace with Washington, unhurt by his enemies at home, and he had acquired the essential liberty of action to conclude an honorable peace with Israel. Only that. But the attack is made.

For the next fortnight, the Cairo press overflowed with oaths of fealty to Anwar Sadat, and lurid particulars of the conspiracy.
Sami Sharaf was accused of fomenting public disorders, of organizing a network of rumor mongers and of breaking into Gamal Abdel Nasser's office. Sharaf was accused of burning bundles of incriminating documents and taped telephone conversations. All of the conspirators were accused of "corruption, embezzlement and other crimes," and Sharaf was accused of masterminding everything.

"The most painful thing of all," Sadat declared, "was the discovery that my own house had been burgled." (The most popular rumor was that Sadat had been "killed" by Egypt's "bug" and had been discovered by Secretary Rogers. The Secretary, so the story went, came to Cairo wearing a magic wristwatch-an electronic device to detect hidden conspirators. It was informed by Sadat's "% whose name was down in the President's office, the wristwatch began glowing, so the two of them took flight to the garden. American diplomats later claimed this typically Egyptian tale to be a lie: he said he had been much amused. What is true is that Rogers did bring his own debugging expert with him to the suite at the Nile Hilton—but no microphones were found.

For this, Sadat ordered an end to all telephone-tapping and other forms of pervasive police surveillance—except when authorized by a court order or required by the country's "national security." The announcement was admirable, but was it intended to mask a deeper motive—the elimination of Sadat's enemies, now that he felt no longer threatened because they had hindered his freedom of maneuver on the diplomatic front? Whatever his motive, Sadat seized upon a truly popular issue in Egypt, and his reaction pleased the people. On April 14, the end of May, he drove to the Ministry of the Interior to observe a bonfire of thousands of Nasser's magnetic tapes. "The people are tired of the propaganda, the foulspawn, the nonsense," he said. "The hallmark of the Egyptian state would not be snooping, but the rule of law."

"The rule of law. Where had it been these last 19 years?" asked a friend at the time. "Ander that. At the same time, Nasser expelled Egypt from the King? In all his assaults on the 'centers of power,' Sadat-the heir of Nasser's mantle, and now the sole acknowledged president—had never before openly attacked Nasser himself. Sami Sharaf, Sharawi Goma and the other snoppers had all been Nasser's hand-picked men, and if they snooped on so many it was because Nasser had given them the go-ahead. To that end of governing. Sadat's public explanation is that Sharaf and company had got out of hand only after Nasser's death, but this was in language that was ambiguous, that was invented.

For there is at large in Egypt now a most fascinating phenomenon—the demythologizing of Gamal Abdel Nasser. Though the once-sublime facade has been utterly and cruelly vanished from Cairo's streets, the demythologizing has not yet deeply touched the common people. Nor, despite some broad hints, has it yet explicitly exploded in the pages of Western newspapers. Yet the first, second, third and fourth generation of the intellectuals, technocrats, middle class and even some of the military, who served Nasser, have become disaffected with a vengeance. So much so that I found myself exhorting my intellectual friends to retain some sense of balance.

"Look," I said, "Admit that Nasser made some mistakes. I would agree that he gave Egypt the vision of becoming a modern state. He built factories, hospitals and schools, nationalized the Canal and ran it well, erected the Aswan Dam..." 

"No," my friends replied. "He ruined Egypt. He destroyed all of our democratic institutions, and brought back the despotism of the Mamelukes. Whenever one of his ministers showed signs of independent thinking, Nasser fired him. He led us into the disastrous union with Syria, gave us an Egyptian Vietnam in Yemen, and-despite all his efforts for peace—-ran us directly toward our defeat with Israel in 1967. That was the worst defeat in our modern history, and the day will come when every Egyptian will damn him for it."

"But, but, until that day of reckoning—it could tear Egypt apart—President Sadat must drape himself in Nasser's toga. Publicly, he makes a show of his affection for Nasser, but secretly he is constantly observing signs of strain. Nasser's widow and his children are said to resent Sadat, much as the Kennedys came to resent President Johnson after his accession. The most widely-circulated rumor in Washington is that many distinguished diplomats believe it is that sometime before he died Nasser deposited $16 million (the figure varies) in a secret Swiss bank account. Nasser's closest friends—Aly Sabry, Sami Sharaf et al.—-and jelled them as traitors. Furthermore they feared that Sadat's purge of the Arab Socialist Union and his plans for a more Western orientation have long been "fraudulent," he said) would exclude most of Egypt's Marxists from future participation. For instinctively the Soviet leadership has always understood that internal affairs through the party-cum-intelligence apparatus is the foundation of its own power. Some Western diplomats state that a number of the purged Marxists had been on Moscow's payroll.

In fact, the Soviet leaders were so surprised by the purges that they very nearly recalled their ambassador in Cairo, Vladimir Pozharsky, to Moscow to discuss their repercussions. To Sadat, this smacked suspiciously of a summons. "I can't come now," he said to Pozharsky when he called on him..."

"Look, we're not asking you to reinstate Aly Sabry and Sami Sharaf—they were our friends, but we've written them off. What we want is to have them back in the regime, to be more internal associates. We want to stabilize and formalize our special bond with Egypt—not with one man, or group of men, but with the whole Egyptian state and the Egyptian institution. As you know, we have long been unhappy with Egypt's social policy—it's much too bourgeois. We want to show the world some written evidence of Egypt's new philosophy. We are concerned with the modernization of institutions and cadres. We want to increase the contacts between the Arab Socialist Union and the Communist Party. We are hopeful that you will now make a serious effort to turn the Arab Socialist Union into a vanguard of authentic Socialist transformation."

The result of these discussions was the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, which was signed on July 20, 1971. The treaty is renewable for 10. The treaty duly pledged Egypt to pursue a "Socialist transformation," and included as well the highly interesting Article VII. Article VII pledged the two parties to "coordinate positions" in the event of "circumstances which, in the view of the two parties, constitute a threat to or a violation of peace." Article VII also pledged to continue its "aid in training the personnel of the [Egyptian] Armed Forces, and in their assimilation of arms and equipment supplied to [Egypt] for strengthening its capability to resist aggression."

The treaty is unprecedented outside of the Soviet bloc. On its face, it confers considerable blessings on both parties. The Russians are guaranteed permanent fidelity to the "anti-imperialist camp," and that neither the attempted rapprochement with Washington nor Sadat's purges mean a return to Israel. The treaty also received "firm and unbreakable friendship" between Cairo and the Kremlin. Sadat was reassured of continuing Soviet support despite the purge—and he now has a signed commitment to return the Sinaitic Peninsula, by diplomacy or by war. Or has he? The crucial clause is Article VII, and the Soviets seem to have kept it deliberately vague. The word "aggression" is interpreted to read the clause not as a provocation to the Egyptians to resume war with Israel, but as a restraint. "I've gone over that section carefully. It only escalates still more. For with all of the steadfast American optimism, and despite the Egyptians' own persistent longing for a peaceful settlement if it can be achieved, the Egyptians have disengaged the Rogers initi-
EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS

July 20, 1971

ative. The cautious expectations that President Sadat entertained in early May that he might change the military, the economy, and the government in Egypt, had, by the end of June, all but vanished in his frustration and impatience. "I'm not interested in further questions, notes, or negotiations with the Israelis," he said at the beginning of the month. "I'll be ready that for a year, and it's achieved nothing." Rogers himself told me, "We have nothing more to ask of Egypt." We've made our own point; Egyptians might be dragged along the Canal unless we are sure it will lead to a total Israeli evacuation of our land. All I want to know now is—what are the Americans going to do, and when?"

The evidence is that Sadat will resume some sort of limited warfare along the Suez Canal—with or without Soviet agreement, treaty or no treaty. His vision of Egyptians might be dragged along the Canal unless we are sure it will lead to a total Israeli evacuation of our land. All I want to know now is—what are the Americans going to do, and when?"

The Egyptians unquestionably possess sufficient resources to keep the blood flowing for the Israelis entrenched in the Bar-Lev line on the Canal's eastern bank. Should the Israelis themselves attempt deep air sorties or a troop crossing westward toward the Suez Canal, the Egyptians, with their capabilities (which they should, in the event of war) they would probably incur heavy losses—because of the pervasive Soviet air-defense system which the Egyptians have developed, and because of the deep air sorties into Upper Egypt at Aswan. Conversely, it is doubtful that the Egyptians could inflict major damage on Israeli positions deep in Egypt itself, unless the Russians abandon their present pledges and sent to fly the planes. "EitherSadat has to get 800 Soviet pilots," says a skeptical Western air attaché in Cairo, "or wait five years to turn the tables on the Israelis.

Nevertheless, Sadat keeps talking of "the battle of destiny" and now announces that 1971 will be the "decisive year"—just as Nasser did in 1967, 1969 and 1970 respectively. And a decisive year would probably be the "decisive year." Much of this may be bluster to frighten the United States into putting more pressure on Israel, but in the coming months we may expect to see the Egyptians speak in such bellicose pronouncements to try to buy more time and to convince America, Israel and his own army that he means business. For the Egyptian Army itself truly possesses the will to fight a "battle of destiny"—as did the Algerians and the Vietcong—another matter. I have my doubts, and are the other Sadats doing the talking? And perhaps I am too logical. The mood in the Middle East is explosive. In such a mood, logic—and all of its restraints—could become the first casualties.

In the meantime, meager options, the Egyptian people are left to wonder what, in the meantime, will happen to them. For example, what of Egypt's "Socialist transformation," as Sadat has no intention that it will be a collectivist society after the model of the Soviet Union. The Russians may read the mood that way, but the Egyptians are as jealous of their culture, their religion, their tradition, and personal freedom as we are. And they consider the treaty as a political alliance, not an ideological bond.

Indeed, Sadat knows that if he is ever to achieve a "world" of an Egyptian founded on faith and technology, he will have more than ever need the skills of his growing managerial class, and the last pill those bourgeois democrats will swallow is Soviet-Socialist Style. Thus, while he has placed a pair of doctrinaire Marxists in his Government (to incline him to the left) and within which he will ritually repeat the slogans of Socialism in his speeches, in practice his policy will probably creep in the other direction. As he has clearly shown in his decrees and his economic measures, the government wants more free enterprise, more personal incentives, more private investment—because he has observed the uneven results of Nasser's attempts to force the Egyptians to consider a liberal economy more efficient.

"No efficacy without freedom"—that is the dominant slogan of educated Egyptians now. Whatever his motives for doing so—I must emphasize that even during its most repressive moments under Nasser, Egypt was never the kind of grotesque police state we have here—or is now, the government now wants more freedom, is, in new and more refreshing, however, is the new mood of realism in this quixotic nation. More and more Egyptians are coming to understand that they cannot seriously compete in political and economic terms with the West, and that, in a backward country. And in understanding that, the Egyptians paradoxically are relinquishing their desire to see Israel destroyed, even the Russians would leave Israel, they say again and again, "then we can face our faces home, and by God, how we could build this country!"

I am persuaded of Egypt's desire for peace, I am not so sure of his ability to achieve it. A treaty of peace with Israel, an that his people and his army would accept it, so long as it did not involve the loss of land which he so desperately wants back. But at moment his army is less persuaded that Sadat has the will to do this, if only because Egypt's internal problems have become so horrendous that peace almost seems impossible.

Having said this, one is left with the ironies and contradictions of Anwar Sadat's present policies. He has rid himself of Nasser's friends, then signed a restrictive treaty with Israel to prevent any action against the Suez Canal, under the rule of law, then—without too delicate a regard for either—swept all his suspected rivals off to jail. He has promised real power to the military, the Egyptian is not yet ready to allow the Government into his own hands. He is liberalizing the economy in the name of Socialism. He wants peace, but he may go too far.

The armed forces are his strongest pillar—but for how long? He can count on them till autumn anyway, perhaps till Christmas? If by that time he cannot produce a peace solution in the Sinai, they may force him to withdraw again. Egypt is ripe for new upheavals then? Anwar Sadat has a violent past. Beneath his urbane exterior, we must assume that primitive emotions abide. If he were pushed to the wall, would he allow the old brutality erupt? One hopes not, but if it does we can only lament that it is probably the Egyptian people who will have to pay.