EGYPTIAN-SOVIET FRIENDSHIP TREATY

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House the gentleman from Indiana (Mr. Hamilton) is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Speaker, the significance of the Egyptian-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed in Cairo May 27, 1973, should not be exaggerated.

The treaty produced more pessimism in the West about the course of events in the Middle East than it did in either Israel or Egypt. According to a New York Times of June 1, 1971, Prime Minister Golda Meir said the treaty contains little that is really new, and the Egyptians regard it as nothing more than a means of utilizing their tremendous gratitude for Soviet aid over the last decade.

The only provisions of the treaty that go beyond a general plea for increased cultural, military, and political cooperation between Egypt and Russia are articles 7 and 8.

Article 7 suggests that if the political situation deteriorates in the Middle East and peace is endangered, and if either party feels threatened, it shall communicate his intention to the other side in order to concert their positions with a view to removing the threat that has arisen or reestablishing peace.

Article 8 calls for military cooperation and full support with the Arab States—thus the U.A.R.'s—capacity to eliminate the consequences of aggression as well as increasing its ability to stand up to aggression in general.

The treaty, by itself, will not necessarily lead to any new arms deliveries or further Soviet presence in Egypt. This is not to say, however, that material deliveries will not increase.

It is useful to put this treaty into the context of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's diplomatic strategy in recent weeks. Sadat's international role has been profuse, on the Arab side, cooperation with the United States in order to pressure Israel to make concessions on withdrawals, and, on the other hand, outward signs of increased rapprochement with the United States, in order to increase Egypt's security and strengthen its negotiating position. In President Sadat's political position, results are extremely important. With the foreign policy of cooperation with the United States producing few results, the treaty becomes an obvious way to increase his image.

From the Soviet Union's viewpoint, the treaty has the effect of bringing that country back into the forefront of events in the Middle East at a time when the U.S. interim peace proposal for opening the Suez Canal was maintaining some momentum, largely bypassing the Soviet Union.

The circumstances surrounding the signing of the treaty emphasize, first, that all nations have an important interest in maintaining any interim agreement that can promote, second, the importance of the United Nations' dominant role in promoting a peace that can be more widely accepted and not offended by each other's maneuvers specifically, that the United States is not upstaged by this treaty and the U.S.S.R. by the recent Rogers' mission and the political upheavals in Cairo. Third, that both Egypt and Israel have their own peace strategies that must be examined separately from the tactics of Russia and the United States.