President Anwar El Sadat began by referring to his last meeting with information people at the beginning of 1970 among a series of meetings which took place at that time to explain our attitude and that of the enemy and the possible events during 1970. He said: «I considered it important to hold these periodical meetings because we are fighting a battle, and because the developments which happen every day, and every hour necessitate these occasional meetings in order to evaluate the whole situation». He added that he wanted to deal with a number of points, namely:

1 — The general situation and its assessment.
The President reviewed the general situation since June 1967 and said: «We want to connect all the events of the battle and all our movements since 1967 until the present day because they are all attitudes tied to and dependent on one another. On June 9 and 10, 1967 the people rose, in spite of the defeat, bitterness and humiliation which we experienced, and insisted on continuing the battle... Gamal was forced to remain in his position in order to lead the battle and never to surrender... After 1967 we entered several stages, and as I told you before ... the President had two main functions to perform:

First: Rebuilding the Armed Forces.

Second: The reformation of our political structure from the base to the top in the light of post June 5 events.

As I told you Gamal began by rebuilding the Armed Forces. He held a meeting on the evening of June 11, to draw up a schedule for rebuilding.
rebuilding the Armed Forces, and it was attended by First Lieutenant General Mohammed Fawzi and the late Lieutenant General Abdel Moneim Riad. This schedule was put into effect as planned and sometimes even faster than the time-table set up for it.

The President then spoke of the latter half of 1969: «Président Gamal Abdel Nasser held a meeting with the politicians and military men at the beginning of December 1969, in order to re-evaluate the whole situation with regard to 1970. At this meeting he stated his conviction that the enemy will use his air-superiority in order to make the battle a decisive one.

President Gamal Abdel Nasser left for Rabat on December 20, 1969. On December 25, the first Israeli movement began supported by the United States, to make the battle more decisive through air-superiority. It attacked us on this day, with 264 planes, while the number of planes with which Israel attacked us on June 5, did not exceed 220. The Israeli aggression continued for more than 8 hours — from 8 a.m. until 4.30 p.m.

They hit our positions along the Suez
Canal frontline throwing thousands of tons of bombs.

In 1970, the enemy moved on to the second stage of escalation. They removed the battle from the frontline to the second line, inside the country. Israel’s aim was to move from one line to the other in order to open up skies to their complete domination, to move as they please and impose the solution they want and which they have not been able to impose or realise with the defeat of the June 1967 war.

Therefore, the enemy’s strategy in 1970 was based on hitting the homefront in order to shatter the morale of the people. Haim Bar’Lev twice voiced this intention. He said: «We must destroy the Arab peoples’ resistance so that we can realise our political aims of the June war».

President Gamal Abdel Nasser replied to this statement when he was in Khartum, attending the celebrations of the Sudan’s independence.

When the President returned in January, the enemy had already hit the frontline then the second line — Tel El Kebir, Inshass, Dah-

shour, Watari, Zaabal, Dahshour, etc. This took place in order to clear their enemy’s path to the border, in order to cause the enemy to fall into their trap, in order to shatter the people’s morale and to impose the solution the enemy desires. However, we have not been able to impose on the enemy the desire it desires. This is due to the strength of our army, our people, and our leadership.

The enemy is not satisfied with the defeat of the June 1967 war, nor is it satisfied with the defeat of the September 1973 war. The enemy is not satisfied with the defeat of the June 1967 war, nor is it satisfied with the defeat of the September 1973 war.
...of tons of... 

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Sudan's... in order (to)... Haim... He said:... resistance... aims of the...

He replied to... at... Sudan's... in January... frontline then... Wadi Huf and Helwan. The psychological... had begun with the raids in depth accompanied by heavy bombing. They said that Egypt's skies were open to them and that they... of 10 kms. from Cairo. This was intended to exert strong psychological pressure on us in order that we may despair and find no other alternative but to surrender.

They continued until the raid over Abu Zaabal. But neither the raids over the frontline nor those over the second line succeeded in undermining the people's morale. The enemy intended through his raid over Abu Zaabal to cause heavy losses in only one raid over the factory in order that he may break down the people's morale internally and realise his aims which he was not able to realise in 1967. However, the Abu Zaabal raid had a contrary effect. It increased the people's determination, resolve and hatred. Contrary to the enemy's desire it succeeded in increasing the steadfastness of the homefront.

The late President said that Israel resorted to the United States when the non-effectiveness of these raids became apparent. On February 2, 1970, the United States advised us...
in the form of a warning — to end the war of attrition and resume the ceasefire, or else Israel will continue carrying out its raids in depth and hit the vital establishments and utilities and the United States will not be able to do anything to stop it.

This was a warning under the guise of a piece of advice: either we accept a permanent ceasefire or the raids in depth over our vital installations will continue.

President Abdel Nasser then made his secret trip to Moscow at the end of January 1970, before the raid over Abu Zaabal and before America had sent its warning. During this visit President Abdel Nasser came to an agreement with the Soviet Union about the new missiles, for the defence in depth of our country.

President El Sadat described the late President Abdel Nasser's trip to the Soviet Union as one of his most important political achievements. He added that when the time comes to reveal the details of this trip, it will be considered one of his most prominent political moves.

President El Sadat said that following
President Abdel Nasser’s return from Moscow and during 40 days ending on March 15, 1970 another miracle was achieved by our people which was the installation of the missile bases inside our country. The rate of expenditure on these bases was over L.E. one million daily. By March 15, 1970 all the missiles had been installed and as a result the raid in depth stopped completely. Then the enemy re-assessed his position and realised that his losses in the raids in depth were enormous. Instead of breaking the internal front these raids had, on the contrary, strengthened it and made our people more determined to stand firm and to win the battle.

However, what we expected took place. The next escalation by the enemy was the raids over Abu Zaabal, Bahr El Bakar school and other positions near Cairo. Eventually, we succeeded in making the enemy concentrate his raids on the Canal front instead of inside the country and we were able during the first half of 1970 to win the air battle.

President El Sadat described this battle as similar to the Battle of Britain when Hitler tried to put an end to the war by launching air raids over London. He said: «Israel at-
tempted to end the battle in January, but before the Israelis could complete their scheme, President Abdel Nasser took the initiative and went to the Soviet Union.

Then our people went to work and within forty days the missile bases were installed — no mean feat even for a big power.

Israel then limited its attacks to the front line. Their raids on the front were sometimes carried out by 80-80 or 120-180 aircraft during a period of over two months. Thousands of bombs were thrown daily, in a sick fury aimed at demoralising us. The cost of the bombs alone ranged between one and one and a half million dollars daily — without counting the aircraft and the other expenses of war. Only a major power can undertake such an operation.

We entered the battle... and our sons, on the Canal front, recorded some of the most magnificent heroic actions against hundreds of enemy aircraft and raids that lasted for 17 hours.

Our soldiers were steadfast and determined.

The President continued saying: «I was
On the front line last summer, there I tried to express to our men on behalf of all the people the appreciation of those of us here in Cairo and in other cities, to them who have been in their trenches for three and a half years, under a barrage of thousands of tons of bombs. Not a single man left his position. Our air-defence men never left their sites — they stood by their guns and some of them, after a raid, were found dead over their guns, burnt with it.

This is the magnificent heroism of our men during the summer of 1940.

On August 1970 there was a ceasefire after our acceptance of the American initiative. The ceasefire was a wonderful opportunity for us to build and reinforce all our positions along the entire battlefront. It was an opportunity to reorganise, retrain and to raise the level of efficiency of our men in battle. Our forces did not lose a moment in the first ceasefire period.

The President continued: Then, we were faced with the crisis in Jordan in September 1970. It became clear afterwards that the Eastern front had collapsed. BarLev described: The ceasefire was a wonderful opportunity for us to build and reinforce all our positions along the entire battlefront. It was an opportunity to reorganise, retrain and to raise the level of efficiency of our men in battle. Our forces did not lose a moment in the first ceasefire period.

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ed the situation and said that the Eastern front had collapsed and the Palestinian Resistance Movement was now out of the battlefield. Then there were the events in Syria as well as those in Iraq, followed in Egypt by the death of Gamal Abdel Nasser. Bar'Lev was speaking on the graduation day of one of the military colleges when he told the students: «The future is full of promise before you».

This was the situation in the last days of September 1970. The death of President Gamal Abdel Nasser which deprived us of his leadership was a bitter blow which could have destroyed any people especially in circumstances like these. But we thank God that our people are determined, noble and sound — a people with thousands of years of life behind them, a people resolved to continue the path begun by Gamal and to continue the battle which Gamal lived and died for.

The entire people pushed us forward — that is due to the efforts of our people who outlined the path that we followed and that we are still following. We overcame our deep grief. It was essential that our Armed Forces feel that the people had overcome their grief and were determined to continue along the path begun and to achieve realistic goals.

The Arab nations and the Arab people have a great opportunity to achieve their goals in order to create a real situation in which they can achieve their nation's prosperity and its national pride. It is quite clear that after the death of President Nasser an attack was launched by the dictators of the Arab world against the whole Arab nation and this attack came internationally.

The Arab nations and Arab people had to push us forward — we owe this to them.

We remember the late President, Dr. Riad who had a great contribution. For he was the one who was determined to achieve this realistic optimism.
begun by the man who sacrificed his life to realise all this to his people.

The President said that America seized the opportunity of the ceasefire, the crisis in Jordan and all the dark days that followed, to exert violent pressure. At one time it was able to convince the world that the issue was Egypt's violation of the ceasefire agreement and its establishment of missile bases and not that of Israel and its occupation of lands and that a Security Council resolution has been issued in this context and forgotten. America was able to picture all this to the world in an attempt to pressure us. They hoped that after the death of Gamal Abdel Nasser, the whole system in Egypt would collapse, that internal struggles would result and Egypt become involved in side issues.

They did not conceal their hopes, but our people were more solid than ever — and this we owe first and last to our people.

We had to answer them, and Mahmud Riad went to New York to fight this allegation. For the first time in 25 years the U.S.A. was defeated by a resolution. Even the most optimistic did not think that we would be
able to come out with a resolution; but Riad exerted enormous efforts despite the opposition of seven Arab countries.

On the 25th anniversary of the United Nations Mahmud Riad was able to win a majority resolution and defeat the U.S.A. Actually America was forced to withdraw a draft resolution it had planned to present.

Our aim was to present to the world, once more the true dimensions of the issue. The issue is not that of missiles or a cease-fire agreement. They wanted to prove that we had committed a crime against peace.

President El Sadat then asked: «How can they say we committed a crime whereas we are defending our territory?

Then he said: «For the first time, Dr. Jarring, special envoy of the United Nations Secretary General has been asked to present a report to the Security Council within two months, on action taken during this period.

It was clear that this resolution isolated America and Israel and embarrassed them in front of the whole world. As we expected and at the last moment, Israel contacted Ambas-
sador Jarring in an attempt at manoeuvring and procrastination.

The situation today can be summed up in the following:

After three days Jarring should present his report to the Security Council and he will of course say that both parties contacted him, because, Abba Eban sent word to him saying that Israel will contact him. He will also say that we and Jordan are in contact with him.

Then they began to speak of extending the ceasefire claiming that contacts must be carried in a calm atmosphere for the sake of peace.

The strategy of America and Israel for 1971 aims at realising the following two objectives:

1. Not to implement the Security Council Resolution which stipulates in its very beginning the illegality of acquiring territories by force — i.e. stipulating withdrawal.

2. To make the ceasefire permanent — a perfect condition for America and Israel to introduce our issue among the issues...
of the cold war. Twenty years would pass, the enemy remaining on the Eastern Bank and the world would lose interest in the case.

The President added that our strategy for 1971 and for the first six months of this year is this: not to allow the ceasefire to become permanent... We won recognition by world public opinion of the fact that the ceasefire is only temporary, as stipulated by the U.N. Resolution. We will not allow the ceasefire to become permanent unless there has been serious action, namely withdrawal and the implementation of the Security Council Resolution. Otherwise, we will not commit ourselves to a ceasefire.

For this reason, I visited our Armed Forces during the Bairam and informed them of these facts. Therefore, enormous responsibilities await us for which we must be prepared.

President El Sadat added that today war is no longer a battle between two sides using their armed forces; it is a comprehensive war in which every citizen in the country should participate and in which he has certain duties that must be performed.