Enclosed for Department's information are MENA texts of President Sadat's interviews with Arsenal DeBorchgrave, senior editor of Newsweek, and Hedley Donovan, editor in chief of Time. These verbatim texts were released by the Presidency, and undoubtedly differ from texts edited in New York.

Enclosures: (1) Newsweek Interview (DeBorchgrave)
(2) Time Interview (Donovan)
Following is the text of the interview in question-and-answer form:

Q.: What leads you to believe that the shift in U.S. policy in the Middle East represents a fundamental change?

A.: If you compare what happened in June 1967 and in October 1973, you cannot escape the conclusion that there has been a fundamental change in U.S. policy. Your guarantee to Israel on maintaining the balance of power remained the same. In 1973, you even threw all your military weight openly on the side of Israel. In 1967, however, the U.S. prevented the Security Council, for the first time in its history, from ordering withdrawal along with the cease-fire.
The U.S. twisted arms, threatened and did their level best to inflame further what already was the most dangerous situation in the world. Not so in 1973. Though the U.S. heavily supplied Israel with the most sophisticated weapons and military equipment, it very quickly understood the implications of the October 6 war. This was the turning point which led the U.S. to take a new look at the Middle East and to embark, as a result of that, on a policy of working towards peace based on justice for the region.

My talks with Dr. Kissinger convinced me that he rejects the simplistic notion of some of your strategists who see - or saw - Israel as the American Gendarme in this part of the world. The whole equation has changed. October 6 has changed many things in the world. It has even forced a drastic "re-thinking" on relations between the "have" and the "have-not" countries throughout the world.

Q: To what degree do you feel that the Mideast - and the chances for a lasting settlement - would be affected by President Nixon's impeachment?

A: It would be a real tragedy for our area and for the world if he were impeached because, as I told you it is the first time that we see in the Middle East, which holds vast American interests, a new approach to the solution of our problems. This is the doing of the Nixon Administration. Make no mistake about it. Look at what the Johnson Administration did by comparison.

Yes, it would indeed be a terrible tragedy if the American people lost sight of the global picture for the sake of narrow domestic political considerations.

ISRAELI POLICY

Q: Do you now have the feeling that Israeli policy is also beginning to change?
A.: If we witness a successful disengagement on the Syrian front, as I think we will, then you can say there is a new look in Israel. It is not disengagement in itself that is important, but what it signifies. The significance, quite simply put, is that expansion has come to an end. The theory of secure borders through acquisition of others' land has proved a failure.

Q.: What, in your judgement, is a settlement that everyone can live with?

A.: It's quite clear. Evacuation of the territories occupied in 1967, along with a solution of the Palestinian problem that is based on the legitimate national rights of the Palestinians. That will mean a final end to the state of belligerency that has poisoned the area for 26 years. And that, in turn, will mean that a new era of peace will become possible.

OCTOBER WAR

Q.: Many Israelis concede that the October war has profoundly changed the Middle situation and tilted the balance in favour of a lasting settlement. But they still ask me what is President Sadat's vision of a lasting peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors. Before they take real risks on complete withdrawal, they want to know how you envisage Israel's role in a new era of peace?

A.: First of all let me state as categorically as possible that I vehemently reject the way of thinking that says that in fulfilling complete withdrawal there will be a risk for Israel. I can assure you there won't be. To say that there is a risk is a reflection of the June 1967 mentality. If the Israelis continue to think that withdrawal entails a risk, then we shall be back in the vicious circle that was created by the Johnson Administration.
CORE OF THE PROBLEM

A: Palestine is the core of the whole problem. And I'm a man who believes that nothing is impossible. I think we should go ahead and tackle the core despite all the difficulties and obstacles. And at the end I'm quite sure the Palestinians will assume their responsibilities.

Q: Hardly a day goes by without an Arab leader referring to the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. But no one defines them because they say it's up to the Palestinians to do so. Doesn't anyone have any ideas on the subject? What are your ideas, for example?

A: I have my ideas, of course, but they are only mine. They are not Palestinian. I'd give them an opportunity to express themselves at Geneva. It won't be as difficult as many people think.

WHAT ARABS WANT?

Q: Many moderate Israelis still suspect the Arabs, long-term, want to dismantle the state of Israel as it existed prior to the 1967 war. What can you do or say to prove to them this is not so?

A: I pledge real and honourable peace. If I were interested in dismantling the Israeli state why didn't I use my ground-to-ground missiles during the war? I can tell you something only a few Egyptians knew up until now. My long-range missiles were trained on three main cities in Israel.

And why didn't I give the order to launch an all-out attack against their pocket on the West Bank of the Canal? A simple order from me and we could have eliminated that pocket in very short order. We had rockets zeroed in on every one of their 500 tanks which at night were dug into static positions. In a few seconds, they would have lost about half their tank force on the West Bank allowing for misses. We also had 800 of our own tanks around their pocket ready to roll over the rest of the Israeli force.

But wars are a serious business. You don't start or re-start them the way you start a student demonstration. Some 3,000 tanks were lost in the October war on both sides. That's much bigger than anything that happened in World War II. We had made our point to the Israelis in October - collapsing all their pet theories. There was no more ground to more war. Peace is now the way. A peace based on justice under which all
What I think is this: There must be new thinking in Israel as a result of October Six as there is now thinking in the Arab world. The end of the state of belligerency is the achievement we should all think of — and work toward. Let us concentrate on our pending problems — the ways and the means and the international guarantees necessary to ensure a permanent and honourable peace.

Q. : Some key Israelis say they would be willing to take a risk on returning all of Sinai if Egypt were prepared to establish normal relations with Israel and agree to demilitarize most of Sinai. Is this possible in the future?

EL SADAT HAP OF PEACE

A. : I am a man of peace. But the Israelis must not be so ambitious as to think there is instant peace. How can relations become normal instantly after all the bloodshed, turmoil and bitterness of the past generation? Ending the state of belligerency will be an achievement in itself. But first the Israelis must take a new look. The question is whether they are ready in Geneva to relinquish the old theory of security of Ben Gurion and the pioneers that has proved illusory and a failure. I want to make peace, real peace.

Q. : You have asked the Israelis to take a chance on peace, which must include respect for the legitimate national rights of the Palestinians, when the Palestinians themselves cannot seem to agree on what this means. Isn't this a little risky?
Israel and Arabs

Q: Are you convinced in your own heart and mind that Israel and its Arab neighbours can live side by side in peace?

A: The future will decide this because it will be a reciprocal process. The wise attitude is to begin from the proper point of departure - meaning that no one should take what does not belong to him under any pretext. Once it is returned, it will be like someone returning stolen goods and asking honourable sounds.

Next Withdrawal Stage

Q: How long do you give yourself to reach the next phase of Israeli withdrawal across Sinai?

A: I would hope tomorrow morning. But being a realistic man I realize it will take some time. Probably a few more months.

Overall Settlement

Q: What sort of timetable do you envisage for an overall settlement? How long for Sinai and Golan? How long for the creation of a Palestinian State?

A: An overall settlement cannot be reached with Egypt only. There will be no separate peace. Egypt, Syria and the Palestinians will move forward in the negotiation together along parallel lines. With new thinking on all sides, you will see that events can be telescoped and it won't take as long as you think.

Q: Isn't it better in the next stage to negotiate an overall Sinai settlement rather than a phase by phase arrangement which each time may create a new crisis?

A: That would be the wise way to proceed, but not Egypt alone. The other parties must also be included. Disengagement, which was negotiated separately on the Egyptian and Syrian fronts, was purely military issue, when it comes to political issues, the three parts are inseparable.
Q: Is the reopening of the Suez Canal to international traffic a contingent on an overall Sinai settlement - or is it now a routine procedure once the Canal has been cleared?

A: My purpose is to create a new atmosphere for peace in the Middle East. I told Secretary (William) Rogers so in 1972. Had he understood what I was talking about. The U.S. and Egypt could have restored full diplomatic relations long ago. Reopening the Canal is purely an Egyptian decision. Our aim is to ease all the difficulties for our friends in Africa, Asia and Western Europe so that everyone can share in the prosperity that an open Canal will bring.

Navigation...and Settlement

Q: But is there a link between the resumption of navigation and a Sinai settlement?

A: Why do you Americans always have to link everything?

Q: You have reestablished your means of direct military pressure on the Israelis - which was engagement on the West Bank of the Canal - and agreed to reduce your own forces and weaponry in a zone on the East Bank. If you don't obtain further Israeli withdrawals, what will the situation?

A: Draw your own conclusions from our attitude in the last three years. I am not threatening anyone, but the other side must realize it cannot stay in our country - unless, of course, they are thinking of another war.

Kissinger's Role

Q: Kissinger describes you privately as the only statesman with vision in the Middle East - and he included Israeli leaders in that assessment. What do you think of him?

A: First let me say there are many men of vision in the Middle East. I am not the only one. Kissinger as a man of his word. I trust him completely. He is the first U.S. official who has dealt with our problems who has proved himself to be a man of integrity - direct, frank, and far-sighted. We have suffered a lot with American officials in the last two decades, beginning with Dulles and ending with Rogers-Kissinger; under the guidance of President Nixon, and you cannot separate the two; he revolutionised the thrust of U.S. policy in our area - and before that in the rest of the world. What Nixon and Kissinger did with China and the U.S.S.R. was unthinkable a few years back. They are now doing the unthinkable in the Middle East. Kissinger is a strategist and a man of vision, imagination and, perhaps most important of all trust.
Q: What were the key factors in your decision to set October six as D-Day? Is it true that the Nixon-Brezhnev decision in the spring of 1973 to put the Mideast problem in cold storage and the subsequent Israeli Labour Party platform and its annexationist programme tipped the balance in favour of war?

A: Partly correct. But also bear in mind other factors. In the Summit communiqué of the year before that there was a reference to "military relaxation," and that, automatically, meant that no-war-no-peace would continue indefinitely and that was intolerable to us.

No strategist in America or Israel guessed correctly why I asked Soviet military advisors to leave in July 1972. Everyone thought that I had abandoned war as a way of breaking the deadlock. They all said that without the Soviet advisors I could not go to war. Well, with the Russian military out of the country, I was making sure that no one could claim that what we did in the future was inspired by the Soviets. If Arab victory there was to be, it had to be clearly Arab. A victory that the world would describe as a non-Arab victory would clearly have defeated my overall strategic objective.

After the war broke out, the Israeli propaganda machine said that it had been aided and abetted and planned by the Soviets. This was an attempt to keep the Mideast polarised between Israel and the U.S. on one side and Egypt and the Soviet Union on the other. It didn't work and that polarisation has now come to an end.

IN FIVE YEARS

Q: What is your vision of Egypt and the Middle East five years from now?

A: A durable, just and honourable peace in our area. And with everything the Arabs now have; you will see prosperity that defies the imagination. I also see the Arab unity forged on October six continuing and growing. And all this will mean that our area will enjoy the best of relations with the big powers and the rest of the world.

ALL PAPERS
Text of the interview in question-and-answer form follows:

Q: Did you foresee an American response — in a diplomatic sense — to try and really get a settlement?

A: Starting from the summit meeting in Moscow — the first between Nixon and Brezhnev in 1972 — and the communique that was issued after it, there was a very critical phrase that caused us great annoyance. It said that both parties agreed on military relaxation in the area. Military relaxation meant that the state of no-war-no-peace that had prevailed here and that had caused us all our trouble and our dilemma, would continue.

The next year, in the summit of Washington, it was obvious that the superpowers had gone a step further. It was quite clear from the communique that our problem had been put in the freezer again. So, believe me, when I took this decision (to go to war) I did not know what the reaction would be because both superpowers wanted to freeze the whole thing. It was a pure Egyptian and Syrian decision to face our fate. Whatever the reaction from both superpowers we were not ready to continue this state of no-war-no-peace. We were no longer ready to bear this humiliation that we had suffered for six years.

Q: But you certainly were prepared to fight on the diplomatic as well as the military front, weren’t you?

A: Two years earlier, on Feb 4, 1971, I offered my initiative. If it had been taken seriously by both America and Israel we would have avoided this military operation. I said I was ready for peace. I said for the first time in 22 years that I was ready to reach a peaceful agreement with Israel.
EFFECTS OF NIXON AND KISSINGER MAKES ONE FEEL OPTIMISTIC

Q: You seem to feel that peace is a possibility now. What are the new elements since the war to make you more optimistic in terms of peace?

A: The most important factor is the American position. You know that the American position had always been one of complete alignment with Israel, in 1967 and before 1967, and after 1967 - and before the Nixon Administration, to be fair. During the Johnson Administration, it was horrible for us. We suffered a lot through this complete alignment with Israel.

I was not optimistic before and I said during 1971-73 quite openly before the world that I was pessimistic but after the October war, and the changed attitude of the United States - specifically the attitude of the Nixon Administration and the tireless efforts of Dr. Kissinger - am optimistic. This is the main reason. Another thing, I think, is that the October 6 must have changed some of the outlook in Israel. Up to this moment I am not sure of this.

DISENGAGEMENT ON SYRIAN FRONT

Q: What, do you think, are the prospects for disengagement on the Syrian front?

A: Bringing about disengagement on the Syrian front is very essential for the process of peace to continue. I think it can be brought about and I have full confidence in the ability and will and understanding of Henry Kissinger. He can achieve it.

Q: Does your government have a diplomatic role to play in this effort toward Syrian disengagement?

A: We are ready, but it concerns mainly our brother the Syrians. I have already proposed that the Egyptian-Israeli military committee in Geneva that was formed for (The Suez front) disengagement be ready to do its share. But that is for our Syrian brothers to decide.

Q: Why does disengagement on the Syrian front seem much more difficult to achieve than Egyptian-Israeli disengagement?

A: I don't think it is difficult. From my side, my government has a personal relationship and understanding between me and Dr. Kissinger. I think that Kissinger is doing his best, and President Hafez (Assad) is doing his best.
Q: When you agreed to exchange prisoners with Israel last November, you seemed to have made concessions beyond previously stated position taken by your Government. How do you explain this?

A: I had a three-hour talk in November with Kissinger. We put forward our main target and then the details, and it was very easy to shape our views into the six points (agreement). In policies, I think, flexibility without losing the target is very essential.

Palestinians Trust Participate in the Geneva Talks

Q: Do you have in mind some long-term objectives, some settlement that the Palestinians too, would find satisfactory?

A: Sure, sure, I have.

Q: What form would that take?

A: I cannot say really because we must leave it to the Palestinians at the Geneva Conference to have their say, since they are the people concerned with this problem. I have my own ideas, but we must listen to the Palestinians.

Q: Would it be correct to assume that you would back almost any stance they might take?

A: Yes.

Q: In other words, if it makes them happy, it makes you happy?

A: That's right. The Palestinians are the core of the whole problem in the Middle East. After 26 years, I think it is time that we bring in the Palestinians and tell them "let us hear what you have to say about your problem".
**Time Frame for Settlement**

Q: Can you tell us something about the time frame for a settlement - how long you think the process might take?

A: My idea is this: disengagement on the Syrian front must first take place. After that, all of us will go to Geneva, and there will start the real process for peace. Disengagement is only a military conception. It is a ceasefire. The main problem - discussing peace - in my mind is a matter of months only. It does not need more than that. For instance, we shall not go to Geneva to discuss the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Arab territory. Withdrawal is a fact. May be, to be practical, we can discuss security.

**Reopening of Suez Canal**

Q: You mean that withdrawal to the 1967 borders is a fact?

A: It is a fact.

Q: Does Israel know this?

A: I should like them to know it. No acquisition of others' land by force - this was stated in the (Security Council) 242 resolution and I think it has been proved as the sixth of October that this Israeli theory of security has failed completely. But let us discuss security problems in Geneva. Let us discuss them openly. But they must be prepared to do their share (for security) because it is not just security for them only. It is security for us too.

Q: What about the Israeli notion of looking for signs of relaxation on your part - such as reopening the Suez Canal? Was that part of the disengagement agreement?

A: Not at all. The Suez Canal is Egyptian, on Egyptian land. Opening it is an Egyptian affair. It was never a matter of discussions or a matter of condition, I would never permit it. On the other hand, you see that we are preparing the Canal to ease the problems of our friends in Asia, Africa, Western Europe.
Q: If the situation continues to be favourable, will the Canal be reopened?

A: Yes. The Canal will be reopened. I have given the appropriate orders to the Canal Authority. Since the Israelis left the Western bank, everything has been going forward.

Guarantees

Q: Can you visualise a new type of international guarantee of borders that might be useful?

A: Yes, sure, it would be welcome, either by the two superpowers or all the big powers. But the talk in Israel about the demilitarisation of Sinai should stop. If they want a demilitarised Sinai, I shall be asking for a demilitarised Israel. How can I demilitarise Sinai when within six hours, I could be threatened by them. This is something they lived with after 1967. If there is a demilitarised zone it must be on both sides.

Q: What about a strip of perhaps ten miles on each side?

A: I quite agree. Twenty miles on each side? I quite agree. Why not?

Q: Do you think demilitarisation would be helpful and would you improve the chances of keeping the peace?

A: I am for peace but, please, in any agreement, consider this: I am not ready to surrender one inch of my land or one iota from my sovereignty. If there is a demilitarised zone on both sides, I quite agree. Whatever the width, but on both sides.
Q: Would you want a kind of United Nations Emergency Force interposed between the two sides in such a demilitarized zone?

A: I would not object to it. In fact it is necessary.

Q: If the negotiations went very well and within a few months the outlines of a settlement began to appear, could you visualize them leading to normal diplomatic relations with Israel at some point?

ENDING STATE OF BELLIGERENCE IS BIG ACHIEVEMENT

A: How could you visualize that after 26 years of bitterness, belligerence, hatred and violence? It cannot for 26 years, a state of belligerence has prevailed between us. Let our aim be to end this state of belligerence officially and openly, that will be a big achievement.

Q: Then you think that diplomatic relations would be years off in the future?

A: This is not a point for discussion.

Q: Is there some concept down the road of what a more permanent relationship with Israel could be like?

A: As I told you, I think it would be a big achievement if we agreed before the whole world to end the state of belligerence. That will be a very good starting point.

Q: Short of diplomatic relations, what about other forms of links - people visiting each other's countries, commercial intercourse, that sort of thing?

A: You don't get my point of view at all. What you are talking about cannot just come about, in an instant after 26 years of bitterness, violence, all that has taken place as a practical man, I say let us end the state of belligerence and then there will be a new atmosphere. We cannot say what will happen after that.
Q: Can you tell us about your vision as regards Egypt in such a new atmosphere, both political and economic, of your aspirations for the country?

A: I have already started. I think there are great possibilities. As you know, investment was very limited during the last seven years because of the war. By now our services - telephone, drainage, communications, sanitation, education - are in great trouble. Our population is increasing by about a million a year. We have to find food, everything for them. Without industrializing the country and improving our agriculture, introducing infra-industrial projects, improving our industry in terms of new technology, rebuilding the cities in the Canal Zone and the factories that were destroyed, we cannot move. This is a huge programme with priorities... before the war, I always said that we must make the battle the starting point for economic take-off for building a new country on the technology of the generation of which we are a part, through the cooperation of the big powers of Western Europe, I think we will achieve that. We shall have free zones in Port Said along the Western Desert, in Cairo in Alexandria. Chase-Manhattan bank, for instance has agreed to open a branch here. Other American banks are now in Cairo asking to open branches.

ARAB UNITY

Q: You see ahead then a good mix of the public and the private sectors in economy?

A: That is inevitable for us because of our growing population. We did not choose this social system because we wanted to be in a certain camp. No, it is like that; there is no other alternative for us. We have a small cultivable area of land, a big population that is increasing by the highest rate in the world.
Q: How do you see Egypt's relationship with the big oil-producing Arab states in a post-belligerent world?

A: One of the great achievements of October 6 was Arab unity. When I say Arab unity I do not mean some constitutional arrangement. What we have achieved is real Arab unity because in the difficult hours we came together. I think we shall continue this way.

Q: What about relations with the United States?

A: President Nixon whom you do not value as we value him here, has done much for the U.S. We have suffered a lot from all your previous administrations, starting with Dulles and ending with Kissinger. The real approach to the problem and the real new look they should have come from America in this area long ago, not only from Nixon and Kissinger. You have your domestic difficulties, but you are in a big power and you have responsibilities and obligations all over the world, and in particular in this area which is the most dangerous in the world. I hope that the American people realize that persistent and continuous concentrating on domestic problems of the magnitude we have been witnessing for sometime now would have serious and harmful implications on the effectiveness of the indispensable role which your country, because of its global responsibilities, should play in issues dealing with war and peace. This, I assume, will run against the national interests of the American people.
Q: Do you see American-Egyptian relations as continuing to improve?

A: I concur with your assessment. There has never been any problem between us except this (American) alignment with Israel. If we can reach understanding on this there will be nothing between us. Our relationship can thus improve step by step.

Q: Did you have in mind re-establishing diplomatic relations with the U.S. before you met Kissinger or was the resumption a result of meeting with him?

A: It was the result of meeting him. After a three-hour talk with Kissinger in November, I felt confident, so when he asked me about diplomatic relations, I told him in principle I agreed but, as you know, this needed some time. We agreed on this, and then the time came.

Q: What happens, for speculation's sake, if the negotiations grind to a halt?

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION NO 242

A: There are some facts that must be taken into consideration. First of all, the cease-fire and rapid implementation of (U.N. Resolution) 242 is guaranteed by the two superpowers. Number two, there is the Security Council. Number three, there is our position before the whole world. Taking into consideration these three points, if Israel intends not to reach a solution it will mean that they want war again. If they want war. I think I proved to you that I am ready for any consequences. I am not threatening anyone, we have started on the peace process. If that stops, I see no other way but the war process. And this will be before the whole world... But I hope with all my heart that it will not come to this because I do not like war.
Q: Could you tell us a little about your plans for greater freedom, greater liberalization in Egypt?

As Politically speaking, I am proud. My press is 100 per cent free now. For two and a half years now there have been no concentration camps in my country. There will be none in Egypt. As for the economy Cairo is full of your business men, of Western Europeans, of Japanese, I am a villager, I come from a small village in the Delta, not more than 2000 population. We consider that the beginning of any achievement must be family spirit. I have done my best in the last three years to build this family spirit all over the country.

On the sixth of October, Egypt proved to be one family everyone, rich, poor, peasant, worker, intelligentsia, everyone and above all the armed forces. When the true history of the war, and the war diary is printed you will learn amazing things. I have made of Egypt one country, apart from all those different ideologies that made a lot of trouble for us in the past.

Q: What is the relationship between your regime and that of Gamal Abdel Nasser?

Nasserism

As I have always said that I am responsible in part for every decision made during Nasser's regime because I was his partner and he left me as his Vice-President. Believe me, if Nasser had lived to this moment, he would be doing what I am doing. It is a continuation but in this continuation there are two main points: first, we had an experiment and in the experiment there were negatives and positives. What I am now doing is trying to correct the negatives. Second, there must be a new look because all around us in the world including relations, and balances are changing hour by hour, not day by day. So there must be a new look and I am trying to adapt ourselves to this new look, to the new balances, to the new strategies. Some are shouting that I am abolishing Nasserism. I don't abolish Nasserism, I don't pay heed to them at all. They are just shouting - some for personal reasons, some for material reasons.

Q: Do you intend to designate an heir or deputy, in the way Nasser designated you?