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AUTHORITY: NND 8056
DATE: 10/27/01

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Department of State TELEGRAM

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EO 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR EG
SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER'S REPLY TO SECRETARY'S
LETTER OF DECEMBER 28 TO PRESIDENT SADAT

REF: (A) STATE 251947; (B) CAIRO 4245

1. AT 1245 I WAS CALLED TO MEET WITH MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS FAHMI AT 1315. I ARRIVED ON TIME AND SAT IN HIS OUTER OFFICE FOR FIFTEEN MINUTES WAITING FOR OMAR SIRRI, WHO WAS TO PARTICIPATE IN MEETING WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER. A RUSSIAN FROM THE SOVIET EMBASSY ACCOMPANIED BY AN INTERPRETER/NOTETAKER SHOWED UP AT 1330. BOTH WERE SHOWN INTO THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S OFFICE AND I WAS ESCORTED TO ANOTHER OFFICE TO AWAIT SIRRI'S ARRIVAL. SIRRI ARRIVED AT APPROXIMATELY 1340 AND SHORTLY AFTERWARDS HE AND I WENT IN TO SEE THE FOREIGN MINISTER, WHO WAS IN GOOD HUMOR AND APPEARED WELL RESTED.

2. THE FOREIGN MINISTER HANDED ME TWO LETTERS: ONE WAS HIS REPLY TO THE SECRETARY'S LETTER OF DECEMBER 28, THE OTHER WAS PRESIDENT SADAT'S REPLY TO THE SECRETARY'S LETTER OF DECEMBER 29, WHICH IS BEING TRANSMITTED BY SEPTEL. IN IDENTIFYING THE TWO LETTERS THE FOREIGN MINISTER INDICATED THAT PRESIDENT NIXON'S LETTER OF DECEMBER 28 HAD BEEN REPLIED TO BY THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S LETTER OF DECEMBER 30 TO THE SECRETARY (CAIRO 4252).

3. FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF FOREIGN MINISTER'S REPLY TO SECRETARY'S LETTER OF DECEMBER 28:

QUOTE

"DECEMBER 31, 1973

"DEAR MR. SECRETARY OF STATE:

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"PRESIDENT SADAT RECEIVED YOUR MESSAGE OF DECEMBER 29, 1973 AND HAS SENT YOU HIS REPLY UNDER A SEPARATE COVER.

"AS TO YOUR MESSAGE DATED DECEMBER 28, 1973 WHICH, BY THE WAY, IS OF A DIFFERENT TONE AND SUBSTANCE, IT IS PERTINENT TO RECALL WHAT I HAVE REPEATEDLY TRIED TO DRAW YOUR ATTENTION TO, AND THAT IS, THE IMPORTANCE OF PUBLIC OPINION, NOT ONLY IN THE UNITED STATES BUT ALSO IN EGYPT AND IN THE ARAB WORLD.

"YOU WERE VERY CONCERNED IN YOUR MESSAGE OF DECEMBER 28, AND BEFORE YOU, PRESIDENT NIXON, ABOUT THE SO-CALLED DISCRIMINATORY NATURE OF THE ARAB OIL MINISTERS DECISION TAKEN AT THEIR MEETING IN KUWAIT ON DECEMBER 25, 1973.

"I HAVE, UPON INSTRUCTIONS FROM PRESIDENT SADAT, EXPLAINED TO YOU THE SITUATION AND THAT, IN REPLY TO PRESIDENT NIXON'S MESSAGE TO PRESIDENT SADAT IN THIS RESPECT.

"MOREOVER, I HAVE INFORMED YOU THAT PRESIDENT SADAT UNDERTOOK THE NECESSARY CONTACTS WITH SAUDI ARABIA AND ALGERIA REGARDING YOUR CONCERNS.

"BUT, I MUST TELL YOU FRANKLY, THAT I WAS APPALLED BY THE UNUSUAL, AND I DON'T WANT TO SAY UNACCEPTABLE, TONE OF YOUR MESSAGE OF DECEMBER 28, 1973, PARTICULARLY WHEN YOU LINKED IN YOUR WORDS THE IMPACT OF THE DECISIONS TAKEN IN KUWAIT ON DECEMBER 25 ON YOUR PUBLIC OPINION WITH YOUR EXPRESSION OF THE INABILITY OF THE UNITED STATES TO CONTINUE TO PLAY THE ROLE WHICH IT HAS PROMISED, TO BRING A PEACEFUL AND JUST SOLUTION TO THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS.

"IN ALL CANDOUR, YOU MAY AGREE THAT THE RESORT TO SUCH A PROCEDURE IS NOT A HAPPY ONE BECAUSE, BASICALLY, IT WILL NOT HELP THE UNITED STATES AND ITS RELATIONS WITH THE ARAB COUNTRIES.

"YOU HAVE EXPRESSED, AND RIGHTLY SO, YOUR CONCERN OF THE EFFECT OF THE DECISION TAKEN IN KUWAIT ON YOUR

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-3- CAIRO 0023, JAN 02, NODIS/CHEROKEE

PUBLIC OPINION WHILE YOU HAVE COMPLETELY IGNORED WHAT EFFECT ON ARAB PUBLIC OPINION THE DECISION OF YOUR GOVERNMENT AND CONGRESS HAD TO GRANT ISRAEL, WHILE ITS FORCES REMAIN IN OCCUPATION OF ARAB LANDS, SUCH MASSIVE QUANTITIES OF SOPHISTICATED WEAPONS WORTH MORE THAN 2 BILLION \$ AS WELL AS FURTHER ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO THE AMOUNT OF 700 MILLION \$.

"HOW, IF I MAY ASK, DO YOU BELIEVE WOULD OUR PUBLIC OPINION REACT TO SUCH A PROVOCATIVE AND UNTIMELY DECISION TO CONTINUE TO HELP THE AGGRESSOR IN SUCH A MASSIVE AND UNDISGUISED MANNER WHILE HE CONTINUES TO OCCUPY ARAB LANDS, PERSISTS IN DENYING THE LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIANS AND PROCLAIMS AT THE SAME TIME THAT JERUSALEM WOULD REMAIN THE CAPITAL OF ISRAEL?"

"DO YOU NOT SEE THAT, AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, THE ARAB OIL MINISTERS WERE, BY YOUR OWN DECISIONS, PUT TO REACH THE CONCLUSION WHICH RESULTED IN THE MANNER IN WHICH THE KUWAIT MEETING HAD ENDED?"

"HOW COULD THE ARAB OIL MINISTERS HAVE JUSTIFIED ANY OTHER DECISION TO THEIR OWN PUBLIC OPINION?"

"YET, IN SPITE OF ALL THAT WE HAVE NOT, AS YOU KNOW, THREATENED TO BOYCOTT THE GENEVA CONFERENCE OR TO DISCONTINUE EXERTING SERIOUS EFFORTS FROM OUR PART TO BRING ABOUT A JUST AND PEACEFUL SOLUTION."

"MOREOVER, PRESIDENT SADAT, WITH ALL THE RESTRAINT IN HIS POWER, STARTED TO TAKE UP NECESSARY CONTACTS TO CONSIDER POSSIBILITIES RELATED TO THE DECISIONS TAKEN IN KUWAIT ON DECEMBER 25, 1973."

"WITH WARM PERSONAL REGARDS

"ISMAIL FAHMI"

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